STANDING COMMITTEE ON INDUSTRY
COMITÉ PERMANENT DE L'INDUSTRIE
EVIDENCE
[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]
Wednesday, December 2, 1998
• 1532
[English]
The Chair (Ms. Susan Whelan (Essex, Lib.)): The
chair calls the meeting to order pursuant to an order
of reference of the House dated Tuesday, November 3,
1998, consideration of Bill C-54, an act to support and
promote electronic commerce by protecting personal
information that is collected, used or disclosed in
certain circumstances, by providing for the use of
electronic means to communicate or record information
or transactions, and by amending the Canada Evidence
Act, the Statutory Instruments Act, and the Statute
Revision Act.
I am very pleased to welcome the Department of
Industry back again today. I apologize that we didn't
get to them yesterday; however, we did have a very good
discussion with the minister.
I'm going to turn
it over to Michelle d'Auray for some opening comments.
It was my understanding that we'll stick with the
privacy issue, and we will try to separate the bill into
two sections.
Ms. Michelle d'Auray (Executive Director,
Electronic Commerce Task Force, Department of
Industry): Thank you, Madam Chair.
With me today are Ms. Helen McDonald,
the director
general of the policy development group of the task
force on electronic commerce, the section of the task
force that is responsible for the development of the
privacy legislation; Ms. Stephanie Perrin, who is
the director of privacy policy for the department with
the task force; and Ms. Heather Black, who is with
Industry Canada via the Department of Justice, advising
us on the privacy provisions of the legislation.
We also have experts with us if
questions on the electronic documents component of the
legislation arise during the course of this
discussion. We're very pleased to be here today and
to be able to answer any questions the committee may
have.
[Translation]
We are pleased to be here today to answer your questions. I
will make a very brief introduction.
[English]
since the minister
covered most of the general overview points
of the bill yesterday.
Generally speaking, the goals of information privacy
policies are to establish responsibility; to identify
purposes at the time of collection of information; to
limit collection to those purposes identified; to limit
use and disclosure; to obtain consent for other
purposes; to oblige data quality; to oblige data
security; to allow individual access and correction; to
allow individual redress; and to establish an oversight
responsibility. These principles generally appear in
any legislation that has been established in the world,
and they are generally based on the 1980 OECD
guidelines for privacy protection.
• 1535
The forces that are at work in bringing privacy issues
to the agenda are implications of the patchwork system
that we have in Canada. With the exception of the
province of Quebec, which has legislation on privacy in
the private sector, we have very spotty regulation. As
the minister indicated yesterday, there is a need to
establish confidence in electronic commerce on the
information highway. In some instances,
there is an eroding distinction between the public and
private sectors in regard to the treatment and
collection of information, and there are some growing
implications internationally for trade and other issues
with regard to privacy and data transfers.
The arguments for legislation in Canada are fairly
important. We need to provide some consistent rules of
the road. We need to establish an impartial “traffic
cop” or oversight mechanism. We need to
be able to bring under legislation those known as the
free riders, or those who do not conform to
self-regulatory codes. And we need to satisfy, in many
respects, international data protection standards.
This legislation, Bill C-54, does these things by
embedding into law the Canadian Standards Association
model code for privacy protection. The bill
provides an oversight mechanism through the federal
Privacy Commissioner, with a fairly easy recourse, and
an ultimate recourse, to the federal court.
I will stop at that, and leave it open to questions
from the committee.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Ms. d'Auray.
I'm going to ask members if they have questions. I'm
assuming some may have some technical questions, while
others may not have any at this time. We will have the
opportunity to have people from the department back on
this again if need be, as well as when we deal with the
bill some more in February again.
That being said, Mr. Pankiw, would you prefer that I
begin with Madame Lalonde?
Mr. Jim Pankiw (Saskatoon—Humboldt, Ref.): Yes.
[Translation]
The Chair: Ms. Lalonde, do you have any questions?
Ms. Francine Lalonde (Mercier, BQ): I would expect that
Ms. d'Auray would give us a more extensive outline of the Act
itself; her failure to do so is quite surprising, since it must be
the foundation of the rights for all citizens.
The meaning of the law should be found amidst a series of
conditions, which the law would unify by creating obligations.
Frankly, I feel that it takes more than a law course to find out
what the law and the obligations are when reading the standard and
the Act itself. Thus there is a good deal of confusion, and I can
quote an attorney who works for a consumer association in Quebec
and who said to the newspaper Le Devoir that after a briefing with
departmental officials, there were 40 people with 60 different
interpretations. That will be my first question.
Ms. Michelle d'Auray: Thank you. The question of the standard
is interesting. We decided to incorporate the Canadian standard in
the Act in order to make it possible to use a standard already
known by consumers and businesses in the private sector, and by
governments. The standard is an integral part of the Act and it
sets out obligations with which businesses must comply.
By attaching the standard, it can be used for audit purposes.
It can also be used internationally to make an assessment and
oblige companies dealing with Canadian businesses to comply.
Sometimes it is quite difficult to make companies comply with laws
in other countries. Thus the Act contains a standard whereby
international comparisons may be made.
The Act is a unit from the first part to the appendix, but the
obligations are clearly set up in the standard itself, which has
the force of law.
• 1540
Ms. Francine Lalonde: Allow me, madam, to differ strongly with
you. You say that the obligations—and I would add the rights—are
clearly included in the standard itself; that is not so. When you
look at the provisions of appendix 1, which is called Chapter 4 or
Article 4, you see that there are so many verbs in the conditional
that they have to be explained by subsections (1), (2) and (3) in
section 7.
I repeat, it is impossible for businesses to know what their
precise obligations are. I'm not concerned too much about the large
companies; they have their own attorneys and all kinds of
resources. However, the small and medium-sized businesses, which
are in the vast majority, would not know what direction to take.
I'm thinking mainly of the common people. You say that consumers
are familiar with the national standard— Probably a few members
of consumer associations know it, but apart from them, the national
standard is not generally known. Thus I must differ with you
totally in this regard.
Let me get back to the right of recourse. In the experience
gained through the application of the Quebec law—
The Chair: This is your last question, please, Ms. Lalonde.
Ms. Francine Lalonde: Not in the whole procedure, I'm sure,
madam. However, I will be good, as usual. I'm waiting for you to
smile after the interpretation.
The Chair: This is your last question, please.
Ms. Francine Lalonde: I was saying that in Quebec, the
effectiveness of the law—because it has been effective, after four
years of implementation, even though the companies balked at
first—is tied in with the individual's right to have recourse
rapidly and free of charge.
In the federal Act, if I understand correctly concerning the
right of recourse, when problems of personal information arise,
section 15 refers to section 8 of the national standard, which says
that the person must first try to come to terms with the company.
Failing this, he or she can approach the commissioner, who can then
make an investigation. A report and recommendation are made, and if
the company does not comply, the person must after a certain period
of time apply to the Federal Court. Would this not discourage
people, on the one hand, and on the other hand, fail to give
encouragement to companies to apply what might appear to them to be
the spirit of this Act? We must bear in mind that there are
companies whose intentions are good, and there are others. The
government must be on the side of the ordinary person and the
consumer.
Ms. Michelle d'Auray: I might add one more thing concerning
standards. For SMEs, the requirements are quite clearly set forth.
The Commissioner, through his or her public education powers, might
produce very simple documents indicating the 10 steps one must
follow to comply with the law. The language in the standards is
quite clear and is written very simply. The obligations are set out
and have force of law. The other elements, the recommendations, are
there to give the companies suggestions on how to conform to the
requirements.
As for the right of recourse and how to exercise it, the
person may go directly to the Commissioner.
Ms. Francine Lalonde: Not in every case, if I understand the
Act.
Ms. Michelle d'Auray: The person may approach the
Commissioner. Normally, when a person realizes that there is a
problem, it's because he or she has tried to obtain information
from a given company. That's usually how you find out that a
problem exists. It can then be brought before the Commissioner, who
may on his own initiate audits and bring cases directly to court.
We felt that because of his public education power and his
power to make certain terms and conditions public, it would be
better to give the Commissioner these powers and combine them with
powers to audit, rather than give him powers to decree, and leave
this up to the courts.
• 1545
[English]
The Chair: Thank you.
Mr. Lastewka, please.
Mr. Walt Lastewka (St. Catharines, Lib.): Thank
you, Madam Chair.
I wonder if you could explain this. We've had some
discussions already about the overlap of provincial law
and federal law. I realize Quebec is the only one that
has a provincial law at the present time. Could you
explain the procedure of how the provinces—I think
it's under clause 25—if they've enacted
portions of the Privacy Act, will be exempt
from federal law? Also, what about where there are
federal organizations or dealings in provinces that
will have to fall under the federal law as they can't
fall under the provincial law? Would you give us some
examples?
Ms. Michelle d'Auray: The bill provides for the
coverage, in the first three years, of federally
regulated industries, such as banks, communications
companies, cable companies, telecommunications
companies, and phone companies, as well as
interprovincial transportation, such as airlines. It
also covers international and interprovincial trade in
information.
Three years
after the coming into force of the legislation, where
provinces have acted, the government may exempt from
coverage those provincially regulated industries.
It's because the province has acted. Otherwise, the bill
will apply to those provincially regulated industries
in terms of their commercial activities in the trade of
information.
The process really is based on whether or not a
province legislates and whether the legislation is
substantially similar to the federal legislation. So
when there is a difference, a province can
extend its scope in many instances. Provinces may
choose to go beyond the coverage of provincially
regulated industries to deal with municipalities or
municipal issues. They would also have to deal with
the employees of provincially regulated companies,
because under federal jurisdiction, we cannot deal with
privacy issues related to provincial employees or
employees of provincial companies.
In essence, if a province like Nova Scotia decides not
to legislate, then federal legislation will apply three
years after the bill comes into force to those
provincially regulated companies. If Nova Scotia does
decide to act, then the companies under its
jurisdiction will be covered by provincial law, and
the federally regulated companies will covered by the
federal law.
Mr. Walt Lastewka: If Nova Scotia decides to act,
how is the decision made that their law covers everything
that's in the federal law? What's the process?
Ms. Michelle d'Auray: The process is essentially
to make sure there's an approach to harmonization.
There's a group set up
to work with provincial administrations to make sure
that if they develop legislation, there's an
understanding of how to best harmonize that.
In terms of what's defined as a provincially regulated
commercial activity, it's defined in relation to the
federal jurisdiction, federally regulated companies.
So it's that which is not essentially covered by a
federal works business or undertaking.
Mr. Walt Lastewka: What discussions did you have
with the provinces and the Privacy Commissioner prior
to the bill being tabled?
Ms. Michelle d'Auray: In terms of the provinces,
discussions on privacy issues started in the summer of
1996. They were part of the federal-provincial
information highway ministers meeting in fall 1996.
I believe it was in September in Winnipeg.
The discussions then proceeded further over the next
couple of years, leading up to the declaration of the
information highway ministers in June 1998 that
privacy protection was important and that working
toward the Canadian Standards Association's
model code was seen as a baseline element.
• 1550
So we have been in discussion on the
intent of the federal government to legislate since
about the summer of 1996.
Mr. Walt Lastewka: Were all provinces involved?
Ms. Michelle d'Auray: Yes, they were all involved in
the discussions.
Mr. Walt Lastewka: What about the Privacy
Commissioner?
The Chair: Mr. Lastewka, this is your last
question, please.
Ms. Michelle d'Auray: The Privacy Commissioner, in
a number of his reports, has been calling for
legislation in the private sector for some time. We
issued a discussion paper on which he commented as
well. So there have been some discussions with the
Privacy Commissioner at that level.
I also forgot to mention we had a public
consultation paper that was issued in January 1998 on
the best means by which to ensure protection, the
federal government's wish to legislate, and what kind of
legislation should be developed.
Mr. Walt Lastewka: Thank you, Madam Chair.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Lastewka.
Mr. Jones, please. You have no questions?
[Translation]
Ms. Lalonde, do you have another question?
Ms. Francine Lalonde: Yes. You said, madam, that there was
consultation. There was the beginnings of such a process, but it
was abruptly interrupted by the tabling of the Minister's bill. One
week before tabling his bill, the Minister sent a previous proposal
to the provinces. But there was a much more comprehensive procedure
among the various provinces, one in which Quebec was pleased to
participate, but it ended abruptly.
I asked the Minister the question yesterday. One of the
proposals in circulation would, in light of the constitutional
interpretation of its jurisdiction, give the federal government a
residual role, since the provinces would have laws coordinated to
protect the rights. The Minister replied that he would never have
accepted such a proposal. I don't have the blues; I tried to get
them, but they aren't ready yet. But my understanding was that he
never would have agreed to the federal government's having residual
power.
Do you realize that Quebeckers currently enjoy rights that
they would lose simply by having this bill passed? I hope that
before it is passed, we will be able to convince you to take
another direction.
I am thinking of the Air Canada employee who asked repeatedly
to see her file. When she appealed to the Quebec commission, it
wished to make a ruling. The company objected. They went to the
Superior Court. In a recent judgment, they said that as long as
there was no federal law, Quebec law would apply. So at this time,
the person in question has a right.
In your bill she does not have that right. So the company
refused. There was mediation, and the company refused to give the
information. With your bill, she might not have access either.
Under Quebec law she can benefit from a mediation process, but not
under yours.
That is one example. A number of others could be given. It is
not an abstract problem, but a very concrete one.
Ms. Michelle d'Auray: In the case you refer to, I believe that
the question is being appealed before the Quebec Superior Court.
Ms. Francine Lalonde: A ruling has been made, namely to the
effect that as long as there's no federal statute, the Commissioner
has jurisdiction.
The Chair: madam Lalonde, madam Lalonde.
Ms. Francine Lalonde: You can just say madam.
[English]
The Chair: Madam Lalonde, when the witness is
answering, I would prefer if you wouldn't interject.
This has happened several times already today.
You've spoken; now let them reply.
[Translation]
Ms. Francine Lalonde: madam Chair, I respect your right to sit
in the chair. I will try to restrain myself. Even though you find
me impertinent, my attitude is not unparliamentary. Thank you. But
I will try to restrain myself.
[English]
The Chair: I didn't suggest it was
unparliamentary. I suggested that once you've spoken,
it's time for the witness. Several times you've made
comments while they were speaking, and it's
inappropriate.
Madam d'Auray.
[Translation]
Ms. Francine Lalonde: Thank you.
Ms. Michelle d'Auray: As you indicated, the federal Act
completes the—
Ms. Francine Lalonde: —
[Editor's Note: Inaudible]
The Chair: madam Lalonde, please.
Ms. d'Auray.
• 1555
Ms. Michelle d'Auray: The federal Act completes the Quebec
Act. There are areas of federal jurisdiction in which the federal
law applies because the federal government has the right of control
over companies or businesses under federal jurisdiction. So we will
be completing the Quebec legislation on a number of levels, in
particular the interprovincial and international levels.
As the minister said yesterday, because Quebec is the only
province to legislate in this matter, when the federal law is
passed, the people of Quebec will have the most comprehensive
protection in Canada. They will be protected at both the federal
and provincial levels.
[English]
The Chair: Thank you, Madam Lalonde.
Mr. Murray, please.
Mr. Ian Murray (Lanark—Carleton, Lib.): Thank
you, Madam Chair. I'd like to ask a question on clause
7 regarding the protection of personal information. It
states that “an organization may collect personal
information without the knowledge or consent of the
individual only if”, and it gives a number of
different circumstances. Paragraph 7(1)(c) says “the
collection is solely for journalistic, artistic or
literary purposes”. Can you tell me why a journalist
should be allowed to collect personal information
without somebody's consent, or am I misreading this
somehow?
Ms. Michelle d'Auray: The collection is
essentially deemed to be for publication of an article
or a media-related activity. It is to cover activities
that in Canada are recognized, let's say for
investigative journalism or for the purpose of
publishing a novel or a play. But it is to collect.
If the issue then is one of libel or other kinds of
disclosures, there are other laws that will kick in to
protect the individual. Given the practice of
journalism and of media in Canada, it was deemed to be
a more effective way of allowing for the publication of
information in the public interest, and then leaving it
to the individual for recourse under traditional other
recourse if there was misuse, wrongful publication, or
publication of wrongful information.
Mr. Ian Murray: Doesn't it seem rather broad? I
get the impression this could be used as a defence by
journalists. It includes journalistic, artistic or
literary purposes. I'm not clear how it's necessary to
have personal information on somebody for artistic or
literary purposes, unless it's a biography of that
person on the Internet and somebody is looking up
information about them.
We're talking here about personal information; we're
not talking about publicly known biographical
information that would be out there regardless. The
kind of personal information we're concerned about, by
its very nature, would have to be financial or other
information we don't want other people to have access
to. So I really don't understand why journalists
should have access to this kind of information. This
seems very broad and eliminates a great deal of
protection just in that one clause.
Ms. Michelle d'Auray: A journalist obviously can
request information from an institution or an
organization on an individual, but again, the law
provides a protection for the individual that the
information is not to be disclosed without that
individual's consent. So how a journalist obtains
information may therefore be an issue, or whether or
not that information is freely given may be an issue.
Then the individual can have recourse if the
information was given and it should not have been given
by an institution or a company. So there are checks
and balances throughout the legislation.
We also have to provide for the charter right of free
speech, so it is a balancing act at that level as well.
If there is information that is inaccurate, the
individual also has recourse through libel and other
means. But we need to create a balance. It's not just
on the Internet; it also applies to any form of
artistic or journalistic activity—paper, Internet or
otherwise.
Mr. Ian Murray: Thanks.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Murray.
I want to thank the department for being with us this
afternoon. I'm sure over the course of the hearings
we'll be asking you questions from time to time. I am
sure you'll be monitoring them. I appreciate you
coming back today.
• 1600
Our next witness, Mr. Phillips, is now here, so I'm
going to ask our witnesses to trade places.
Ms. Michelle d'Auray: Thank you.
The Chair: We're pleased to
welcome Mr. Bruce Phillips, the Privacy Commissioner of
Canada, here today. Everyone should have in front of
them a copy of the presentation by Mr. Phillips.
I understand Mr. Phillips may have some opening
comments that are different from the presentation in
front of us, but we want to hear whatever opening
comments you have, Mr. Phillips. I'll turn it over to
you, if you'd like to begin.
Mr. Bruce Phillips (Privacy Commissioner of
Canada): Thank
you very much, Madam Chair and members of this
committee, for asking me to come along to discuss this
bill.
Before I begin, I'd just like to introduce the people
who are with me. Holly Harris is our general counsel
and Julien Delisle is our executive director. I
suspect that during the course of the questioning you
may have a few things you'd like to ask them, as well
as me.
The piece of paper you have in front of you
constitutes our formal submission to this committee. It
contains, toward the end of the outline, those things we
feel need or could use substantial improvement by way
of amendment.
What I'm going to say to you now is rather more
informal. I would like, first of all, before I begin
my remarks, to put one thing on the record. I support
and my office supports this bill. It is, in my
opinion, long overdue. It fills a necessary gap in the
protection of data in the Canadian community. It
recognizes the necessity to establish legal privacy
rights for citizens of this country, no matter where
they live or in what particular activity they are
engaged. It puts Canada close to the same level of
privacy recognition and data protection that now exists
in almost all of western industrialized Europe and
various other jurisdictions. It puts us ahead of the
game with the United States.
It is not a perfect bill. I cannot recall in my own
experience, in one capacity or another, ever seeing
what could be described as a perfect bill. But it goes
a long way toward doing what has to be done.
In the course of your deliberations, doubtless various
suggestions will occur to you for its improvement. Some
have occurred to us already, and they're in our formal
submission. But I want to make it clear now that I
would be very sorry to see this bill fail because of
what I consider to be minor deficiencies.
It recognizes the basic principle that people have a
right to some control over their personal information,
no matter where it's being used in the Canadian
community. That is the first and most important
principle of good privacy protection. It embodies the
notion of consent for usage. It embodies the notion of
transparency in its usage. It embodies the notion of
knowledge of things that are being done with people's
personal information. It's a good bill in that respect.
• 1605
It gives an adequate oversight
responsibility so that people have a place to go if
they have a complaint. It allows for a court
adjudication if no other solution is possible. It
establishes by way of dispute resolution an
ombuds-office as opposed to an order-making office. We may
get around to discussing that later, but the ombuds-office
is specifically what my office suggested would
be appropriate in these circumstances, and I'm glad to
see it reflected in this bill. We can come to that
later.
Now, if you would give me just a few moments of your
time, I'd like to impose upon this committee, because
this is the first time I have appeared before the
industry committee—normally, I make my two bits' worth
before the justice committee—to talk about privacy as
a concept and what has gotten us to where we are today.
In our society we all tend to take privacy a bit for
granted, and we often forget it is a value that is
absolutely at the foundation of so many of the things
we cherish in our lives, things such as the secret ballot;
doctor-patient confidentiality; solicitor-client
privilege; our wiretapping laws; and the old, ancient,
and honoured notion that our homes are our castles.
Those things all stem from the notion that we are
autonomous human beings who are entitled to fence about
us enough protection to decide what it is we want the
world to know about us.
So privacy is not the flavour of the month. Let's get
that clear. It is a bedrock value. Supreme Court
Justice La Forest described it as being the value that is
at the heart of liberty in a modern state.
It's not—as is often argued,
particularly in fora such as this, where you often
become involved in trying to balance rights against the
public good—an individual right that is
enjoyed at the expense of society in a collective
sense, because it goes to the notion of mutual
self-respect. Respecting each other's privacy is an
integral element in the mucilage of a coherent society.
It helps keep us together.
Respecting the boundaries we choose to draw
around us makes the difference between a life of
liberty, autonomy, and dignity, and the
alternative, of course, and, if you care to think about
this in the modern context, the opposite, the
alternative, is a pretty hollow and intimidating kind of
life where we're under a cloud of constant and oppressive
surveillance. We're getting more and more of it
in our lives these days, and we are supinely and
insensately accepting it all. It's time we started
taking a hard look at this stuff.
Whether we reveal or conceal the details of our lives
ought to be individual decisions for us to make, not
for others, not for business, and certainly not for the
state, except in limited, specific, and
lawfully established circumstances.
Let's think for a second about the current climate and
the computer existence into which society is moving and
contemplate the power of new information management
systems to mine data, to match data, to manipulate
data, and to collect data. The word
“exponential” is utterly inadequate to describe
it. It has grown
at an explosive rate almost on a daily basis since
things such as the existing Privacy Act were first
passed 15 years ago or thereabouts.
When the Privacy Act was passed, in my office there
were, I think, three word processors. The commissioner
had one, and one staff member had a typewriter. In my
office, thanks to budgetary restraint and good
economical management by my staff, our stuff has never
been state of the art, and the computing, when it was
done at all, was done on mainframes, which were then
largely used simply to store static data.
• 1610
Today, just a few years later, every person in my
office has a personal computer on his or her desk.
The standard desktop computer has 64 megs. That's
more powerful than the old mainframes were. They don't
stand alone any more, and they're not used just for the
retrieval and storage of static data. They're
linked to each other, and they're used for all kinds of
things, such as manipulating and analysing data and transmitting
personal messages back and forth. There are almost
an unlimited number of uses.
The more these machines can do, the more we seek new
and creative uses for them and for the data they
store. We call this function creep.
As one of my staff said, let's paraphrase Kinsella,
the man who wrote the baseball book, and say “If
you build them, we'll think of some new way of using
them”, and that's what's happening to our personal
information. I'm not trying to argue that we can
live in a society without electronic information
processing. We're not Luddites, and we're not
impractical people. The benefits of this in terms of
improving commerce, making greater prosperity, and
creating wealth are self-evident and need no argument
from us.
But there is a quid pro quo here, which I think doesn't
get the attention it deserves. The quid pro quo is to
provide legal protection for individuals whose personal
data can, thanks to the computers, be amassed, mined,
manipulated, disclosed, and unhappily often without
people's knowledge or consent.
You have, in a sense, my sympathy for the complexity and
difficulties of the job facing you, because you're in
an economic, social, and technical environment that few
of your predecessors ever imagined would happen.
As parliamentarians you now have to find a way
through all of this and come up with answers that are
going to be properly respectful of individual rights.
I'm not going to go on too much longer, and I
certainly don't want to sound apocalyptic in this brief
dissertation. There's going to be enough
end-of-the-world stuff as we approach the millennium.
But I would like you to go away from these sessions
with not just a better understanding of the minutiae of
a particular piece of legislation but also of the
context in which it has been brought forward, to
understand a little better the nature of the society
into which we're moving; in other words, to consider
the cumulative impact on our social values of all that
is transpiring and how this particular bill fits into
it. I think it would be very helpful to you.
Up to this point, in the face
of the clamant necessity to recognize the need for
better protection of personal information,
we have in this country nothing much
more than an inadequate patchwork. Most of the
provinces—and if I repeat what other witnesses have
said, please forgive me—have a privacy law of some
sort or another. Only the Province of Quebec—God
bless it, I've said it many times—up to this point has
had the courage, the foresight, and the wisdom to
legislate in the commercial world. Nearly all of these
other statutes cover only public sector activities,
including, until today, the Government of Canada.
Those early data protection statutes, including the
federal Privacy Act, were very good in their time, and
the federal Privacy Act has stood up very well, but to
leave unattended and—I will avoid the use of the word
“regulated”—unwatched, which is a better word, I
think, the activities of the largest accumulators,
users, manipulators, and marketers of personal
information, the commercial world, has, in my opinion,
been an unfortunate oversight, which we should have
dealt with earlier than this. I am glad to see that
this government is acting.
• 1615
It's a very simple thing. At this moment neither I
nor anyone else in this room, except those who are
residents of the province of Quebec, have any right to
know what information business has about you, how they
got it, how they use it, whether it's correct, with
whom they share it, and whether and how they intend to
keep it. If you're all comfortable with that, then
include me out, because I am not. I think that's a
distinctly uncomfortable position. The legal defences
we have up to this point are inadequate, they're
threadbare, they're drafty, and we want something
better to keep ourselves warm at night.
I'm sure other witnesses who have preceded me
have explained the circumstances that have driven the
government to act—of a practical nature, the passage
of the European Union draft directive on the protection
of data and its possible consequences in terms of
transatlantic and international trade; and the onrush of
electronic commerce and the need to get some
ground rules for that.
Those are all good reasons. As a privacy advocate, I
think I can be grateful for the serendipity of all
this, but I insist that the really basic necessity of
this goes well beyond electronic commerce, well beyond
the European draft directive, and has everything to do
with our rights to be free, autonomous citizens
entitled to mutual self-respect and some element of
personal dignity. That's what's involved here. Let's
try never to forget that.
When looking at a bill, we've had a number of
opportunities over time to put submissions both to the
Department of Industry, to the Information Highway
Advisory Council, and so on, about what we thought
was the solution or at least a partial answer to this
problem, and I'm pleased to see that the bill reflects
a number of our propositions.
We offered the following
advice to Industry Canada on what a bill should look
like. Keep it simple. Let's avoid the pitfalls that
some European jurisdictions have followed of requiring
the registration of databases, and so on. Let's not
get into a costly, cumbersome, bureaucratic process.
Let's keep this as clean and efficient as possible.
Let's try to get as level a playing field as
possible. The last thing we need is a situation in
this country in which one province or some important
geographic area is free of any obligations under data
protection, and as a consequence, functions as a data
haven for people who prefer not to respect your rights
and would prefer to put profit ahead of that.
Above all, give the bill a little teeth. Put in a
proper watchdog, watchperson, with reasonable
investigative powers and the right to make known to the
public what his or her view may be of any particular
informational practice.
Put the onus on business. Business should be obliged
to deal with all complaints, in the first instance.
Let's not burden the Office of the Privacy Commissioner
or anybody else with the problem, initially, of
explaining their conduct. That is a relationship
that, if at all possible, ought to be resolved between
the customer and the corporation or the institution.
That's the best way, and if it can be done that way, in
my opinion, it's far better than having every complaint
referred automatically to a privacy commissioner.
But finally, and most importantly—and I speak from a
long experience now as a privacy commissioner—we must
educate both the public and the business world on this
very important topic. We've done a number of surveys,
which indicate pervasive uneasiness in the public at
large about the state of their privacy, but at the same
time a lamentable knowledge of what is really involved,
what business is doing, and so on.
I must say, the same is true of business. What I have
found in discussing this thing with businessmen, which
I have over the years, is that they frequently do
things not out of any malign intent, but simply because
they don't know better. That has certainly been true
in our relations with hundreds and hundreds of federal
bureaucrats in many, many departments. It's not that
they are not willing to do the right thing; frequently
they don't know what the right thing is.
So the educational, research, and public relations
function is exceedingly important, because we're now
getting into a new area.
• 1620
I think that's all I would like to say, except to
make one little pitch here for my own office. This
bill contemplates assigning to the Office of the
Privacy Commissioner the function of being an auditor
and a complaint investigator, and if necessary, on
behalf of aggrieved complainants, a litigator as well.
We will certainly need reasonable resources to do that
job. One of the principal ways of undermining or
undercutting, whether deliberately or by reason of
benign neglect, the proper function of an ombudsman is
simply to starve the poor guy to death. I can
speak with some authority on this subject. We have
been suffering severe fiscal anorexia in my office for
many years, I can tell you that.
I don't want to burden this committee with my tale of
grief. There's not a public servant in the land who
wouldn't be able to bring you a sad story. But when I
tell you that after paying our staff, we have left, for
everything from the telephones, to the cleaner, to the
postage stamps, to the pencils, to the stationery, for
every other activity, including travel and education and
public affairs, you name it, and legal work and
research and everything else, $100,000. That's all we
have left. There's no way anybody can do an adequate
job that way.
We have carried this case repeatedly to the money
people in the government, and I can't say they've turned
a deaf ear, but they weren't listening all that hard for
most of the way. I'm happy to say we are now
getting a better reception than we had been in bygone
years. Perhaps things are a little easier these days.
But we certainly will not be able to do the job that
Parliament is being asked now to assign to us if we
don't get proper dollars.
That's the end of the crying towel exercise.
I have a final word about the bill itself. It has the
essence of good data protection there. There are some
things about it that we think ought to be fixed or altered.
That's in our submission. It is so far ahead of
where we are at the moment, though, that in my opinion
this is a bill that deserves support, and we certainly
support it. Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Phillips, for
your opening comments.
I'm now going to begin with questions. We'll begin
with Madame Lalonde, s'il vous plaît.
[Translation]
Ms. Francine Lalonde: Mr. Phillips, you deserve a good deal of
respect for everything you have done and written. I have read some
of your writings. However, with all due respect, please allow me to
disagree with you on a certain number of things, as I said I would.
Let us begin by acknowledging that this bill is better than
what currently exists. That is clear. You yourself said that there
is nothing. When there is no protection, it's a cause for concern.
However, put yourself in my place. You said that there is
currently protection in Quebec, which you did not qualify. But I am
qualifying it: it is a measure of protection that is greater, with
more effective recourse than what is in this bill—and it's free of
charge. I'm not talking about the constitutional provisions,
because I know that you are not the one to answer these questions.
Once the Act comes into effect, and I hope it never does, because
I would like to see us find another way of protecting Quebeckers
and Canadians, a number of companies, in particular Quebec
companies which tend to respect Quebec law, which is more
stringent, will have to comply with another set of rules, and this
other set of rules will be less stringent.
• 1625
For Quebec, aside from the constitutional question, this means
a weakening of rights. As a person who strongly favours privacy
rights and human rights, you should be on my side.
The question that I have for you is a political question, but
I'm asking it anyway. Do you not feel that it would have been
preferable to continue the process with the provinces, even if the
Minister found that it was somewhat slower, to reach a measure of
coordination, to agree on a foundation and to take Quebec law into
account? Of course, we would not have made it in time for the
ministerial conference on electronic trade, but neither would we
be, anymore, in this type of situation that makes no sense: Quebec
and I are defending rights, and we realize that we are ahead, but
we find ourselves having to defend ourselves, as if we were the
cause of the problem. But the real problem is that Canada has
delayed too long. We cannot agree to have Canada, in catching up,
take away a portion—and a growing portion—of what we have
achieved.
There, I'm asking you the question.
[English]
The Chair: Mr. Phillips, do you have a response
to that?
Mr. Bruce Phillips: Madame Lalonde, the very first
thing I want to say is I'm very glad we agree on a very
basic issue, which is the necessity for adequate privacy
protection, and any differences that may arise have to
do with the quality of the protection being discussed.
You've asked me a question that I'm sure the minister
will have replied to earlier in the day. I was not
here to listen to his testimony—
Ms. Francine Lalonde: No.
Mr. Bruce Phillips: —but I imagine that
would have been a question you would put to him.
I'm not going to debate whether this is better or worse
than Quebec's bill, because I don't think it's all that
relevant to begin with. Certainly, it is different
from Quebec's bill. It is in fact in some respects
better. In some respects it's not as strong.
This bill, and the federal Privacy Act, for example,
give the commissioner the right to conduct audits and
compliance examinations. That, in my opinion, is a
very significant improvement over any bill that doesn't
have it, for example. On the other hand, in the areas
of collection and consent, it could be argued that the
language in the Quebec bill is more precise and a little
stronger. And I won't quarrel with anybody who wants
to view the Quebec bill in its essence as stronger or
weaker. It's certainly different.
But in their essentials and in their main objectives,
they share certain things in common. All of these
privacy statutes do. They reflect to a significant
degree a serious commitment to the basic elements of
fair information practice. This bill does and the
Quebec bill does. The Ontario privacy act does. So
does the Alberta bill and the British Columbia bill,
although there are significant differences in many
areas. For example, all of these other provincial
statutes give their commissioners order powers, and
they, as a consequence, function in the nature of
judges.
The federal Privacy Commissioner functions as an
ombudsman, and I have no power to order anybody to do
anything. I can tell you I'm perfectly happy not
ordering people around, because the great value of the
ombudsman's office is not, first and foremost, to find
blame and tell people what to do, but to find solutions
to problems. I would make this argument,
immodestly perhaps but confidently, that this has been
an enormous success, because there have been literally
hundreds if not thousands of cases that have come
before my office in the eight years or so I've
been there in which we have—thanks to negotiation,
discussion, and careful examination of problems—identified
areas in the federal public service, where our bill
applies, where information management has been
significantly improved to eliminate privacy problems.
• 1630
I can give you examples if you like. One leaps to
mind right away where there was an embarrassing
disclosure of a person's correspondence with a
minister that led to some difficulties for that person.
That was a very unhappy event. The disclosure was
very unfortunate. In the process of investigating the
disclosure, which undeniably occurred, and there was no
question that the Privacy Act had been breached,
the real question in my mind was, how did this happen and
how could this be avoided again?
So merely writing an order saying you've broken the
Privacy Act— what is that going to solve? Much more
important, in my view, is to get into things by
way of compliance auditing and investigation to solve
problems. That has always been the end objective
of any investigation that this office has undertaken
since I've been the commissioner. It's not just enough to
find out whether the act has been or has not been
obeyed, but let's identify the problem and see if we
can fix it.
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Phillips. Merci,
Madame Lalonde.
Mr. Shepherd, please.
Mr. Alex Shepherd (Durham, Lib.): Yes, thank you.
Mr. Phillips, you got into the area of cost, and that's
something that's dear to my heart as well. I'm
going through your 1997-98 annual report. I'm
trying to understand some things, and I'm not trying
to be cute at all.
It talks about 1,826 investigations
you did in the last fiscal year, and I'm
trying to understand these columns. It talks about
well-founded resolve, not well-founded, and so forth. My
interpretation is that there are 638 cases that were
well-founded but never resolved. In other
words, roughly 35% of all cases you thought were well-founded
but nothing happened to them. Is that a fair
assessment?
Mr. Bruce Phillips: That does bear some
explanation. Some cases cannot be resolved because
what has happened is beyond any resolution. For example,
the Privacy Act requires that any request has to be
fulfilled within 30 days, there must be a response
within that time, or
60 days if there is some special circumstance. If
the department fails to respond within 30 days, it is a
well-founded complaint. It cannot be resolved because
you cannot recover the 30 days, so it just becomes a
well-founded complaint. And we don't call it resolved.
We use the term “resolved” usually in cases of
requests for access, for example. If somebody writes in
and asks for information and it's denied by the
department, the complaint comes to us, we open a
discussion with them, and frequently we will find that
the department was wrong in refusing to give
access—that makes it well-founded. If the department
as a consequence of our intervention decides to give
out the information, or a significant portion of it,
then we consider it well-founded and resolved.
Mr. Alex Shepherd: So this is a reflection on
government. Is that what you're saying, that they
haven't resolved 35% of your investigations?
Mr. Bruce Phillips: No, it doesn't mean that
at all. I'm sorry if you misunderstood me. Some
complaints, such as a delayed complaint— you cannot
resolve something that has happened for which there is
no remedy is what I'm saying. If the government
improperly discloses a piece of correspondence that it
should not have made public and thereby breaches
somebody's privacy, it cannot be resolved because the
disclosure has happened and cannot be recovered. Once
a piece of information has been released, it's gone. Do
you see what I'm saying?
Mr. Alex Shepherd: If I take the total of the
1,826 and divide it by your cost—in spite of your only
having $100,000 for overhead expenses, you have a total
budget of over $6 million—that works out to $3,526 per
investigation.
Mr. Bruce Phillips: I'll bring Mr. Delisle in here
in a moment, but let me tell you that $6 million is not
our budget. That is the budget for both the Office of
the Information Commissioner, the Office of the Privacy
Commissioner, and the Office of the Director of
Corporate Management. Ours is one-third of that
total.
Secondly, to apply all of our costs simply to the cost
of investigation is to ignore the fact that we're
engaged in a great many activities. We do public
affairs work to the extent possible. The commissioner
gives on average anywhere between two dozen and 50
speeches a year—that involves a travel budget. Our
investigators have to travel around the country. We
have to conduct, within the limits of very scant
dollars, some policy research work,
because one of the most important functions in
the operation of an office such as mine—which is an
office of Parliament; you are the people who employ
me—is to be in a position to give Parliament pertinent
and informed advice on a very wide range of privacy
matters.
• 1635
For example, over the years, we have printed
and published some of the world's leading pieces of
commentary on very important issues such as DNA
sampling, drug testing, and biomedical research. Those
items have emerged from our office with no mandated
budget to do the work, but simply because we scraped
together some paper clips, rubber bands, and so on.
They have become standard reference works in the
privacy community around the world. We have to
do all those things. And only half the staff—15
out of the 35 people—are actually complaint
investigators.
Mr. Alex Shepherd: I wasn't being critical. I was
just trying to understand matters, and you're helping
me immensely.
I have one final question.
The Chair: Mr. Shepherd,
just before you get to that,
I think Mr. Delisle was going to comment as well.
Mr. Julien Delisle (Executive Director, Office of
the Privacy Commissioner of Canada): No, I think the
commissioner elegantly dealt with that.
The Chair: Okay, fine then.
Mr. Shepherd, this is your last question.
Mr. Alex Shepherd: The final point would be
whether or not you
have taken any time to consider how
much it's going to cost to administer this act.
Mr. Bruce Phillips: We have, and I will invite Mr.
Delisle to deal with that.
Go ahead, Julien.
Mr. Julien Delisle: We were consulted by the
Department of Industry shortly before this matter went
to cabinet. Of course, we hadn't had the benefit of
seeing draft legislation. At that time, we weren't aware
of the trade and commerce provisions.
We did provide some numbers based on an exploration of
budgets of the Human Rights Commission and others
with a similar mandate, such as the Commissioner of
Official Languages and the Commission d'accès à
l'information du Québec, which also has a
private sector mandate. Based on those explorations,
we looked at about a 50% increase over our existing
budget. That was the number we put forward at that
time. Again, however, we didn't have the knowledge of
the bill. We had not seen the cabinet document, so we
did the best we could.
I can't tell you with any great degree of certainty
how we'll fare with what's being proposed. What we
will do in the near future is conduct an in-depth
feasibility study, and then we'd be glad to provide the
committee with the results of that work.
The Chair: We would welcome that, Mr. Delisle.
Thank you very much, Mr. Shepherd.
Mr. Jones.
Mr. Jim Jones (Markham, PC): Mr. Phillips,
what portion of this
act is the Privacy Commissioner responsible for?
Mr. Bruce Phillips: Part 1 of the act, which deals
with data protection.
Mr. Jim Jones: Are you assuming part 2, too?
Mr. Bruce Phillips: No. Except for the fact that
we're very interested in the subject, that is not a
matter that generally comes under our jurisdiction. It
does only to the extent that information moved
electronically will be covered by the statute, the same
as any other information.
Mr. Jim Jones: You're guesstimating that the
administration of this act is going to increase your
budget by 50%. What's new in this versus what you do
today in terms of what you're taking jurisdiction over?
Mr. Bruce Phillips: It gives the Office of the
Privacy Commissioner the function of investigating
complaints from citizens, Canadians, having to do with
the management of their personal information by the
private sector. It gives us the responsibility of
conducting compliance audits in business—a complex
exercise that could be quite expensive. It gives us
the duty to educate and inform the Canadian public;
there is a specific direction in this bill to conduct
public education activities. And it gives us a duty to
conduct research where necessary, in order to keep us
competent.
The last two or three items I mentioned are not
included in the current federal Privacy Act,
although they were recommended by a previous Commons
committee as recently as 1987. These are the proper
activities of any well-functioning office of privacy
oversight, simply because we have to come in and talk to
committees such as this and we have to be in a
position to be able to offer some reasonably informed
observations.
By way of guidance, sir, the present complement of my
office is about 38 persons tops at any time, plus or
minus one or two, depending on resignations,
retirements, and those kinds of things.
About half that number, 15 or 16, are actually
involved in the work of investigating complaints, of
which we handle an average of about 2,000 a year.
There are a few supervisory people associated with that
investigating, and there is a director of complaints,
who has a couple of assistants. The balance of the
staff are myself and some research people, an executive
director, a small legal office—odds and sods, if you
want to put it that way. So about half of what we do
is complaint investigation.
• 1640
There is no element of the operation of the Office of
the Privacy Commissioner that can be easily disposed
of. Investigators investigating a privacy complaint in
a government department will come back and say,
here are the facts. They suggest to me that the reason
the person didn't get the access to this information
that he or she should have had is that they don't
understand the Privacy Act in the department in
question. We then have to follow that up by going over
to that department in order to sit down and discuss it
because they all need a little education on the
subject.
Alternatively, an investigator will come back with a
case that may indicate a very serious systemic problem.
A department may be collecting a whole lot of
information that it ought not to be collecting. Or it
may be extraordinarily careless in its management of
documents, and those documents are not kept in a
sufficiently confidential and secure manner by which
improper disclosures can be avoided. The example I
drew to your attention earlier was one such situation.
When we got into looking at why this disclosure
occurred, we found a lot of problems with what you
would think would be a simple thing: the way mail was
being handled. Far too many people had access to what
really ought to have been documents with very limited
circulation. We helped to fix that problem.
So you can't ask why we don't just investigate
complaints. If you did, you would lose a great
deal of the value of conducting the investigation in
the first place.
I don't know that I can tell you much more than that
about the way the place works.
Mr. Jim Jones: One of the things that I thought
about was the idea that this bill should have been
broken into two pieces. Shouldn't there just have been
a bill on privacy, with another bill on e-commerce and
electronic documents?
Mr. Bruce Phillips: I think that's a
reasonable observation, sir. Really, though, it's a
question the department should answer. As I look
at it, part 2 of the bill doesn't have a whole lot to
do with my function. I assume they put them together for
the sake of convenience, because they felt these things
were associated subjects at least in a broad contextual
way and that it would be easier to move them all
together.
Mr. Jim Jones: Yes, but privacy is not necessarily
just the electronic use of information.
Mr. Bruce Phillips: That is so.
Mr. Jim Jones: It could be paper that—
Mr. Bruce Phillips: You're quite right,
absolutely. And I'm happy to say this statute applies
to a lot more than just electronic commerce. We have
made no detailed analysis of this, and I'm not
competent to discuss that part of the bill in any
detail. I am happy to say, though, that there was no
attempt either to limit my side or to exclude
electronic commerce from my side.
I don't know that I can give
you a better answer than that. As far as I'm
concerned, I would have been perfectly happy just
having this one bill before you. But if the
government, in its wisdom, decided to bring it
together, you'll have to explain it.
Mr. Jim Jones: Is the Quebec bill that Madame
Lalonde keeps talking about just a privacy bill? It
has nothing to do with e-commerce or electronic
documents, right?
Mr. Bruce Phillips: It's not a bill that deals
with the problem of electronic signatures and so on.
This bill is specifically designed to do that. But the
Quebec bill is a privacy bill, and it deals with a lot
more than electronic commerce, as this or any other
self-respecting privacy bill does.
Bill C-54 does not cover the entire field. This is a
data protection bill. That's a more appropriate
description for it. It
covers personal information that's recorded about
individuals. It doesn't cover every area of
information usage, nor does it necessarily
cover—although it may cover them in some
circumstances—such
things as video surveillance, biomedical testing,
drug testing, and that whole field of intrusive privacy
practices that are developing these days.
• 1645
In some ways the bill does touch on them, but
it's not aimed specifically at that. This bill is
principally aimed at information used in business.
Since information used in business constitutes by far
the largest, most massive usage of personal data, then
it's absolutely necessary.
Even if we never
get around to dealing with such things as video
surveillance and so on, which in some respects are
dealt with in other statutes, such as the Criminal Code,
we would still need this.
So people do say, well, it doesn't do this,
it doesn't do that, and it doesn't do the other thing.
I readily agree. It does not do this; it does not
do that. But what it does do is so absolutely
essential for developing a healthy climate for the
continuation of business in the computer age that it
doesn't need to justify itself beyond that. That's what
I'm saying.
The Chair: Thank you.
Thank you very much, Mr. Jones.
Mr. Murray, please.
Mr. Ian Murray: Thank you.
Mr. Phillips, it's good to have you with us this
afternoon.
I'd like to return to the same subject I raised
with the previous witnesses from the department.
That's the question of the protection of personal
information under clause 7, where:
an organization may collect personal information
without the knowledge or consent of the individual if
—and one of those ifs is if—
the collection is solely for
journalistic, artistic or literary purposes.
Now, I know you did address this in the brief you
handed out to us, but I'm essentially zeroing in on the
journalistic aspect. It's still not clear to me why a
journalist should be allowed to collect personal
information on somebody, whether or not they're allowed
to use that in some way.
I mean, the purpose of the privacy legislation is
essentially to prevent anybody from having information
about you that you don't want to have out there.
I can imagine a
situation where journalists over time will have files
on certain individuals. It may be the case that two or
three years down the road there's a breaking story
and they want to look in the files and see what they have on
that person. They use some of this material, even
though this bill does not specifically spell out that they're
allowed to do so.
Then when there's a complaint, they're saying, well,
we're not going to reveal our sources—any excuse they
want—and it's very difficult in the courts to take
them on.
So I'm just interested in whether you and your
colleagues looked at this specifically when you were
looking at this bill initially. Do you have any
thoughts on this? Maybe I'm just being
excessively paranoid about this.
The Chair: Mr. Phillips.
Mr. Bruce Phillips: You'll understand the somewhat
ambiguous position that question puts me in.
Let me be serious. The issue you raise is certainly
capable of an interesting debate. But as an individual
whose biases you may wish to take into account, I feel
that the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which
specifically enshrines a free press in our society, is
good enough for me.
I cannot visualize a circumstance in which a free
press could exist if journalists were always required
to seek consent for collecting personal information.
That is because by its very nature—probably concerning
the individual to whom it related—there would be a
wish to keep secret or confidential a good deal of the
information on which consent would be sought.
So if you want to put it that way, I guess an
exemption for the press is an essential precondition
for maintaining its ability to do its job in a free
environment.
The issue of the ethics of modern journalism, and
whether it does or does not go too far, is perhaps one
of the things that lies at the root of questions such
as the one you have raised.
I have an opinion about that. There are times when
I'm happy I'm not a journalist any more—let me put it
that way. I would argue that the best of Canadian
journalism is better than it's ever been. The worst is
certainly a lot worse than it was before.
There are a number of reasons for that. The
competitive pressures that exist in journalism these
days are far more intense than they were, even as
recently as 15 years ago when I left it. I think
society as a whole has a somewhat meaner, sharper
edge, which is reflected to some extent in what
journalists do.
• 1650
I do not think the solution for that
is to impose impossible restrictions on the ability of
journalists to do their job. There has to be, in my
opinion, a rebirth of the commitment of modern
journalism to its ancient, honoured, ethical basis.
That's missing.
There's too much pack journalism. There's too much
repeating somebody else's story without verification.
There's far too much usage of quotes without
attribution. There is, in some people's view,
excessive interest in the personal minutiae of the
private lives of public people. All those are
legitimate questions about contemporary journalism.
I wouldn't agree that in every circumstance
journalists are at fault. I think we can all take
comfort—and I'm taking a little time with this,
first of all, because it's a subject that is close to
my heart. I was in it for nearly 40 years. I loved it
and sometimes miss it.
But it is so important in our society. We ought to be
arguing not for less journalistic freedom but for more
freedom; for better training of journalists; for
better resources for journalists, because publishers
are notoriously niggardly; and above all, for better
education, particularly in the ethics of good journalism
and what is and what is not permissible.
It's a matter of some interest to me that the editors'
committee of the Canadian Daily Newspaper
Association four years ago decided to abolish altogether
its code of ethics. It did so, I'm sorry to
have to say, on advice from its own legal counsel that
it might expose journalism to liabilities. I didn't
think that spoke very well of their attachment to what
I consider to be a necessary improvement in Canadian
journalism. I think I've probably already said too
much.
The Chair: Last question, Mr. Murray.
Mr. Ian Murray: You mentioned on page 6 of your
brief that perhaps the definition of personal
information could be expanded. The region now
defines personal information as “information about an
identifiable individual that is recorded in any form”.
Would it not be fair to suggest that you'd end up
with a never-ending list of exemptions or definitions
if you didn't have this kind of a broad definition, and
that people could always use that as an excuse, if it
wasn't defined, to get around this definition problem?
Mr. Bruce Phillips: You make a good point, Mr.
Murray. I think there are arguments on both sides. I
simply say that the existing federal Privacy Act does
include a number of examples, 12 or 15 of them I think.
It also includes a few things that it would not
consider as personal information, such as the name,
address, and function of a public servant.
Although it's personal information, it's not
protected by the act. One might argue for the same
sorts of examples being put into this bill regarding
executives of corporations and so on.
This is workable the way it is. I guess the virtue of
putting in a list is it tends to reduce the areas
of argument to some extent.
Perhaps Ms. Harris would
like to say something about that.
Ms. Holly Harris (General Counsel, Office of the
Privacy Commissioner of Canada): I don't have any strong feelings
on the list, frankly. I think what it does is convey
to the layman an idea of what was in the mind of the
legislator at the time. I think it's helpful in that
sense.
Mr. Ian Murray: Thanks very much.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Murray.
[Translation]
Do you have another question, Ms. Lalonde?
• 1655
Ms. Francine Lalonde: Mr. Phillips, to explain why you did not
wish to have power of order or decision-making power, you invoked
your lengthy experience in the public sector.
With all due respect, once again, there is a tremendous
difference between the administration of the law, when you are a
government-appointed commissioner and when you are dealing with
publicly-owned organizations, and having the same role in a
completely different world—I could call it a jungle—of
publicly-owned corporations. In addition, there are organizations
that do not have a commercial purpose and that are not covered by
this Act. In my opinion they should be, as they are in Quebec.
There is a tremendous difference. As I said a moment ago, it's
a whole different ball game. There are companies that will
cooperate, especially big ones, because their reputation is at
stake. However, there are others in which the ordinary person finds
himself alone. As the French minister said at the conference on
electronic commerce, this is where the State must be on the side of
the citizen whose rights are being infringed upon. They should not
have to expect to go to court. It doesn't make sense. It's costly,
takes too much time and will discourage people.
When I talk about being weaker than the Quebec law, I am
talking among other things about the recommending power you have,
a power which in many cases is exercised after the person has had
to go and plead his case before the company.
Once again, with all due respect, are you presuming that your
experience will be the same? On the contrary, should you not have
the power to make a decision?—and here I feel that the consumer
associations will agree with me.
[English]
Mr. Bruce Phillips: I'll try to deal with the
various points you've raised.
With respect to the process itself, it is essentially
the same as the one that exists now. A person who
wishes to obtain personal information from his or her
files in the hands of the government, for example, must
first apply to the department that has the information.
Frequently, a dialogue will ensue between the
department and the requester.
The complaint only comes to us if it cannot be
resolved in the discussions between the requester and
the department. I see no essential difference between
that arrangement and the one that's proposed in this
bill, in which a customer or a client, as the case may
be, has a difference with a corporation or an
enterprise, and the first place they would go with that
complaint is back to the person where the problem
originated. If it can't be resolved there, they come
to me.
With respect to access to the courts, I am satisfied
that access to the courts is adequate in this case. In
any event, unless the attitude of business is far more
confrontational and aggressive than it has been with
the federal bureaucracy—and I would find that
difficult to imagine because bureaucrats can be pretty
tough—I do not see a great many occasions on which
the commissioner would have to resort to the court to
obtain satisfaction. Out of the thousands of cases and
investigations we've had, we found it necessary to go
to court I think on fewer than 10 occasions. We've had
plenty of them settled at the courthouse door, though,
on the steps.
Finally, I don't regard order power here— Let me deal
with this again.
• 1700
When dealing with business, what matters more to a
major corporation? Paying a fine of $5,000, which is
money that they would spill off the end of the coffee
table before they start work in the morning, or having
the Privacy Commissioner issue a public statement
saying this corporation is not respecting the
privacy rights of Canadians?
Which would matter more,
which would have a more telling effect, and which
person is going to be in a better position to make that
statement? A person with order powers, bound by all the
restraints of the legal process, or an independent
ombudsman who can look at this and say this is a
reasonable judgment?
I would argue for the ombudsman
every time, and I think it's even more useful in the
private sector than it has proved, and it has proved very
useful in the public sector, than simply ordering
somebody to do something. Yes, it may provide
satisfaction to the individual complainant, but it
might not solve the problem. That's my opinion.
[Translation]
Ms. Francine Lalonde: Mr. Phillips, when you used your—
The Vice-Chairman (Mr. Eugène Bellemare (Carleton—Gloucester,
Lib.)): This is your last question, Ms. Lalonde.
Ms. Francine Lalonde: Yes, thank you.
One does not prevent the other. When you used your power with
the large companies— I don't think that the problem arises there,
but it could. Take for example Air Canada, which is presently in
court. Air Canada refused to give a health file to an employee.
When your influence is not sufficient, why force someone to go
to court? A number of cases will arise. Remember that you are
getting into the field of data transactions used in marketing.
People are not familiar with these transactions. You are getting
into big business. It is not necessarily a world where everyone is
smiling and shaking hands. Here people need some real help.
I can't help thinking about my experience in health and job
safety. In this area, one would think that companies are
sufficiently concerned about physical integrity to do what the
inspector asks them to do. But you might be very surprised to find
that this isn't the case at all.
A growing number of people are dying on the job, a trend that
has not been seen for some time. In the real world, things are
tough. Electronic commerce is a new world and a real jungle
competitively.
Mr. Bruce Phillips: Ms. Lalonde, you're right.
[English]
I agree with everything you've said, but I am not
persuaded that the problem of oversight must
necessarily be solved by changing the powers that this
bill proposes to put in the hands of the commissioner.
Where business is concerned, the power of the
pen is mighty and ought not to be underestimated. It
is, for that matter, in the field of data protection in
the public sector as well. Ministers and bureaucrats
do not like to have to stand up in the House of Commons
or explain to the press why they have fouled up. It's
far more important, and I think far more effective, than
simply levying a fine or some other form of
disciplinary action. That's my conviction.
But in any case, that argument tends to beg the point
of the great asset of the ombuds approach, which tends
to be focused on understanding the culture of the
business, first of all; educating the business as to
its responsibilities; negotiating the problems;
identifying the weaknesses; seeking solutions. All
those things are part and parcel of the ombuds
approach. They're much more easily achieved when you
embark on these things in a spirit of—
Let us not be naive, and I'm conscious of what you've
said and you are right. Businesses are tough. But
we're not wimps in this office either.
[Translation]
Ms. Francine Lalonde: I hope—
[English]
Mr. Bruce Phillips: My approach to all this is
that we will always go the last mile in an effort to
reach a sensible resolution of a problem, but if people
are going to thumb their nose at me, they're going to
be sorry.
• 1705
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Phillips.
[Translation]
Thank you, Ms. Lalonde.
[English]
Mr. Bruce Phillips: I'll take them to court;
that's all.
The Chair: Thank you.
Mr. Lastewka, please.
Mr. Walt Lastewka: Thank you, Madam Chair.
Mr. Phillips, I really appreciated not only your
opening remarks but your frankness in answering the
questions right to the point, and I think this is what
is important as we move forward on the reviewing of
this total bill.
You mentioned very strongly the importance of
education, and you've left me with the understanding
that once this bill gets approved, your
responsibilities would be very strong to educate, and
when you say education—and I read your paragraphs on
page 6 a number of times—you mean the importance of educating
the individual and all the people involved who could be
affected by this bill.
When you made your remarks concerning the questions
people start to ask, such as whether this bill has enough
teeth and whether this bill puts you in an awkward
position, having to educate, and then trying to
identify the problem and fixing it, you reassured me
that what's in the bill is better to get the end result
and be consistent across the country.
My concern is the level playing field, and I'd like you
to give some more information on that, trying to make
sure that when the provinces are doing their bills,
there has to be some uniformity. I think you mentioned
that what you were trying to avoid is having a weak
area, which everybody would recognize as weak and
that's where they'd do business. Did I understand you
on that?
Mr. Bruce Phillips: Yes, that's the creation of
a data haven in which there is effectively no data
protection of any kind, and businesses such as
unscrupulous telemarketers, people like that, look for
areas like that where they can do business.
On the level playing field issue, one of the objects
of this bill, as I see it—and there are other,
better advocates for this subject than I am, and I only
tell you how I see it—is to harmonize privacy protection
around the country. It's complementary in areas such
as Quebec.
I believe the minister has already
committed himself, by the way, Madame Lalonde, on
several aspects of that.
There are processes that are embedded in the bill that
I think promote the notion of harmonization. The
commissioner is specifically given authority in here to
do business with other commissioners and seek their
advice on how they're handling problems, and so on.
There's a good deal of that, which now transpires
informally, but I'm glad to see it is reflected in
the statute.
It would have to be a very strange
situation indeed where a provincial government
responding to the clear call here to act in its own
jurisdiction would come up with a piece of legislation
that was materially different, which ignored some very
important element of fair information practice. I
can't imagine that happening.
Those provinces that intend to pass companion
legislation will have the assistance of this office,
their own privacy commissioners, and the Uniform Law
Conference of Canada, which has been working on
this very problem for several years now. This is not
something that was just dreamed up yesterday, sir.
There have been ongoing conversations over a number of
years, so already a good deal of work has been
done.
I think one way of looking at it is this. This
bill, the federal Privacy Act that now exists, the
provincial privacy statutes that exist, and in fact
most of the privacy laws around the world, are
reflections of the OECD guidelines that came out
twenty years ago, which set out a code of fair
information practice, and most of these statutes have
reflected that.
• 1710
You're going to get differences. Yes, there may be
some provinces that say we should have order powers.
Madame Lalonde, I do not dispute with you the efficacy
of that approach. I simply say that I'm satisfied with
this one.
If experience should prove me wrong, well, that would
be worth looking at, no doubt. Merely passing a
half-decent privacy act almost, in a sense, guarantees
some reasonable level in the field. You know what I'm
saying?
Any province that passed a bill that didn't provide
for some form of oversight, dispute resolution, or
adequate consent provision, for example, wouldn't be
worth the time of day. It wouldn't be a privacy act.
It would never get passed. It would be laughed out
before it ever got past a parliamentary committee.
Mr. Walt Lastewka: Some people have mentioned that
this bill is a bit complicated. You've been in the
privacy business for a while, and I appreciate your
experience. Do you have any suggestions for possibly
making this bill simpler?
Mr. Bruce Phillips: I was a reporter, not a
lawyer, so I find all bills complicated.
I've heard this observation. It's certainly an
unusual bill in the way it's put together. But I would
defer to Ms. Harris for a more professional answer to
that question.
The Chair: Ms. Harris.
Ms. Holly Harris: What can I say? One
can always criticize the drafting
of others.
I think there probably were a lot of constraints in
terms of drafting this bill. There was a CSA code
already developed. The idea was to try to incorporate
it into the legislation. Aside from extracting
provisions out of the CSA code and putting them into
provisions directly in the bill, I don't really see any
other way it could have been done. But,
unhappily, I do agree it's a bit unwieldy because of
that.
The Chair: Thank you.
Mr. Lastewka, do you have a last question, or are
you—
Mr. Walt Lastewka: I have one more.
Commissioner, I'd like to ask you a question. What do
you see as the single biggest threat to privacy going
on in the world today?
Mr. Bruce Phillips: In the world?
Mr. Walt Lastewka: Let's just say at home, then.
Mr. Bruce Phillips: Ignorance is the biggest
threat. That's why I put so much emphasis on the value
of education. People don't understand what's happening
in the system. As a consequence, they're not being
sufficiently vigilant in their own dealings with
business to ensure that they ask the right questions.
They're not being sufficiently alert to this problem so
as to bring this to the one group who can solve
these things in a legal way: their legislators. So
what's happening here today is, in my opinion, a very
promising, welcome, and necessary attack on the very
problem I've been talking about.
When I say ignorance, there's both episodic and
empirical support for that. Look at my own dealings
with my own associates or friends or what have you.
They ask what I do. I say I'm the Privacy Commissioner
of Canada. Their eyes roll back in their heads and
they start talking about football scores. That's
because they don't know what it is, and they're not at
all certain they want to find out.
We have participated in some fairly comprehensive
public opinion surveys. These make it abundantly clear
that the public is insufficiently informed about these
matters. They know something is going on out there,
but they don't know exactly what. They're worried,
but they're not exactly certain why they should be
worried. They need to know more.
The privacy problem itself yields to an informed
public almost easier than anything else you could think
about. That's because the more people know, the less fear
there is. The more people understand the system, the
less likely they are to be abused by it.
As a consequence, there are fewer complaints that are
likely to wind up on a desk of a privacy commissioner.
• 1715
For instance, we get thousands of calls every year
from people who wonder why they always have to give
their SIN number to the clerk when they want to buy
something, and so on and so forth. Even on that very
simple issue of the SIN number, people really do not
understand. Well, we can help that process.
Businesses, partly for good reasons and partly for no
reason at all except for their own sense of security, ask
all kinds of information from the public that they
would have difficulty defending to a privacy
commissioner, because they don't really need it.
This bill is, I think, going to produce much better
information management processes in business.
They're going to look at the stuff they're collecting
and wonder whether they really need this, what good is
it to them, and why they continue to ask people for
their SIN numbers and so on.
Many businesses are already ahead of the curve. The
banks have been struggling with this now in a fairly
active way for several years, possibly in hopes of
avoiding this very thing. But certainly, they're more
alive to the privacy problem. They've been reviewing
their collection and usage processes more thoroughly in
recent years than how they did it before.
You asked me the question, and ignorance is the
answer.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Lastewka.
[Translation]
Ms. Lalonde, please.
Ms. Francine Lalonde: I am going to discuss one section of
Bill C-54 that Paul-André Comeau, the Quebec Information Access
Commissioner, finds disturbing. He said he was especially disturbed
about subsection 7(3)(f). Under this provision, an organization can
communicate personal information without the consent of the person
involved, if the information
—is communicated for statistical purposes or for erudite study or
research; consent is practically impossible to obtain—
It's difficult to say.
—and the organization informs the Commissioner before conveying
the information;
It doesn't ask for permission; it informs him.
Paul-André Comeau says:
Contrary to Quebec law, authorization does not have to be obtained
from the federal Commissioner before the personal information is
conveyed. Whole files of sometimes very sensitive personal
information can thus be conveyed without any formalities other than
notification of the Commissioner.
Do you share Mr. Comeau's fears?
[English]
The Chair: Mr. Phillips.
Mr. Bruce Phillips: To a certain extent, yes, I
agree. I would like to see this more precisely
drafted. I think you will see that in the paper we
distributed to you.
The provisions are pretty broad. I think the bill
would be improved if the terms and conditions under
which this were to take place were altered. The
security and third-party usages could be more carefully
defined. There could be a process for a more careful
definition of the project and a justification. All of
those things might be considered to be improvements
that could be written into the research aspect of this
bill. In my opinion, yes, this is one area where it
can be improved. I think your point is well taken.
The Chair: Do you have one last question, Ms.
Lalonde?
Mr. Bruce Phillips: Julien just
reminded me that the process of notifying the
commissioner is not without its uses, of course. I
mean, I can initiate a complaint if I feel like it on
any issue. If, in my opinion, the project involved
doesn't have the proper justification, I
can't stop it, but—
[Translation]
Ms. Francine Lalonde: You cannot prevent it from happening?
There's the weakness of your position. You should get angry and
insist on having a greater capacity to intervene. You see things
happen, and you cannot do anything except go before the court
afterwards to seek damages. You should be able to act beforehand,
with information, training and education.
• 1720
[English]
Mr. Bruce Phillips: I'm not certain I should
have that kind of authority. I would be happier with a
bill that more precisely defined the justifications
necessary. I would like a little more guidance in the
bill. I do not wish to be the sole arbiter and judge
of every research project that comes along. I don't
think there's any individual in the world who's
competent to make that decision.
Let the legislators consider this and see whether they
wish to define this more narrowly. If, in my opinion,
it's not a good idea, I'll say so publicly. That
would, in those circumstances, compel the person who's
proposing it to make a public justification. We would
join in a debate in public. Then let's see who would
win that.
I think, Madame Lalonde, that I would invite you
anyway to reflect on the great value of the
commissioner's ability to speak. It has certainly been
the most powerful weapon I've had in eight years. I
don't feel the need for any more than this. I feel quite
confident that when I really feel I'm right about
something, I wouldn't feel that way if I couldn't
develop the facts of the argument to support it and the
case for privacy anywhere and at any time. I'm quite
happy to submit my case to the general judgment of the
public, legislators, and other people.
I do not feel I need the authority to order people to
do things. We've got enough people in this country
pushing other people around and telling them what to
do. That's includes business. I'd like to see less of
that, not more. I would like to see people saying that
I was right about this being a good privacy issue such
that they're going to get on board with me because it's
good for business.
I'm not going to get to that point with a businessman
if I have to tell him to do it my way, otherwise it's
into the pokey with him. I don't believe in that. I
don't believe it's necessary.
Admittedly, it might occasionally be necessary. I
might not stop the thing from happening, but I can
certainly deal with it afterward. I'm willing to
wager, Madame Lalonde, that experience will prove that
in 99% of the cases, we're going to settle the problems
without having to order somebody to do something.
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Phillips.
Mr. Bruce Phillips: If I'm wrong, I'll be the
first person to admit that I was wrong. I'll
certainly be happy to buy you the best dinner in
Ottawa. But that's not saying a whole lot.
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Phillips.
Mr. Bellemare, please.
[Translation]
Mr. Eugène Bellemare: Thank you, Madam Chair.
[English]
Mr. Phillips, I finally get to see you in person.
I've been watching you. The national news in the
Ottawa area is really local news. I'm a local
boy. I heard a great deal about you, read
about you, and saw you on TV.
Since I've got this optic about you in the media, I'd
like to revisit a media event. Take freedom of the
press. You banged that drum heavily today. I think
it's a motherhood issue. In Canada, we pride ourselves
on freedom of the press. You seem to say one should
not touch the media because they should keep on having
that freedom.
I think you admitted—this is my
interpretation, at least—that there's abuse. Is it
illegal? Is it immoral? Is it whatever? You didn't
get into that domain. But you did admit that the worst
of journalism is worse than ever before, and the best
of it is better than at any time before.
Journalists can build up a case against a public
figure. A public figure is either a politician,
clergyman, or business person. It's someone in public
life, let's say, anywhere in any municipality or province.
• 1725
A media person can really build up a public figure. He
or she can also destroy a public figure by association.
Someone could draw a parallel between the President of
Iraq and a public figure just by associating ideas,
never saying this person is actually the President of
Iraq. But the way the article is written, you want to go
and string up the person, because the media has created
a mindset.
They'll talk of a variety of things. It could be the
person's habits, or his or her age. I say age also
because we have a Charter of Rights and Freedoms. I
thought, for example, you could not discriminate
against the age of a person for hiring purposes. In the
case of, let's say, a public figure, suppose a
90-year-old gentleman wanted to run for public office.
Isn't it illegal to start harping on his age?
If this person happens not to be a man, but is a
woman, for example, and if this person is not just a
woman, but someone from the Middle East or the Far
East, and if the people in the community dislike the
person, and everything that is said is true, the case
could be built in such an abusive way that they destroy
this person's chance of becoming either a politician
or let's say, a chair of a caisse populaire—it's the
only place in the banking system where you could get
elected to office. I don't know how you could get
elected—
The Chair: Mr. Bellemare, your question, please.
Mr. Eugène Bellemare: My question is simple; it'll
get a yes or no.
As an authority in privacy and in media, why don't you
come up with an amendment—and you said you had a
pocket full of them—so that the most abusive kind of
journalist, the one who collects data in order to be
malicious, could not do this? Why haven't you come up
with some kind of recommendation or amendment? I'm
talking about the extreme abuse, because you said let
what is good alone because we want to protect our
Canadian liberties.
The Chair: Mr. Phillips, do you have a reply to
that?
Mr. Bruce Phillips: I certainly don't have a yes
or no reply. I hate to do this, Monsieur Bellemare,
by turning the question around, but if you have such an
amendment, I would like to see it—one that would curb
the practice you have without doing irreparable
damage to the general freedoms of the press, one that
would also stand up to the charter. This is a
very difficult—
Mr. Eugène Bellemare: But you're the authority.
I'm just a person representing the general public, the
people who get abused by certain sectors of the media
on occasion. You're the one with the experience, the
authority, and the knowledge, not me.
Mr. Bruce Phillips: Well, the first thing I would
say is the press does not operate in a legal vacuum.
There are some fairly decent libel and slander laws
around that—
Mr. Eugène Bellemare: You're hiding behind that.
Mr. Bruce Phillips: No, I'm not. I would say this
about libel and slander laws. They're far too expensive
for the ordinary person to have recourse to them. I
think a solution to that problem is available. I think
the ordinary person, having been blackened by a
resource-rich newspaper chain, or a magazine with deep
pockets, or what have you, can rarely get satisfaction
because they can't afford to accept the legal costs
necessary to undertake the litigation.
In my view, the judicial system and the legal
profession can solve that. Can't they? There are
certainly plenty of cases that, with my lay eye, just
looking at things that I see in the papers, and one
thing or another, seem to me to constitute a pretty
good case for
somebody taking some action.
But it
seldom happens, and public figures generally are
reluctant to do that anyway, because it merely
perpetuates a public discussion about whether the libel
is or is not true. It makes things worse.
• 1730
So, yes, the press does have— Somebody once
said—what was the expression—never attempt to win an
argument with a fellow who's carrying around a 10-tonne
pencil and 6 tonnes of ink. He's likely going to
out-gun you. All of which argues, in my opinion sir,
for a recommitment to basic standards of good
journalism. It's not rocket science.
There are two things involved in news. One is public
interest and one is public importance. When I say
public interest, what I mean is what interests the
public. And that's a great many things, some of which
are not important at all. Let us face it, we're all
fallible human beings and most of us do at least look
at the stuff, even if we think it's terrible when it's
printed and published. It's in human nature.
Journalists know that. It is part of the way of the
world. Newspapers, television stations, and magazines
would be pretty dull places if the only thing they
carried were verbatim reports of the debates of the
House of Commons, the Senate, the local school board,
or what have you—undeniably important though they may
be.
So the aberrant, the unusual, the bizarre—those are
all part of the warp and woof of life, and are of
interest to the journalist.
What I cannot support, and you can't either obviously,
is material that is without any reasonable need to be
transmitted—the publication of material that is
hurtful to people, when it does not serve any useful
purpose. It is difficult enough in journalism. You
frequently must write and publish things that you know
when you do it are going to hurt. To do so without
being persuaded in your mind, as a matter of
conscience, that the public really does have to know
this because it bears directly, for example, on the
qualifications of a person to do an important public
task, to publish it simply because it's interesting and
attractive, knowing it's going to hurt somebody, I
can't support that as an individual. Some journalists
can.
But to me, those are not the major sins of journalism.
To me, journalism would be— Its major sin is
accuracy. There's far too much copycat journalism
going on. Look, I've been on both sides of this fence.
I have worked as an official in government, and I have
to say I was dismayed when I crossed over the bridge to
see the number of times that material I knew was wildly
incorrect was being published, and how deeply it was
resented when any effort was made to correct it.
The press has to have a more vigorous sense of its
accountability. It's got to have more of an attachment
to getting it right. We had a saying when I was a
young reporter that I would like to see printed in
big type in every newsroom in the country: Get it
first. Get it right. But first get it right.
Do you see what I'm saying? Those are the real sins of
journalism and not— Yes, you'll get the occasional
scatological magazine; we have one in this town that
delves into the private lives of people. But that's not
the major problem of journalism. The major problem of
journalism is prioritizing in its mind what is
genuinely useful, important, and interesting for people
in managing their lives, and making sure the stuff is
right. Now it's not easy.
Mr. Eugène Bellemare: Do you want to work on an
amendment?
• 1735
Mr. Bruce Phillips: I don't think I can put all
that in a one-paragraph amendment. I'm sympathetic to
what's been said here, but I don't think you can cure
that by restricting a free press.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Bellemare.
Thank you very much, Mr. Phillips.
Mr. Phillips, I have some questions I may put to you
in writing about your brief. That may be the better
way to get some detailed answers in particular on the
issue of being done by regulation, and what you mean
by formal consultation with the Privacy Commissioner.
However, as we're running out of time and members have
other commitments, I want to thank you very much for
being with us today. Who knows, we may have you back
again before this is done, because we'll be continuing
into the month of February. We appreciate your
comments and we look forward to further discussion.
Mr. Bruce Phillips: Thank you, Ms. Whelan. Thank
you members.
The Chair: Thank you.
The meeting is adjourned.