STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

COMITÉ PERMANENT DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES ET DU COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Tuesday, March 16, 1999

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[English]

The Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham (Toronto Centre—Rosedale, Lib.)): I'd like to call this meeting to order. We're very pleased to have with us Giancarlo Aragona, secretary general of the OSCE.

Members, in your materials there is information about the OSCE, which, as you will recall, has a jurisdiction that, as it says in the literature, stretches “from Vancouver to Vladivostok”. Canada and the United States are both full members of the OSCE. However, its largest preoccupation is with security and co-operation in Europe, particularly in eastern Europe, in dealing with the problems arising from the end of the Soviet Union.

Mr. Aragona is a jurist by background, but has been a practising diplomat for all of his life. Some of us were able to hear him speak last night.

We're very pleased that you are here, sir, on the eve of what we hope will be a successful negotiation in Rambouillet for Kosovo. I understand that you have about ten minutes of presentation. Then we'll open the floor to questions.

Mr. Aragona.

Mr. Giancarlo Aragona (Secretary General, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me say from the outset how delighted I am to have this meeting with your committee. I have been here only 24 or 30 hours, but what I have realized during my meetings here—I come here now from a meeting with the foreign minister and the deputy foreign minister—is the enormous interest Canada lends to the OSCE. In turn, this reflects on the very active contribution your country makes to our activities.

If there is an aspect that I would like to stress in general before briefly touching on some practical problems, it is the conformity, the proximity, between the political and diplomatic culture and the general objectives of the Canadian foreign policy and the objectives of the OSCE. There is a very close proximity.

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We work according to a comprehensive concept of security, which means that the human dimension, democracy-building and ethnic equality are all values at the root of our undertakings. I know that these same values are also at the base of your foreign policy, so this explains this proximity and the fact that your input to the OSCE is extremely important, extremely valuable. Your contributions are very significant.

I will be very brief in my presentation. I saw some of you yesterday at the dinner so I would really like to avoid repeating, for some of you at least, the points I've already made. Let me just, if you agree, give you an outline of our most topical issues. Then I would be very happy to have an exchange focusing on points of more direct interest.

Of course, Kosovo is the most topical question. I realized that this morning at the breakfast at the National Press Club, where I spoke, on this aspect in particular. Concerning the negotiations, the latest point I have from my staff in Vienna is that the Albanians, as you know, have announced their readiness to sign the agreement. This has not yet happened, but they have announced this readiness.

The Serbs tried this morning to also reopen the political package, to say that they still want to discuss the political aspect of the agreement. But as you know, on top of that, there is this fundamental issue of the deployment of a multinational military force to help implement the political agreement, which, so far at least, has been declared unacceptable by the Belgrade authorities. So this is the status of play. Consultations and discussions are going on.

Robin Cook and Hubert Vedrine, the co-chairman of the conference in Paris, have announced that time is running short. There is no formal limit set for a date for the conclusion of this round, but clearly Vedrine and Cook want to stress the point that this cannot last forever and that at the moment each party has to state formally where it stands, the Serbs in particular, for, as I said, the Albanians seem ready to sign. At that point, we shall see what happens.

In this situation, the OSCE, as you know, in the framework of the Rambouillet documents, is due to become the main civil implementation agency of the agreement. All the civilian clauses of the agreement will be implemented with OSCE assistance. We are getting ready to take over this function, which will develop along four main areas: police, democracy, rule of law and elections. We should be ready to do this as soon as an agreement is reached.

If, on the contrary, things do not go in the right direction, that perspective of withdrawing the current mission we have—the KDOM—would become a very serious one, because the security threat to our people would in this case become unacceptable. We would then contemplate their withdrawal. We have a very detailed plan to bring out our people in a matter of hours if the decision is made to withdraw.

We have been in Kosovo since the end of October, when we started to deploy. There is also one point I would like to make to you as members of Parliament of a country that has contributed significant resources to the current phase of the Kosovo mission, to the KDOM. You have pledged 100 people, and a large part of them have been already dispatched to the field. We started to deploy at the end of October.

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One point I would like to make to you is that our presence in Kosovo has made a substantive difference. We are all sure that without our presence the level of violence in Kosovo would have been much, but much, higher. This is a point that I know the public in particular finds difficult to accept, because when you read about the level of violence and the violations of the ceasefire, you wonder what these people are doing there if all this is happening. I think we should also realize that without this international presence the level of violence would have been much higher.

If, as we hope, we are allowed to perform these new tasks, a major effort will be required. We'll have to deploy still in the thousands of mission members, not in large part the same as those who are already there, because the expertise is totally different. I hope we can get enough support from participating states to make this change possible.

That is as far as Kosovo goes, but let me state one point: the OSCE is more than Kosovo. It is more in both political terms and operational terms. It is more in political terms because the OSCE is at the heart of the current debate in European security. When I say European, let me clarify again that I mean a much wider area, including North America, Europe proper and stretching, then, to central Asia, all of the area covered by the former Soviet Union. The OSCE is at the heart of a debate on the future arrangements for security in this vast region.

With the end of the Cold War, we have to rethink how to organize this security. NATO is doing its part of the work by updating strategic concepts and taking in new members. The OSCE is discussing a charter on European security for the 21st century, which should give an outlook on how OSCE sees itself in this complex scenario where several agents, several actors, are playing.

This is a political exercise that is very difficult because, as you understand, there is also a problem of hierarchies among the different institutions operating in this area. There is the problem of the relationship between OSCE and NATO. This is a very complex relationship, as you can easily imagine, because you want to safeguard NATO as the pillar of western security while at the same time making it also a significant contributor to overall stability.

OSCE has a mandate that has to touch somehow with this role. It deals with security and with stability, but the composition is not similar. Of course, Russia is not in NATO, so this complicates the debate. It is an extremely important debate that has been going on for a certain time, and it should receive an impulse now in view of the fact that the next summit will take place in November, 1999. The next OSCE summit will at that point not be concluding the charter, but it will certainly be a moment when a serious assessment should be made of the results achieved.

OSCE is also more in operational terms. We now have 17 field activities, stretching mostly across the Balkans, and then into the Caucasus in central Asia, in the Baltics and in the Ukraine, so we have a very large presence. Even in Russia we are present with an assistance group that deals with the crisis in Chechnya, this area in the north Caucasus. We have a very vast network of field presences.

We operate through a number of institutions: the High Commissioner on National Minorities, the Representative on Freedom of the Media, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, which deals also with elections, with the organized supervision of elections to ensure that they are democratic. Each of these institutions operates in this whole complex cycle, from conflict prevention to crisis management to post-conflict rehabilitation.

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You can see that we are really in the middle of a very serious effort to strengthen our operational capabilities and to find a rightful place in this scenario of the post-Cold War.

One characteristic of this scenario is the fact that, as I've said, there are several institutions operating at the same time, sometimes with similar mandates. We try to open up a collaboration with other institutions. We realize that we cannot and should not overburden ourselves with too many tasks. We have to work together in synergy with other organizations. We do it with NATO, with the Council of Europe, with the European Union and with a number of others such as financial institutions, because economic stability is also an essential part of general efforts to stabilize this vast area—in particular, the countries in transition from communism.

All of this—and this is my concluding remark—requires an enormous effort by the participating states. International organizations are, in a way, empty boxes: they are filled by the resources and the tasks assigned to them by participating states.

So it is important that we continue to enjoy the support of the member countries. One point, I think, should make it easier for member countries to help us, to lend us the support we need, and that is, we are an organization that does not absorb financial resources to maintain an international bureaucracy. The international bureaucracy is really very limited. Our budget is a program budget. It goes to sustain activities. It is a wildly fluctuating budget, because it follows activities that are politically decided. Once they are decided, the necessary resources are attributed to that program.

This in particular, I think, speaking to legislators, is an important element. Your money, the money of the participating states, does not go to feed a large bureaucracy, unlike what happens in several other organizations. It sustains programs, the programs that your countries have approved and want implemented.

I really want to thank Canada again for what it does, and I am sure that with support from Parliament your government will continue to lend us this support. Having met the foreign minister this morning and the minister for corporations yesterday, plus a number of officials in government, I go back to Vienna with what I feel is a convinced message of support from Canada to the OSCE. I'm sure that when I pass on this message to the council in Vienna, all participating states will be gratified by this message of support. In turn, I hope also that the press this morning understood this very clearly: the OSCE owes big thanks to Canada for the support we receive.

With this, Mr. Chairman, I have concluded my opening remarks and am ready to respond to questions. Thank you very much.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary General.

[Translation]

Mr. Sauvageau.

Mr. Benoît Sauvageau (Repentigny, BQ): Mr. Secretary General, it's a pleasure and an honour to welcome you this morning to our committee.

I'd like to ask a short question. Yesterday, there was a one-hour special report on the Kosovo conflict on the Le point television program. The Secretary General was interviewed and spoke of the need to withdraw OSCE observers so that they would not be in danger of being taken hostage. Is the word "observer" the correct term?

Mr. Giancarlo Aragona: "Verifiers" is the term used.

Mr. Benoît Sauvageau: The NATO Secretary General supports this withdrawal of verifiers, whom you briefly mentioned in your presentation a few minutes ago. I'd like you to elaborate on the plan for withdrawing the OSCE verifiers in the coming days, because it was a question of hours or days required to implement it.

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Mr. Giancarlo Aragona: I did not hear exactly how Mr. Solana replied to this question, but I'd like to clarify one point. We would of course make the decision to withdraw our verifiers from Kosovo if the situation required it. We are following developments so as be in a position to make a decision in an appropriate manner should the need arise. Naturally, we hope that things will develop in such a way that our mission, instead of withdrawing, will be able to take on the new duties set out in the Rambouillet agreements.

To come back to the practical side of your question, I can confirm that, if we decided to withdraw the observers, we would be able to move them from Kosovo to Macedonia in the space of a few hours. According to our plan, it is anticipated that eight or nine hours would be required to move them. The plan is complete and was drawn up by experts. We are confident that it can be carried out within the established timeframe.

Of course, all this assumes what we think is also clear, that is, that the parties in the Kosovo conflict realize that it would be a major mistake on their part to impede the withdrawal. We have reasonable grounds to believe that the parties are aware of this.

Naturally, in a situation like the one that exists in Kosovo, there is always an element of uncertainty and unpredictability. It is always very difficult to calculate exactly what the reactions will be in such situations. However, we believe that the parties realize the importance of respecting international verifiers. Furthermore, we should not forget that there's also the NATO extraction force in Macedonia that, if necessary, will be ready to intervene in support of the withdrawal.

Mr. Benoît Sauvageau: My next question concerns your visit here in Canada. When Canada awards you the funds required to carry out the projects decided on by the OSCE, are these funds spent on carrying out the projects—you said "as in other organizations" without specifying any—rather than on a heavy bureaucracy.

For example, when you decide to undertake a project to help Kosovo or Chechnya, and you ask for help from your partners, does the process by which the Canadian government approves it go forward smoothly or are there some problems with the process and procedure when the time comes to meet our obligations?

Mr. Giancarlo Aragona: As far as procedures and the way in which we negotiate Canadian contributions are concerned, no, frankly, there are no major problems.

As a matter of fact, we had a discussion with the Minister yesterday about co-operation and how we could further streamline this mechanism. We even raised the possibility that the OSCE and the Canadian government could sign a memorandum of understanding, which would of course be helpful. I told the Minister that we were prepared to consider this possibility. As for contributions, and especially financial contributions, we are satisfied.

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The area in which mechanisms could perhaps be improved—although I'm aware that there's a problem with the availability of human resources—is the participation of Canadian personnel in our missions. Canada committed itself to a very large contribution to Kosovo in terms of personnel, namely 100 verifiers. That's a high number. Your contribution is one of the largest; you are one of the major contributors to the Kosovo mission. You also assigned Canadians to missions in Bosnia and Estonia. It is clear, however, that if the Canadian government were able to make more personnel available to the OSCE, this would be welcomed because the calibre—and I'm being absolutely honest, it's not at all a question of politeness—of the Canadian people working with the OSCE is really very high. We have always had high-quality Canadian experts in all sectors. In Bosnia, for example, in the area of elections, your experts helped us in a very important way. You make first-rate contributions in all sectors.

Therefore, it is my hope that your government will be able to increase the number of experts that it makes available to the OSCE.

[English]

The Chairman: Mr. Mills.

Mr. Bob Mills (Red Deer, Ref.): Thank you.

Again, welcome. Yesterday I had a number of my questions answered, but if I may, I'll just carry on with a couple of things. I apologize for being late.

First of all, at the breakfast this morning, you mentioned to the media that you would like to see Canada's contribution increased, as you've just stated. I wonder if you could be more specific about what areas and what numbers and what dollars and that sort of thing.

The second thing I wonder about within the OSCE is the pressure of all of the countries. Could you elaborate a little bit more on the kinds of difficulties you have in decision-making? Being in Vienna and observing the interplay amongst your members, I know that... Could you identify the blocs of pressures, if you understand what I'm getting at, so that we could understand the organization just a little bit better? I'd appreciate that. Thank you.

Mr. Giancarlo Aragona: Thank you very much. On contributions for Canada, let me clarify one point. In financial terms, Canada is one of the big contributors. Therefore, all we can say is thanks, and we can express appreciation for the level to which you contribute financially to our activities. As far as financial contributions go, I really can only express thanks.

Where I would encourage Canada to do more, if possible—but I also understand that there are some practical constraints, like finding the people and finding people willing to go to the field and go far away, sometimes to difficult parts of the world—is to second more experts. There has been a growth, but I would encourage this. You have an excellent record in the electoral field and in democracy-building. You have in civil society a number of NGOs and government people committed to developing what we call a good governance system. You also certainly have significant expertise in police training, in democratizing police.

All these areas practically cover the whole spectrum of OSCE traditional activities, and I am sure that Canadian experts, as they have done so far, can really bring to us a significant contribution in these areas. Being aware that you are already a major partner in this field, my appeal is of course an appeal to you to do more if possible.

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To come to the decision-making, it is an interesting point. Maybe I'll pause a moment to give you some ideas on how it works, because it also explains how the organization is structured. As I said last night, the OSCE is a rather peculiar organization. It is, in fact, if we look at it from inside, a conference that has progressively become more structured and now is an organization, but it still has a lot of the characteristics of an intergovernmental forum, so it is rather peculiar. This is also linked to the fact that OSCE is based on political agreements. It has no legal status. It doesn't really make a difference with respect to the operational capabilities, which are not affected by this fact.

This gives you the flavour of how a conference has slowly moved towards a more structured format until it has taken the name “organization”; it has grown as an organization, but at the same time has retained the strong character of an intergovernmental forum. All this translates into some characteristics.

The decision-making is based on consensus. All of the decisions are made by consensus among the participating countries, and this consensus is gathered in the council. But due to the previous conference format, there is a lot of informal negotiation, informal consultation, in parallel or prior to this formal decision-making in the council. You have, at the same time, the formal procedure and the informal procedure then arriving at the same end product when the moment is ripe.

In regard to this problem of the consensus, you know that there is a debate within OSCE about whether we should depart from the consensus in order to arrive at a different form. There is this principle of so-called consensus minus. Consensus minus is a rule according to which, as you know, the country directly involved would be deprived of having a say. In the OSCE it has been applied only once, that is, when Yugoslavia was suspended in 1992. Of course Yugoslavia did not concur with this decision. It was implemented anyway and Yugoslavia was suspended from 1992. That political debate—to depart in a more structured way from the principle of consensus—does not go forward and, in my view, I doubt that it would be acceptable. There is also the idea of consensus minus two, that is, where there are two parties to a crisis they should not be involved.

But all these, frankly, are procedural problems, which I am not sure will bear much result. The truth of the matter, as seen from inside, is that the OSCE decision-making process works. I have never seen a major problem not discussed and decided in a timely way and with effectiveness, with efficiency. I think that in spite of its characteristics as a structured conference, a semi-institutionalized organization, OSCE works, and when we have had to take important decisions we have done it.

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There is an additional element: the financial mechanisms. This is an important point. Until the ministerial meeting in Copenhagen in 1997, the big projects like the Bosnia mission, for instance, were financed on a voluntary base, which means that they were outside the ordinary budget, that there was a special budget that then was financed through voluntary contributions. This system really needed to be corrected, because it implied that there were special envoys of OSCE going around the participating states and even outside... We have some partners like Japan, which has always contributed financially—and also with human resources—to our activities in a very significant way. For Bosnia, we even had a contribution from Saudi Arabia.

We went around asking for money, but now all of that is a thing of the past, because in Copenhagen we decided that there is a special mechanism whereby countries, once a political decision is made, have to automatically contribute to the enactment of this decision. This has helped us to be more effective and faster in implementing whatever we decide to do.

The Chairman: Thank you.

Mr. Assadourian.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian (Brampton Centre, Lib.): Thank you very much.

Mr. Ambassador, in this update on the OSCE, you say that in your geographic span from Vancouver to Vladivostok you have 55 countries. Somehow I find it surprising that you—not only you, your presentation—and the whole OSCE are now focused on Kosovo. I'm not saying you should not, but it's just one question. The way I see it, in that geographic span you have many questions or many conflicts: the occupation of Cyprus, the Kurdish problem in eastern Turkey, the south Lebanon question with Israel—with conflict back and forth since 1982—and Nagorno-Karabakh, just to mention a few.

Why is it that you pick one issue and focus on it and at the same time ignore other issues, like the one in south Lebanon, where last week we had bombing back and forth, a couple of dozen people died and seven or eight Israeli soldiers died? That has been going on since 1974, Kurdish problems for the last 5,000 years and Nagorno-Karabakh since the 1980s.

If you only focus on Kosovo... I'm not saying you're doing the wrong thing. I really think you're doing the right thing. But what is your political measurement such that you decide to focus on the issue? I'm sure you can do some—

The Chairman: There's a war going on.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: A war has been going on in Lebanon since 1982, a war has been going on since 1974 in Cyprus and it has been the same thing in Nagorno-Karabakh since 1990. How do you pick your issues? What criteria are used to pick an issue to get involved in?

The final point is Abdullah Ocalan: what is the OSCE doing about it?

Mr. Giancarlo Aragona: Pardon me?

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: Abdullah Ocalan, the Kurdish leader. What are we doing about it?

Thank you.

Mr. Giancarlo Aragona: Mr. Chairman, yes, in a way, the honourable member is right in saying that the OSCE recently has focused very much on the crisis in former Yugoslavia. Kosovo is the last example, but Bosnia has been a major case.

Certainly this happens because of wars. In Bosnia, there was a war. The Dayton agreement requested that the OSCE implement certain parts of the agreement, and the OSCE acted. In Kosovo, the same thing happened. There was an agreement and we were asked to send a verification mission. If the peace agreement is finalized, we shall perform our other tasks.

So in a way this is due primarily to the urgency and the degree of violence of the crisis with which we have to cope, but I would not agree with you that we neglect other areas of tension.

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Lebanon is outside the OSCE area. It is not part of our area because Lebanon is in the Middle East and the Middle East does not fall under the OSCE area. You mentioned Cyprus. The Cyprus problem has been handled by the United Nations for a very long period and of course you do not want to duplicate efforts. There are special representatives of the secretary-general and there are several for the European Union and others. You do not just involve an organization for the sake of involving it: you do it because it needs some attention.

On Nagorno-Karabakh, in fact, the OSCE is fully involved, in two ways. The Minsk conference, which is the framework for dealing with a Nagorno-Karabakh crisis, takes place within the OSCE framework, so although the OSCE is not immediately involved, there is this forum linked to the OSCE. On top of that, we have an envoy representative who supervises the ceasefire, which luckily is holding. We are fully involved.

I did not want to overburden you with explaining what we do in other areas, but we certainly operate in the Baltics. We are present in the three Baltic states. We are present in Belarus, in Ukraine and in Georgia. By the way, getting back to the Caucasus, we hope to also open missions in Baku and in Yerevan. We are working with the two countries to get their consent and to see how these missions can contribute to the overall development of these two countries to bring them more in line with the democratic and economic standards to which they aspire.

At the moment, Kosovo is—and Bosnia has been—the the focus of a lot of our attention, but I think in all fairness that the OSCE has a much wider horizon and does whatever it can to also cope with other crises.

The Chairman: Mr. Assadourian.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: And Abdullah Ocalan?

Mr. Giancarlo Aragona: With respect to Ocalan, the problem has not been brought to the OSCE, but I'll tell you that last week, for instance, due to a report on the media situation in Turkey from the representatives of freedom of the media, there was a specific mention of this case in the council. So this was also mentioned in the council, but the OSCE is not directly involved in this problem.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: The basic work of the OSCE is the universal protection of member states. Am I right?

Mr. Giancarlo Aragona: Pardon me?

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: The basic principle of the OSCE, with the Helsinki conference, was the protection of human rights—

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp (Beauharnois—Salaberry, BQ): Yes, definitely.

[English]

Mr. Giancarlo Aragona: Yes.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: —so what happens to this person's human rights? Nobody cares?

Mr. Giancarlo Aragona: I tell you that no one has brought this case to the attention of OSCE, but the situation is also... I can imagine why, because the Ocalan case is very much dealt with by individual countries, by different fora. There have been a lot of statements. Also, no one has so far seen a need to duplicate and to multiply the international focus on this case.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: A quick point, Mr. Chair, if I may.

The Chairman: Mr. Assadourian, with respect to the OSCE, Mr. Aragona can't start anything on his own. It has to be one of the member states. Russia or the United States or Canada or someone has to raise this issue at the OSCE. If you want to raise the Ocalan case, try to get on the OSCE parliamentary assembly, which will take place in St. Petersburg this summer and which has a human rights section. I assure you that the Ocalan case will be discussed. I know that case will be discussed in St. Petersburg, because the delegates to that assembly are already talking about it.

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: Mr. Chairman, that's—

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The Chairman: So there is opportunity for us at our level to be involved, even if the member countries choose to use other fora because, they say, they'd rather go about approaching that issue from a different—

Mr. Sarkis Assadourian: Mr. Chairman, the point I want to make is not only about the Ocalan case. There is a member of parliament—one of our colleagues—who is in jail again because he happens to be of Kurdish origin. There are 20 million Kurds living in that country. Nobody cares about their human rights. That's the point I want to make. Ocalan happens to be one person who is the spokesperson of that group. That's the point I want to make, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Thank you.

I want to go to Mr. Turp because he has to leave at 12 p.m. Then I'll go back to Mr. Cannis and Mrs. Finestone.

Mr. Turp.

[Translation]

Mr. Daniel Turp: I'd like to mention, for our colleague, Mr. Assadourian, that there is a procedure—and the Secretary General could perhaps confirm this—and a commitment on the part of States to accept the presence at trials of observers from other States participating in the OSCE. In light of this commitment made by member States and participating States like Turkey, measures could be undertaken to ensure that Turkey responds to and respects its commitment to agree to the presence, at this trial, of foreign observers who are members and participants in the OSCE. Perhaps Mr. Assadourian would like to convince the government of Canada to ask Turkey to respect the commitment it made. Even so, the statements of the Turkish government seem to indicate that it would not agree to observers from other States of the international community.

That having been said, Mr. Aragona, I would simply like to tell you that, being a bit familiar with the OSCE after having taught it to my students at university, I find that it is one of the most interesting organizations that exist today, although it is not, strictly speaking, an organization, as you reminded us yesterday, because it is not founded on a treaty and is not supposed to be permanent. It's a highly original organization, whose light structure, as you said, does not make it ineffective.

I think that, in may respects, it is your organization that can take credit for one of the most important events of this century, namely the fall of the Berlin Wall and this movement of liberation within Eastern Europe. It is my belief that the Helsinki Final Act and a number of other documents relating to human rights that have been adopted since are, in many respects, responsible for that great event. I would like to congratulate you, on behalf of the Bloc Québécois, and congratulate you on your appointment at the head of an organization that deserves our support.

However, I would like to say one thing. Canada has neglected to take an important step as far as the OSCE is concerned. It was Robert Badinter who spoke to me about this when I was in Vienna with Mr. Mills and Minister Axworthy last November. Canada has not ratified the convention establishing a court of arbitration. Mr. Badinter is quite disappointed that Canada is not setting an example by ratifying the convention that creates this tribunal. Canada could lead the way for other States that are also reluctant to ratify the convention. And so, I would like to ask you whether you think that the Canadian government should ratify this convention to please Mr. Badinter, but also to ensure that this tribunal has some influence.

My second question has more to do with institutions and you alluded to it earlier. It seems to me that there is currently a problem in Europe with international and regional organizations stepping on each other's toes. I'd like to know where you would like to take your organization and what priorities you want to give it. If human rights and election monitoring continue to be priorities, you will be in a situation where you are duplicating the efforts of the Council of Europe. Shouldn't the Council of Europe and the OSCE consider pooling their efforts with regard to human rights and election monitoring?

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Shouldn't your organization give priority to the kind of action you're taking in Bosnia and Kosovo, becoming a kind of civil arm of NATO or of the UN in Europe with regard to peacekeeping or peace-building operations?

Mr. Giancarlo Aragona: There are several questions here.

The Chairman: He will have to answer in 30 seconds because he has to leave at noon.

Mr. Giancarlo Aragona: I will try to answer as briefly as possible.

I fully agree with you that the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe certainly played a key role in the breakup of blocs, in the dialogue between the two blocs and in the breakup of the Communist bloc. It's ironic, but when the Soviet Union insisted so strongly on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, it was doing so for just the opposite reasons, namely, to halt the breaking-up of the blocs. In the end, it all turned out to be in vain and the Conference, with Basket III, but also through all its activities, brought the two parties closer together and considerably weakened the grip of the Soviet Union and Communist regimes on the various countries. I fully share your opinion on this matter.

Mr. Badinter is one of my dear friends too and I have enormous respect for him. The problem does not really lie in whether or not to ratify the convention. Up to now, despite the considerable efforts made by Mr. Badinter, who periodically comes to the Permanent Council, the problem is that no party has availed itself of this court of arbitration or the legal expertise behind Mr. Badinter and his team. That's the source of the problem, and not whether or not the convention has been ratified. Of course, if there were to be a wave of ratifications, that could help, but the court of arbitration is not yet part of the culture. To date, no party has made use of the tribunal and the expertise of those who sit on it, including Mr. Badinter with his authority, his knowledge and his prestige. So we will see. The court is there and Mr. Badinter, who enjoys a great deal of prestige, comes regularly to the Council. Things may change in the future, but to date, there has been no response in practice to the existence of this tribunal.

Let us turn now to the central question of the Council of Europe and the OSCE's place in this complex structure. I have to admit that my position on these issues is slightly different from that adopted mainly by parliamentarians but also by the bureaucracy of the Council of Europe. I believe that the OSCE and the Council of Europe work very well together. It's true that the OSCE's emphasis on the human dimension may bring it close to having the same mandate and features as the Council of Europe. But really, in practice, we see that the two organizations work in very different ways, and on the basis of very different principles, which allows us to work very well together.

The Council of Europe is clearly an organization with political goals. Although my friend Tarschys sometimes complains when we remind him of this, there is no denying that the foundation of the Council of Europe is more legal in nature. The Council of Europe is an institution that has played a very important role in Europe by attempting to improve legal standards in the countries. As for the OSCE, it continues to be a purely political organization, having purely political standards and criteria.

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In practice, we work very well together, mainly because we operate in different ways. The Council of Europe is based in Strasbourg, where it has set up a large bureaucracy. It's really nice to see thousands of people working in this superb European palace in Strasbourg. But the Council of Europe is only present in the field when we, the OSCE, ask it to be there. In Albania and in other cases, the Council of Europe sent us experts, but it is essentially the OSCE that is present in the field. I find there is a very strong complementarity between the more political and more operational nature of the OSCE in the field and the Council of Europe's legal criteria based on Strasbourg expertise.

The elections issue is another matter. It does not have to do so much with the Council of Europe as an institution as with the Council of Europe in its parliamentary role. Some of the Council of Europe's parliamentarians are very active in this field. Frankly, we have made a great deal of progress. The Council of Europe is now also participating, from a parliamentary point of view, in our activities to prepare for elections. It is participating with us or we are participating with it, because we are participating on an equal footing. We participate in its election-monitoring activities. Frankly, I do not see the need for an inflexible division of tasks. In fact, the needs are such that, each time we stage an election-monitoring operation, we need to ask for the resources of as many organizations as we can. We need dozens and dozens of monitors. The Council of Europe provides us with expertise, personnel and often experts. All the work is carried out together and goes smoothly.

I know that there is a very heated debate at the Council of Europe on the need to create very clear, and even very rigid mechanisms for sharing the work on which we cooperate. At the OSCE, this is not a very popular issue. I believe that we can be satisfied with what we are doing.

[English]

The Chairman: Merci. Mr. Cannis.

Mr. John Cannis (Scarborough Centre, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Aragona, welcome to Canada and to our committee.

In your mission statement, where it says “A Co-operative Approach”, you state:

The comprehensive nature of security in the OSCE context is closely related to the Organization's co-operative approach to solving problems. Starting from the premise that security is indivisible, participating States have a common stake in the security of Europe and should therefore co-operate to prevent

—and I emphasize “prevent”—

crises from happening and/or to reduce

—and also I emphasize “reduce”—

the risk of already existing crises getting worse.

I have three very short questions, Mr. Chairman.

I'll tell you what I'm driving at. You indicated in your presentation, Mr. Aragona, that right now, like you responded to my colleague, Mr. Assadourian, the OSCE is focusing on the former Yugoslavia breakup and is trying to solve great issues. I would assume, then, that you're very familiar with what is going on in that region and, of course, it being a European problem as well... In your presentation, on not one but three occasions, you referred to our NATO forces in Macedonia. Are you referring to Greece-Macedonia or—

Mr. Giancarlo Aragona: I said FYROM and then I said Macedonia in two places... I mean the new... Macedonia...

Mr. John Cannis: I heard the name “Macedonia” on three occasions, and I'll tell you what I'm driving at. We can't control what the media says, but certainly for people or organizations such as yours that are very familiar with it, especially with it being a European problem, not a Canadian problem, I think we do not move the yardsticks forward positively if we... At least, I know our minister and our government, in questions in the House of Commons, responded to its official name as it's recognized, even temporarily, that is, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia or FYR Macedonia. If we're going to move the yardsticks forward, when people of your stature are on the international stage, you must, in my view, make that effort to make sure that proper names are identified.

I have another question. I recall that Mr. Solana spoke last October and stated something along the lines of it not being just simply signing treaties, but in the compliance of...

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When the OSCE comes down with a ruling, what means and ways could they use to seek compliance, to see that other nations adhere to the OSCE resolutions in co-operation with the other organizations, such as what is happening today in Kosovo, for example?

I'll close with this. We know that there are some trouble spots in the world, whether they are in the Basque region or with the separatist movements in Italy or Corsica or even in some of the unfortunate situations we have here in Canada. NATO having made some very aggressive overtures now, if they should move in terms of bombing, etc., do you not think that they would be setting a very dangerous precedent by doing so? If they do set this precedent, do you not think that should the northerners in Italy or in Corsica or in the Basque region decide to carry out some of these tactics, like we've seen recently in Kosovo, that they would have to, once a benchmark is set, follow the same precedent? In other words, are they going to send NATO troops into Canada should we have, God forbid, an unfortunate situation like Kosovo?

The Chairman: Mr. Aragona.

Mr. Giancarlo Aragona: First of all, let me clarify one point. When I mentioned the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the first time I mentioned it I clearly said FYROM. Then, it is true, I used “Macedonia” tout cour but I used it just for practical purposes. It was obvious that my initial reference to FYROM was, I thought, maybe somewhat of an obscure acronym, so that's why I made it explicit.

I take your point, of course, that everybody should be very careful in using names. I can tell you that we are not only fully aware but that proper names are used, because we realize, of course, the political implications of changes, but there is no such implication in the fact that sometimes we say, informally, “Macedonia”, rather than using an acronym that is not always familiar to everybody.

On compliance, I think we have to distinguish different cases. You mentioned treaties. OSCE as such is not competent to look after compliance with treaties. It is true that we have of course been mandated to execute some of the clauses of the Dayton agreement and, in the case of Kosovo, in the current mission, verify the compliance of the parties with the ceasefire and so on, but these are special cases.

When we talk within OSCE about compliance, it is the respect by participating states of the principles agreed to within OSCE, not the OSCE looking after compliance of agreements or treaties agreed to outside of it. Within OSCE there are mechanisms that make sure the OSCE community monitors the compliance of participating states with principles agreed to at a political level, in particular, those in the field of human dimension. Since the OSCE is not a legal institution, the commitments have only a political nature.

We do this in these review meetings in which each country can raise problems of compliance in other countries. Then the country involved has to give explanations. Even more refined and effective mechanisms are growing, to make sure that these political commitments taken at different meetings are respected by the participating states. I think we have made considerable progress in this area.

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On the other aspect, of course it's not for me to comment on NATO policy. NATO member countries decide on their policies, decide on their initiatives and carry them forward.

Each organization is independent, autonomous, vis-à-vis the other. I cannot comment on how NATO develops its policies and what policies it implements. On a personal basis, I honestly do not see too many similarities. The problem of NATO in Kosovo is that the international community recognizes that, first of all, to bring the parties to an agreement, diplomacy must be sustained by some credible military threat, unfortunately. In an ideal world, we would prefer not to have this need, but experience shows us that this is not always the case. This is the first element.

The second is that the international community recognizes that if the parties are left to themselves, even after the signature of an agreement, tensions are of such magnitude—problems in the past have been of such magnitude—that probably this agreement would not be implemented in bona fide. A military presence, impartial and made up not only of NATO—because you know that NATO is ready to also take additional contributions from other countries—would ensure a serious, transparent and credible implementation of the agreement. That is the situation in Kosovo. Frankly speaking, I don't see how you can transfer this precedent, this example, to other cases.

The Chairman: Thank you very much. I think we'll—

Mrs. Sheila Finestone (Mount Royal, Lib.): May I ask one short question?

The Chairman: Mrs. Finestone has a quick question, Mr. Aragona. I think you have another appointment at 12.30 p.m. so maybe—

Mrs. Sheila Finestone: So do I.

The Chairman: Yes. Maybe you can just finish up.

Mrs. Sheila Finestone: I was curious, Mr. Chairman.

I've listened with a great deal of interest, and you have certainly been most informative, for which I thank you.

You did discuss the fact that there is a decision-making process on a political consensus basis amongst the participating countries; it's a sort of formal mechanism, in a sense. At the same time, there's this parallel informal consultation. I must admit that I haven't followed the OSCE. I remember the CSCE and the Helsinki Accords. I want to know what the mechanism is for the input of civil society so that we can have some kind of a sense that there is a place for organizations, NGOs, as there was at the Helsinki Accords. I won't go into the UN relationship and all the rest of it. I'm just curious about that.

Mr. Giancarlo Aragona: Thank you very much. I think this offers me an opportunity at the conclusion to touch on the contribution from civil society to the OSCE work. It is a very significant contribution.

You mentioned the NGOs, which are the main medium of our civil society in bringing forward their ideas. NGOs are very closely involved in different stages of our work. First of all, they are in close contact with our missions in the field. Each mission receives the direction to immediately establish contacts with local and international NGOs as they open up business so that their work is also oriented from the NGOs and benefits from them. At the same time, they should encourage the establishment of a fabric of NGOs in these countries. This is at the local level.

Then there is a very important further step. All review meetings, which focus on the human dimension in particular, have sessions in which NGOs participate and speak. If there is a main political event, these review meetings take place before. There are some scheduled review meetings, in particular those organized by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, in Warsaw. These take place regularly. Then there are review meetings before ministerial meetings before summits, and the NGOs are closely involved with them. They are invited and they participate in very large numbers. It's open-ended, but we obviously have a network of NGOs that work with us.

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So I can assure you that civil society is an integral part of the working mechanism of the OSCE. I have noticed in my experience that the input from NGOs, and not only from the big ones—don't think only of Human Rights Watch and the big ones—but also from the small, local NGOs, is really a very significant input. Rest assured that this part of the CSC culture is also being safeguarded within the OSCE.

Mrs. Sheila Finestone: Thank you.

The Chairman: I'm going to have to end this, because we're running over our time, but, Secretary General—I'll admit that maybe it's a conflict of interest—I have some disappointment in your answer as a vice-president of the OSCE parliamentary assembly that you don't consider the parliamentary assembly that relates to your body as part of the civil society input.

I believe that the political representatives who go there are the elected representatives from their states, and they bring democratic input into the work of the OSCE, in addition to that of the ministers. I consider, for example, that every single issue we have discussed here today with you, including that of the international tribunal and other things, has been discussed at the parliamentary assembly, at all the sessions I attended. I think that is an additional important civil society input—at our rather lower level. We're not as well funded as some of the big NGOs, but we talk more.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh.

Mr. Giancarlo Aragona: Mr. Chairman, you may also remember that in my intervention yesterday I emphasized the role of the parliamentary dimension, so if there is somebody who is extremely convinced that an international organization cannot really prosper without the strong support of the parliamentary dimension, it is I. I am really not only a big supporter but a great believer in the efforts of the parliamentary assembly.

I was referring to NGOs because the question focused on NGOs, but it is obvious that the medium, la définition, of democratic processes is parliamentary assemblies. There is no doubt. I wouldn't like to leave here with any doubt about that from you or from anybody else. I am a very firm believer in supporting the parliamentary dimension. Ask Mrs. Degn.

The Chairman: Okay.

Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary General. Thank you for taking the time to see us. We hope that your workload is going to increase significantly because we hope that the Rambouillet accords will be successful, and we know that if they are you will have an enormously important job to do in getting them implemented. On your return to Europe, we wish you well, and Godspeed on your way.

We're adjourned.