CHAPTER 3: THE FUTURE OF SECURITY AND DEFENCE COOPERATION IN NORTH AMERICA
It will require an extraordinary effort on our part to demonstrate that not only are we not a threat, but we are an asset, and our friendship, our neighbourliness and our cross-border commerce are assets to them [the United States] that they need to take into consideration in deciding how to deal with their own sense of vulnerability.
Hon. John Manley,
Evidence, Meeting No. 40, November 6, 2001.
… it should be noted that Canadian policy-makers and academics have no tradition of examining NAFTA through the lens of security. Indeed they can be quite hostile to the suggestion of such a possibility. This reflects the extent to which the concept of free trade was contested in Canada, its links in those debates to the question of sovereignty, and also lingering Canadian discomfort with American hegemony. For better or worse, however, participation in NAFTA has had significant implications for Canadian security, broadly defined. The events of 11 September made those implications far clearer.
S. Neil MacFarlane and Monica Serrano,
“NAFTA: The Security Dimension1.”
WHAT WITNESSES SAID
If you speak to an American expert … he will tell you categorically that the problem is that our security policy is very lax. We have a bad system. We let people in. The problem is not Canada as such. He would say that if the Americans solve their problems, they would like Canada to solve its problems so that they feel safe on that front. And I imagine they say the same thing to Mexico.
This is an intellectual question. The only lever we have at the moment is an intellectual one, failing a significant military lever. … We have to make them understand that a strong Canada is in their interest and that a strong Canada is not necessarily one that adopts American policies. However, it is a Canada that protects American interests as well as its own, because it is in its interest to do so.
Institute for Research on Public Policy,
Evidence, Meeting No. 64, February 28, 2002.
In the case of defence, the fundamental reality is we can’t defend ourselves by ourselves against a major external attack, and we do have a basic security bargain with the United States that dates all the way back to 1938. It says the following. The essence of it is that the United States will defend us, and we agree not to become a source of military weakness to the United States. How to work out that
bargain, of course, is the question. We have to provide the necessary assurance to the Americans that we will not become a security liability to them. We don’t have the option, really, of acting unilaterally in the circumstances, given the nature of the threat we face, so we almost have to do it in a cooperative way.
This doesn’t mean you’ve sacrificed your interests; in fact, it might be a way of maximizing them. When you participate with the United States, you try to maximize the security of your own country and you also gain access to the U.S. strategic decision-making process.
Don Barry, University of Calgary,
Evidence, Meeting No. 80, May 8, 2002.
On September 11 we learned that chaos in poor, weak countries halfway around the globe can make a very big difference to us. … That means there is going to be a new context for Canadian-American cooperation and our famous long undefended border. We have to realize that you can no longer do things at borders alone. Borders are now zones, and as this Committee knows from its work on smart borders, the new way of thinking about this is that we have to operate inside your borders, you have to operate inside our borders. Some people will say, isn’t that a derogation of Canadian sovereignty? Not in the least, any more than it is a derogation of American sovereignty. It means we have to get away from our traditional concepts of what borders mean and learn to act cooperatively if we’re going to cope with the threats that come from … this new dimension of transnational relations.
Joseph Nye, Harvard University,
Evidence, Meeting No. 74, May 2, 2002.
Without direct exposure to the deep feelings, insecurity, and vulnerability our American cousins feel right now, it is difficult for governments to justify to their citizenry, and to themselves, the security measures that must be taken to address the fears. We have also learned that what we want to do is protect a shared way of life that is being opposed and threatened by extremism. Our friends in the U.S. must also try to understand if we disagree about particular measures, we’re no less committed to their security and to our shared community.
Brian Stevenson, University of Alberta,
Evidence, Meeting No. 82, May 9, 2002.
… popular opinion in Canada is that we should always be sure to remain distinct vis-à-vis the Americans on our foreign and security policy. My argument is that this would be a mistake, because the values I think most Canadians share in foreign and security policy are identical to the values that the Americans share. The wars the Americans have fought recently have been fought for reasons that most Canadians find entirely acceptable, morally justifiable, and ethically defendable. If you want to protect our sovereignty, protect it in terms of the values and interests that we espouse. Sometimes that means supporting the Americans.
Frank Harvey, Dalhousie University,
Evidence, Meeting No. 61, February 27, 2002.
While Canada ought to continue with a cooperative and coordinated approach with the United States concerning North American security, it would be quite wrong to integrate Canadian and American military capability.
Our model of cooperation has served us well. There is no compelling reason why our sovereignty needs to be compromised by submitting our military capability to American command. We have shown in a number of multilateral missions and endeavours, whether under NATO or UN command, that Canadian troops can indeed serve well in integrated military structures. There is nonetheless a signal difference between joining a multilateral mission and placing our troops under the dictate of a neighbouring power, no matter how benevolent.
Evidence, Meeting No. 82, May 9, 2002.
I think the focus on homeland security is very much a function of September 11 last year. When you come to look at it and try to do something with it, it is again a blend of international and domestic politics. But from the domestic side of it, I think we’re really concerned about vulnerability. What are our vulnerable points? Where are we open that somebody who wished to do us harm could have quite a free shot?
Peter Haydon, Maritime Affairs,
Evidence, Meeting No. 59, February 26, 2002.
If you examine the root causes of political instability, especially in the poorest regions of the world, you see that simply dealing with security as a border issue or a banking issue, while I don’t think anyone disagrees with those efforts, is not enough. Unless you address the core, root issues of terrorism, which are already on the agenda for this summit that is, global poverty, inequality then we’re not going to solve anything.
Jim Selby, Alberta Federation of Labour,
Evidence, Meeting No. 82, May 9, 2002.
On increased military spending, we feel it’s likely the Canadian public could accept a small increase in spending to better achieve civil defence priorities, particularly as they have been identified since September 11. We do want to stress that increases to defence spending are one thing; funding that would support military aggression is quite another.
Kerry Duncan McCartney, Project Ploughshares Calgary,
Evidence, Meeting No. 80, May 8, 2002.
… because we have an integrated economy … does that mean we cannot espouse our values? I would say … that my approach to these questions is not to go at the United States, but rather to manifest our friendship with the United States which we have done in countless ways I won’t take time to enumerate and say to them … that as your good neighbour and your good friend, we have to tell you some things. We see security in the world coming out of a basis of international law and an agenda in which the social and economic conditions of the world are related to developing the conditions for security. We do not see security coming out of the barrel of a gun or that more weapons and more nuclear weapons are going to produce security.
That’s a fundamental difference in our views. I think it ill behoves the Government of Canada, let alone all the people like us in Canada, to pretend that there are not these distinctions in how each of us approaches questions of security. I think, moreover, we would not be faithful to our obligation to the United Nations and everything it stands for were we to sort of knuckle under to the U.S. security demands being made upon us today, when thinking Canadians recognize that those demands are wrong.
Senator Doug Roche,
Evidence, Meeting No. 82, May 9 2002.
In the present circumstances, it would be very interesting to have a Canadian picture of what North American defence, including Mexico, actually means. How do we see it? All I’ve seen from the Department of National Defence is roughly a discussion of Canada, and not so much a discussion of North America and Canada’s role in it, or a high level of appreciation of where we go from here and how we fit into what needs to be done.
Guy Stanley, University of Ottawa,
Evidence, Meeting No. 90, June 13, 2002.
3.1 Introduction: Approaching the New Security Environment in North America
The tragic terrorist attacks of September 2001, as well as the unrelated anthrax attacks soon after, shattered the assumption of many that the United States, the world’s most powerful nation, was invulnerable to attack on its own soil. The events resulted in a renewed focus in the United States not only on security in general, but on “homeland security,” for which domestic actions are even more important than military ones. Given the degree of economic integration in North America, the immediate U.S. move to virtually close its borders had significant economic impacts on both Canada and Mexico and required their governments to increase security cooperation with the United States, if only to prevent further unilateral action. The real challenge was whether they could do so while still preserving key Canadian, and Mexican, values in a number of areas.
Canadians as well as Americans have suffered from terrorism although not to the same degree and all witnesses agreed with the need to increase security within Canada. Likewise, almost all agreed that this would require increasing security cooperation with the United States. There were differences, however, over how far this cooperation should go, and whether it should be governed by new formal agreements or simply evolve from current arrangements.
In terms of military cooperation, Canada dispatched significant naval, land, and air forces to Afghanistan and surrounding areas as part of the campaign against terrorism, and Canadian and American personnel have also operated at an enhanced tempo within the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) during the past year. Despite the very close defence relationship between the two countries, recent years have seen differences over a number of issues with continental implications, notably U.S. plans to develop missile defences and the U.S. belief that Canada does not spend enough on defence. The focus on security after September 11 has renewed calls for closer continental cooperation to defend North America from new threats. For example, Dr. Jack Granatstein of the Council for Canadian Security in the 21st Century told the Committee that the United States would take whatever action it deemed necessary to ensure its security; hence, in his view, Canada now had “no choice” but to agree to long-standing U.S. demands in these areas if it wished both to continue its close partnership and to retain sovereign control over its defence.2
In fact, while the Canadian government has taken important action over the past year to increase both its capacity to fight terrorism and its security cooperation with the United States, the primary focus has been on the Canada-U.S. border. The response to the attacks in this area, and the lengthy debate over border issues that preceded it, has underlined the complex relationship between economics and security in the two countries. As Christopher Sands has argued, the United States has learned that security measures cannot ignore economic concerns, while Canada has learned that economic concerns do not trump security ones.3
In a broader sense, many believe that the attacks, and the subsequent military campaign in Afghanistan, have strengthened a predisposition toward unilateralism in U.S. foreign policy. In a speech at West Point in June 2002, President Bush said: “If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long.” Instead, America would be ready for “pre-emptive action when necessary.”4 Similar arguments were contained in the September 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America.
The focus of this report is on the future of relationships in North America. But as we indicated in Chapter 1, these occur within a broader Canadian foreign policy context in which Canada has traditionally pursued its interests and values through multilateralism and respect for international law, as well as through encouraging U.S. engagement with the rest of the international community. This is all the more important since, as American experts Joseph Nye and Stephen Flynn argued separately before the Committee, in an era of globalization the United States can only truly increase its security by working cooperatively with other states. The Committee heard from a number of witnesses on these points, and also included their perspectives in its June 2002 report Securing Progress for Africa and the World: A Report on Canadian Priorities for the 2002 G8 Summit.
A number of the border and other actions taken over the past year will have long-term consequences that must be monitored. Moreover, the high-profile defence and foreign policy issues noted above remain to be addressed. As the Government considers this agenda, the Committee agrees with the point made to us by Peter Coombes of End the Arms Race that “Canada’s security is far, far too vital to be left to the military experts, to the security experts.”5
3.2 Bilateral or Trilateral Approaches to Security?
That NAFTA now has a security dimension, few would dispute. What to make of it is another question.
Neil MacFarlane and Monica Serrano,“NAFTA: The Security Dimension.”
… although the vulnerability between the U.S. and Mexico on the one hand and the U.S. and Canada on the other is mutual, it is far from symmetrical. The United States economy, for one, would not be affected in anywhere near the measure that the economies of its partners would be in the event of any interruption, threatened or implied, in [the free flow of goods]. U.S. vulnerability, we must remember, has other dimensions, as we saw most horribly and tragically on September 11, but it is not only the threat to its security from terrorism but the threat from trade in drugs, trade in people, and other global flows that preoccupy the U.S. policy-makers. These vulnerabilities, I may note, we share with them profoundly as a fellow modern society in North America. However, in U.S. perception, often that sharing seems to be asymmetrical.
George Haynal, Former Assistant Deputy Minister for the Americas, DFAIT,
Evidence, Meeting No. 56, February 7, 2002.
If there was one area in which a two-speed North America was evident before last September, it was in the realm of security cooperation, in terms of both “public safety” issues such as terrorism and crime, and of military security. Canada and the United States have had a highly developed relationship in these areas for decades. The United States and Mexico have a very limited one, based mainly on 1996 bilateral agreements on defence and security cooperation. Canada and Mexico have virtually none. The borders within North America reflected this reality, with Canada and the United States sharing what they took pride in calling “the world’s longest undefended border,” while the much shorter U.S.-Mexican border was significantly fortified to prevent both illegal (or, as the Mexican government prefers, “undocumented”) immigration and drug smuggling into the United States.
In a press conference last November following what Mexican scholar Dr. Monica Serrano (who testified before the Committee in Mexico City) has referred to as “Mexico’s distant, delayed and clearly mishandled response to the terrorist attacks … ,” President Fox called for the development of a “North American Security Policy” that would include coordinating border policies and sharing immigration and customs information.6 The United States and Canada did not take up this suggestion; they focused instead, in the interest of speed, on using existing and extensive bilateral channels to increase security in their countries.
Nevertheless, the fact that President Fox made this suggestion signalled a change in Mexico’s traditional security orientation, as did its September 2002 decision to withdraw from the OAS’s Inter-American Treaty on Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty).7 Bilateral defence and security cooperation between Canada and Mexico has so far been quite limited for example, to Mexican participation in peacekeeping training in Canada.8 Yet in January 2002, during the first official visit of a Canadian defence minister to Mexico, the Hon. Art Eggleton noted in a speech that “ … ultimately, the relation between our two countries is based on more than trade and economy. It is also based on a shared commitment to international peace and security, a cause we cannot afford to neglect.”9 While the Minister spoke of international peace and security, Mexico’s Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs Enrique Berruga reminded the Committee during meetings in Mexico City that the Mexican government would like the three countries to work together and share best practices in order to secure the region. At the same time, Neil MacFarlane and Monica Serrano observe little evidence of any movement in a trilateral direction towards eventually adding structures of security and defence cooperation, as a “security pillar” to NAFTA.
When questioned by Committee members about the role of Mexico in this regard, Jack Granatstein responded: “I don’t think the defence of North America properly belongs to a tripartite arrangement. We can trade in a tripartite way, but in military terms the reality is that the defence of North America is primarily American and secondarily Canadian and American. I think it would be a mistake for us to pretend anything else.” He added that “The Mexican armed forces, while numerous, are a light year behind Canadian forces, and two light years behind American forces, in sophisticated technology and modern war-fighting capability. They’re essentially an internal security force that aims to keep the Mexican people down you’ll forgive me for saying that, but it happens to be true.”10
Professor George MacLean put it less provocatively:
On the issue of Mexico and defence and security integration … there’s not much interest in the United States or in Canada to try to integrate security forces, defence forces, aside from issues like border issues, migration, and so forth … I’ve certainly not seen any discussion within the ministry of defence in Mexico City about integration with Canada. I think there would be eyebrows raised. “Why on earth would we have military integration with Canada? We barely have economic integration with Canada.” That’s often the Mexican response …. There is a desire in Mexico to be more integrated in a defence context with the United States, though that hasn’t been reciprocated in any real way in Washington.11
Yet the existence of a North American economic community, which is likely to deepen in the future, leads some to argue that a trilateral security and defence partnership in North America would be a natural development. Professor Stéphane Roussel, for example, argued forcefully: “Economic integration requires security integration. The two are closely linked, and I do not think that we can leave Mexico on the sidelines for very long.”12 Similarly, Professor Theodore Cohn made the point that “if we deal with some of these cross-border issues in genuine trilateral terms, I think we’re going to make further progress than trying to keep the clock back and say we’re different from the Mexicans. We are different; we’re very different. But this is a North American issue.”13
Even in terms of defence, Professor Michael Byers, the author of a high-profile study entitled Canadian Armed Forces Under U.S. Command, argued: “We’re talking about North American defence. It seems to me obvious that if we’re moving forward on North American defence with the United States, Mexico should be at the table as well. They’re a very important partner in NAFTA. They have the same concerns as Canada has.”14 Professor Guy Stanley of the University of Ottawa agreed, saying:
I … believe it would be desirable to include Mexicans in the [defence] discussion and dialogue because we don’t know what the direction of American policies will be in the near future. If we want to be able to encourage or to deter some things, we’d better have a major and recognized contribution, and a partner who supports us or shares the same perspective with us and who is capable, in a trilateral context, to provide a stronger dimension and a higher value than what can be done unilaterally. Otherwise, I would be concerned about the decisions the Americans will be making in the short term.15
From a practical point of view, day-to-day defence and security cooperation in North America will undoubtedly remain a bilateral issue at least in the medium term. After speaking last November of the “very deep and profound sense of cooperation” that exists between Canada and the United States on security issues, Jon Allen, Director General of DFAIT’s North American Bureau added: “Right now, because of the issues perhaps of transparency and development, that doesn’t exist between the Americans and the Mexicans. It will come. And as it comes, there will be an ability, I think, to then deal as a perimeter.”16 The Committee believes that the advantages of a trilateral approach to security relations in North America will become increasingly obvious over the longer term. The sooner, therefore, the three countries begin to think about and work toward this goal, the better.
The Government of Canada should increase its bilateral security cooperation with Mexico. The Government should also examine means of beginning a trilateral dialogue with the United States and Mexico to explore common perspectives on security issues in North America.
3.3 Securing Our Borders
… at the heart of American concern … is the issue of security. And at the heart of our relationship with the Americans is a law enforcement and intelligence cooperation that backs that relationship. So on customs and immigration, we can have a deep and profound sense of sharing, because behind it we have a very deep and profound sense of cooperation.
Jon Allen, Director General,
North American Bureau, DFAIT,
Evidence, Meeting No 57, February 19, 2002.
By the 1990s, despite the fact that they took great pride in “the world’s longest undefended border,” Canada and the United States both recognized that important cross-border issues needed to be resolved. They therefore created several new fora between 1997 and 1999, including a Border Vision Initiative focused on immigration and smuggling, a Cross-Border Crime Forum focused on law enforcement cooperation, and a broader Canada-U.S. Partnership (CUSP).17 Overall, however, these fora resulted in little in practice, because mainly of a lack of sufficient political interest on either side of the border.
The primary focus of U.S. border concerns in the 1990s was illegal immigration from Mexico. Despite the significant differences between the United States’ northern and southern borders, Congress attempted to address them through common legislation, with significant implications for Canada. The most important of these was the “Section 110” requirement to document the entry and exit of all “aliens,” which threatened crippling delays at the Canada-U.S. border. The implementation of this requirement was repeatedly delayed, however, partly as a result of Canadian lobbying. Unfortunately, entry/exit controls which American expert Demetrios Papademetriou recently described as “a mindless approach that will simply create additional difficulties for us, any way you slice that particular pie”18 have now been included in post-September 11 legislation. Canada will therefore have to deal with its implications once again, although hopefully this will be easier under the new border regime discussed below.
Another negative result of the U.S. focus on Mexico in the 1990s was that one-third of American border enforcement agents were “temporarily” transferred from the northern to the southern border.19 They never returned, leaving the northern border understaffed. In the fall of 2001, some 832 U.S. border patrol agents and inspectors were assigned to the northern border, compared to over 9,500 assigned to the southern border.20 This fact would later contribute to the arguments of some that the Canadian border was a security threat to the United States.
On the other hand, U.S. officials did have concerns about specific Canadian policies. Following a number of cases of diversion of U.S. weapons technology, in 1999 Canadian exemptions under the International Trade in Arms Regulations (ITARS) were removed. This action seriously affected the export of military technology to Canada until the Canadian system was tightened and the exemptions restored in 2001. In terms of refugee policy, as Stephen Gallagher noted before the most recent policy changes, the fact that Canada had no “policies or practices that give the government the power to control and remove the majority of asylum-seekers who do arrive” made it “unique among advanced industrial nations.”21
According to former senior Foreign Affairs official George Haynal, the issue of “national security” as such did not “meaningfully” enter bilateral border discussions until after U.S. authorities arrested Algerian terrorist Ahmed Ressam, an illegal resident of Canada, as he was attempting to enter the United States with bomb-making materials in December 1999.22 U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft later admitted that it was Canadian intelligence that led to the arrest of Ressam; yet the incident seemed to many proof of an earlier comment, attributed to former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Richard Holbrooke, that Canada was a “Club Med for terrorists.”23 Following the September 11 attacks, this perception was fuelled by erroneous reports, in media including The New York Times and in statements by politicians such as Senator Hillary Clinton, that some of the September 11 hijackers had entered the United States from Canada.
This was, as Dr. Yasmeen Abu-Laban pointed out, an “extreme portrayal,” the logical policy conclusion of which “would suggest that Canada will only cease to be a threat to America if Washington determines all aspects of Canadian immigration.” In her view: “That is why there needs to be a vigorous defence of our immigration system from policy-makers; it relates to Canadian needs and values and interests, and we have a public relations problem.”24 Security and intelligence expert Reg Whitaker agreed that “the post-September 11 security problem posed by the Canadian border was never as serious as journalistic and political critics have suggested. Canada is not now and never was a Club Med for terrorists, despite some irresponsible and ill-informed criticism.” As he explained:
Canadian rules and procedures for preventing the entry of terrorists and criminals have long been roughly equivalent to those in the United States. Indeed, intelligence sharing has meant a common database on the bad guys that is strongly influenced by American intelligence and American interpretation.
September 11, in any event, revealed that the U.S. itself was hardly watertight and indeed guilty of considerable laxity. It is not quite the model that some have held it to be.…
I think basically if there was a gap and there was, in the past, a gap between Canadian and American performance in immigration security, it was not in regard to rules and procedures but in enforcement. Canada did not in the past put as many resources into enforcement as the U.S. did. That gap is now narrowing, with the additional resources for security provided in the 2001 budget.
Apart from certain U.S. politicians and certain U.S. media outlets, the image of the Canadian border as a security risk has not actually made much headway with the U.S. public, according to recent polling by EKOS Research.25
There were also areas in which Canadian security was tighter than its American counterpart. In one example cited by Stephen Clarkson, Canada had instituted a system in 1996 that allowed officers posted at airports abroad to stop more than 33,000 people with false documentation before they boarded planes for Canada.26
In a September 2002 article, Reid Morden, a former Director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and former DFAIT deputy minister who testified before the Committee in early 2002, affirmed that “Canada is neither a security threat to the United States nor a haven for terrorists.” But he also added: “On the other hand, it is legitimate to ask ourselves several questions. Were there gaps in our security coverage on September 11? Do we have terrorist groups in Canada? Have we been, at the very least, ambivalent in dealing with undesirables who would abuse the hospitality that Canada offers? Yes, to all of the above.”27
All governments undoubtedly took security too much for granted before September 11. The hard lesson that the Committee draws is that, in addition to increasing cross-border cooperation, significant domestic remedies were, and continue to be, required in a variety of areas.
Defence of the homeland has a long history in the United States; but for the country to reorient itself to this task after decades of “forward defense” will be a long and complicated task. In Washington, the Committee met with Richard Falkenrath, Director of Policy and Plans in the Office of Homeland Security. As Mr. Falkenrath later explained, the key elements achieved in this area over the past year were: the creation of an executive Office of Homeland Security, headed by Governor Tom Ridge, in October 2001; a request that the amount spent on homeland security be almost doubled in fiscal 2003; the release of a National Strategy for Homeland Security; and the proposal to reorganize the federal government to create a massive Department of Homeland Security.28 The legislation to establish this department was signed by President Bush on November 25, 2002.
As noted by Stephen Clarkson, the structure of Canadian government probably allowed Canada to react more quickly than the United States in this area. In October 2001, the Canadian government created an ad hoc Cabinet Committee on Public Security and Anti-Terrorism, chaired by then-Foreign Affairs Minister John Manley. (Cabinet committees on Security and Intelligence and on Foreign Affairs and Defence had been abolished years before.) The Government also passed sweeping anti-terrorism legislation and increased security-related spending, committing $7.7 billion over five years to anti-terrorism and border security measures in its December 2001 Budget.29 Although observers such as Dr. Thomas Axworthy have suggested more long-term changes, such as making the ad hoc Committee on Public Security and Anti-Terrorism permanent and creating a Department of Homeland Security, the Canadian government has not undertaken permanent reorganizations to emphasize security.30 Nevertheless, the significant American moves in this area will have important implications for Canada that must be monitored.
Much more remains to be done, however. As Joseph Nye of Harvard University, a former Chairman of the National Intelligence Council of the United States and Assistant Secretary of Defense, told the Committee in May 2002:
Technology is putting into the hands of deviant groups and individuals destructive power which was once reserved solely to governments. So if in the twentieth century you had a person who wanted to kill many people a Hitler, a Stalin, a Mao he needed the power of a government to do it. Today it’s not farfetched to imagine terrorists getting access to weapons of mass destruction and being able to do that themselves.… This is a totally new dimension of world politics.31
In its June 2002 report on priorities for the G8 Summit, the Committee reflected the views it had heard in hearings across the country concerning the fight against terrorism. Particular emphasis was placed on the need to pursue this fight within a multilateral framework that respected civil liberties and on the need for Canada and other states to increase cooperation at a number of levels to strengthen their capacity to fight terrorism.32
In addition to protecting Canada from terrorist attacks, it is also important to guard against attacks on critical energy, telephone and other infrastructure shared by Canada and the United States the two governments have agreed to detailed binational workplans in the area and to recognize the possibility of attacks on American businesses and interests in Canada.
From a “Security Perimeter” to Building a “Smart Border”
The challenge of meeting Canadian needs and U.S. imperatives at the border is symptomatic of a larger public policy debate. The focus is the balance between sovereignty, economic security, and national security. This may not be a debate Canadians are ready for, but it has been forced upon us by September 11.
Andrew Wynn-Williams, British Columbia Chamber of Commerce,
Evidence, Meeting No. 76, May 6, 2002.
… although the security perimeter already exists I do believe that the groundwork has already been laid the process is not yet complete. We should expect new initiatives in this area in the months and years to come.
Stéphane Roussel, York University
Evidence, Meeting No. 77, May 7, 2002.
The past several years saw debate about the role of borders in a period of increasing globalization, but the September 11 attacks reaffirmed their importance. As Haynal noted in early 2002, however: “The Canada/U.S. border today is a jumble of contradictions. The publics in our two societies retain apparently conflicting sentiments about it. They expect it to pose no impediment to their movements, but they also treat it as an essential attribute of sovereignty, necessary for the protection of national security and the integrity of national institutions.”33
In essence, the volume of trade and personal interconnections, particularly between countries such as Canada and the United States, is such that security cooperation must begin before the borders are reached, or it will be too late. As Reg Whitaker explained, “in a world in which there is instant communication and very fast transportation movements, you should deal with the problem before it arrives at the border.” He added:
I don’t think that threatens Canadian sovereignty. I don’t think, for example, that pre-clearance of goods that originate in Canadian factories is in any way a diminution of Canadian sovereignty. Those goods have no right to enter the United States. They will be checked either at the border or at the point of origin. It simply makes more sense to do it at the point of origin. In fact, Canada itself has been involved in perimeter security in a broader sense: for example, the interdiction of illegal refugee movements at the point of origin using intelligence resources. I think as long as those elements are done on a functional basis, they can work for both countries.34
While the United States did move some National Guard troops to its northern border following the September 11 attacks, former Immigration and Naturalization Service Commissioner Doris Meissner told the Committee in Washington that early thoughts about fortifying the border had dissipated quickly (at least partly as a result of domestic and Canadian lobbying).
Public discussion quickly turned to the idea of developing a “security perimeter” for Canada and the United States. Clear definitions were never given, but according to Stéphane Roussel the concept implies:
… first of all, closer cooperation between the two states. Secondly, it means strengthening already existing measures. Thirdly, the concept involves the systematic use of new technology to enhance border control and speed up the border crossing process. Fourthly, and this is the most important point, it means harmonizing the policies of both governments in areas that include, in particular, immigration, border control, intelligence, defence and security, and, in particular, law enforcement.35
Some witnesses compared the idea of a perimeter approach to bilateral security with developments in the European Union under the Schengen agreement that has largely abolished internal border controls among most, though not all, of the EU’s member states. For some, the creation of an effective external perimeter would preclude the need for border controls between Canada and the United States, with important benefits for trade and commerce. While Laura Macdonald of Carleton University admitted that the “Europeanization” of the North American border regime would be preferable to the “Mexicanization” of the Canada-U.S. border,36 Reg Whitaker added: “I am not at all impressed with the notion of this as a new formalized arrangement like the fortress Europe system. I think that would sink Canada into a position in which it had little to say.”37 Andrew Cooper argued:
If we had a healthy debate about the EU Schengen model, this would have lots of salience for Canada. But I don’t get a sense that, in the United States, we are having a healthy debate about Schengen or EU models. What we get is a very narrow orientation going back to Section 110, going back to ITAR, and going back to all sorts of other issues that focus on self-help rather than complex interdependence. Therefore, I think the U.S. will look at perimeter not so much in a holistic fashion, but more as a form of forward defence. From this perspective, there may be benefits for Canada, certainly at airports and ports, but we can’t exaggerate the benefits in terms of allowing open access at the border.38
The Canadian government has never favoured phasing out controls along the Canada-U.S. border. For one thing, as our Subcommittee on International Trade, Trade Disputes and Investment heard last fall, the entry of guns and drugs into this country from the United States remains a major concern. Even after September 11, 2001, the Government remained distinctly cool to the “perimeter” concept that was then being promoted by many, particularly in the business community. The Hon. John Manley, then-foreign minister, told the Committee a few weeks after the terrorist attacks that “‘perimeter’ is a short form for something, but I don’t quite know what.”39 Given the obvious need to increase cooperation, however, the real question was whether this would indeed require the “harmonization” of a wide range of policies. As Professor Charles Doran of Johns Hopkins University in Maryland pointed out to the Committee last fall, the basic need was actually for equally effective policies rather than identical ones. Instead of a “security perimeter,” the goal quickly became the establishment of what U.S. Ambassador Paul Cellucci and others called a “zone of confidence.” According to Whitaker: “The concept of zones of confidence, which has begun to replace perimeter security, is a catch-phrase that better captures, I think, the essence of realistic security cooperation.”40 The distinction may seem as much symbolic as real, yet its importance lies in the following: Canada can maintain policies different from those of the United States in key areas, as long as Canada and the United States can agree to a mutual recognition of each other’s policies on the basis of mutually assured effectiveness.
The years of inconclusive discussion on border issues paid off handsomely in the fall of 2001, when political urgency allowed Canadian officials to quickly develop a package of proposals. These were presented to the United States and largely formed the basis of the “Smart Border Declaration” and related 30-point “Action Plan” agreed to in December 2001. The key elements of the Smart Border accord were: (1) the secure flow of people; (2) the secure flow of goods; (3) secure infrastructure; and (4) coordination and information sharing.41 Mexican legislators expressed considerable interest in this initiative during the Committee’s March 2002 meetings in Mexico City; indeed, shortly thereafter, the United States and Mexico adopted a simpler agreement based on the “smart border” model.
As Deputy Prime Minister Manley explained to a parliamentary committee in April 2002: “The guiding principle of the Smart Borders Declaration is that public and economic security are mutually reinforcing. Our security is enhanced when we adopt a risk-management approach that expedites the flow of low-risk goods and people, allowing us to concentrate our resources on higher-risk flows.”42 Minister Manley and Homeland Security Advisor Ridge announced “tremendous progress” in implementing the Smart Border Action Plan in June 2002, and issued a one-year status report on December 6, 2002.43 At their meeting in Detroit in September 2002, Prime Minister Chrétien and President Bush approved of progress so far, encouraged officials to go beyond the original 30-point Action Plan, and said that the private sector would be brought into these discussions in a more formal way. They also witnessed demonstrations of key programs designed to expedite the shipment of commercial goods (Free and Secure Trade FAST) and the crossing of known travellers (NEXUS). The Committee addresses these trade-related aspects of border security and facilitation in detail in the next chapter.
Canadians seem to have accepted these border security measures as a necessary part of both increasing our security against terrorism and protecting our economic security by ensuring access to the United States. However, a number of witnesses counselled caution. As Laura Macdonald argued: “Proponents hope to achieve what still seem to me to be mutually incompatible goals, to make the border disappear for the movement of what seem to be desirable goods, capital and people, and to reinforce controls over the movement of undesirable goods, capital and people.” She added that “some of these measures are highly controversial. There are widespread concerns that they entail the gradual harmonization or convergence of a wide range of domestic policies with U.S. policies, and there are concerns about their implications for sovereignty.”44
Some items in the Action Plan were obviously more difficult to negotiate than others. These were, notably, the requirement for Advanced Passenger Information data on all passengers landing at Canadian airports; the development of a system for harmonized commercial processing; and the negotiation of a “Safe Third Country” agreement.
The last-mentioned agreement was designed to prevent “asylum shopping” by allowing immigrants to apply for refugee status in either Canada or the United States, but not both. According to the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration: “There has been widespread acceptance that some measure of control was necessary to limit abuse of Canada’s refugee determination system, and this Agreement represents an effective and humanitarian means to accomplish this.”45 However, while accepting the need to increase cooperation against terrorists, even some business representatives warned that it was necessary to understand the implications of cooperation across the board. In Vancouver, for example, the Committee heard from American Greg Boos, Vice-President of the Pacific Corridor Enterprise Council an organization described to us as “sort of like a cross-border chamber of commerce” who also chairs the American Immigration Lawyers Association border watch group. He reminded the Committee that Canada and the United States had taken a different perspective on refugees from Central America in the 1980s and 1990s, when the region was experiencing civil war and the United States government “was supporting some of the factions down there.” With that as background, he continued:
One of the things I don’t like about the 30-point plan, and one of the things that American immigration attorneys and other people that are concerned with human life in the United States don’t like about the 30-point plan, is the 30-point plan calls for harmonizing U.S. and Canadian refugee policy. More specifically, the 30-point plan calls for saying that if a person were in the United States and didn’t apply for refugee status, that person could not come to Canada and apply for refugee status….
I think that what we need to do with the 30-point plan is we need to say that in the asylum and refugee forum there needs to be a common screening for terrorism between the United States and Canada, but I don’t believe we should say that the two systems really are equal, so that if one person is in the United States he or she can’t apply in Canada or vice versa. You can never tell; it might be the United States that is wearing a white hat eventually in a particular case with a particular people and Canada wearing the black hat.46
In September 2002, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration announced that negotiators had completed a Safe Third Country Agreement, and final agreement with the United States came in early December 2002. Concerns have been raised that an agreement on safe third countries could mean the harmonization of certain immigration policies, convergence in the assessment of the situation in foreign countries, and thus convergence of foreign policy to some extent. Indeed it could even have an impact on Canada’s ability to meet its commitments under the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Accordingly, the Committee considers that the Government should proceed with caution and be sensitive to the implications of such a project for the independence of Canada’s foreign policy, and supports calls for ongoing parliamentary and other monitoring of the implementation of this agreement.
While Minister Manley and Governor Ridge will undoubtedly continue to issue progress reports on current developments, the Committee notes that there has been no public commitment to produce the sort of comprehensive report card on the Smart Border process that was issued at the September 2002 meeting of Prime Minister Chrétien and President Bush. The Committee believes such reports are vital in order to monitor the implications of this process. Accordingly, in order to allow a more comprehensive review of these issues, the Committee undertakes to convene a hearing in the near future in order to review cumulative developments over the first year since signing of the Smart Border Declaration on December 12, 2001. We will also invite the participation of members from other parliamentary committees that have reported on border-related issues since September 2001.
The Government should produce an annual report to Parliament reviewing in detail the status of the “Smart Borders” process. The ministers responsible for the implementation of border security measures should also appear before the relevant committees of both houses of Parliament on the substance of that report.
Law Enforcement and Intelligence Cooperation
Intelligence and law enforcement are important elements of security cooperation. Following the September 11 attacks there was broad agreement on the need for increased intelligence cooperation. As experts at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies, which the Committee visited in March 2002, stated in a major study released in the fall of 2001: “With good intelligence, anything is possible; without it, nothing is possible.”47
Canada and the United States have enjoyed excellent cooperation in these areas for decades. Since 1988, officials from the two governments have met annually in a Bilateral Consultative Group on Counter-Terrorism Cooperation. In addition to agreements on research and development in counter-terrorism technologies and joint exercises, discussions in this group led to the creation of a “Tip-Off” agreement, under which the countries exchanged lists of possible terrorists for use in visa and border control purposes. The Smart Border action plan also committed the two countries to significantly increase cooperation in this area.
Following the September 11 attacks, the Government of Canada significantly increased the resources devoted to its intelligence community which had seen major cuts as the government struggled to reduce the federal deficit and also gave the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) new powers under anti-terrorism legislation. Bilateral cooperation with the United States was also increased, including through the creation of six new Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETS). These teams include police, immigration, and customs officials from the two countries who work together on a daily basis with local, state, and provincial agencies. This brought the total number of IBETS created to date to 10, with 19 planned by the end of this fiscal year.48 Indeed, U.S. Ambassador Paul Cellucci commented to a September 2002 conference of security and defence experts held in Ottawa that cooperation between U.S. and Canadian intelligence and law enforcement was always “good,” but is now “extraordinary.”
An increase in Canada’s own capabilities and bilateral cooperation in this area serve both countries well. As Denis Stairs has recently noted, “… we need first-class intelligence. Even more, we need first-class intelligence analysts.” He added that “… cultivating … our own analytical capabilities can be as useful to our neighbours as to ourselves. This is partly because there are things that researchers from a small power can do that researchers from a hegemonic power cannot.… There are perspectives on ‘reality’ that flourish in smaller powers but are quick to die in the more muscular world of the great powers.”49
In its fall 2001 preliminary report, the Committee agreed with recommendations from such experts as Professor Wesley Wark of the University of Toronto, and Professors Martin Rudner and Andrew Cohen of Carleton University, on the need to increase funding for the Canadian intelligence community. Some witnesses also suggested the creation of a Canadian foreign intelligence agency, although Deputy Prime Minister Manley told a parliamentary committee in April 2002 that the Government had not yet decided whether this was necessary.50
The increase of resources for the intelligence community in the December 2001 budget was welcome. In light of the new challenges, however, Professor Stuart Farson of Simon Fraser University (who was involved in a parliamentary review of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act in 1989-90) told the Committee that the intelligence community would still benefit from both an independent review and increased parliamentary oversight; some degree of oversight is currently carried out by the Subcommittee on National Security of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights. In Professor Farson’s words:
On the question of how we get action to improve the security intelligence community, I think the key issue is to have some fresh air brought to the situation. The way I think that can happen is by a comprehensive review of the sector….
Related to this, of course, is that Parliament has to be informed and needs to be engaged in the process of review. It must hear and have access to the product of the review. I also believe that Parliament needs to have a permanent security and intelligence committee hopefully that can operate in a non-partisan manner.51
The Committee agrees. As the Government itself stated in its October 2002 response to a February 2002 report by the Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence: “The Government recognizes that the continued effectiveness of Canada’s strong review and accountability framework will be assured by increased Parliamentary and public knowledge. This enhanced transparency and public discussion is in the interest of all Canadians.”52
While acknowledging potential legal restrictions, the Committee recommends that the House of Commons establish a Standing Committee on Security and Intelligence, with appropriate secure premises, dedicated and cleared staff and other requirements. In addition, the ad hoc Cabinet Committee on Public Security and Anti-Terrorism should be replaced by a permanent Cabinet Committee on National Security. Further, the Government should institute a review of Canada’s intelligence services and report the findings to Parliament. Finally, the Government should also facilitate increased parliamentary oversight in this area by the new Standing Committee on Security and Intelligence recommended above.
3.4 The Future of Canada-United States Defence Cooperation
… the people of the United States will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened….
President Franklin D. Roosevelt,
Kingston, Ontario, August 1938.
... we too have obligations as a good friendly neighbour … and one of these is to see that, at our own insistence, our country is made as immune from attack or possible invasion as we can reasonably be expected to make it.…
Should the occasion ever arise, enemy forces should not be able to pursue their way, either by land, sea or air, to the United States, across Canadian territory.
Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King,
Woodbridge, Ontario, August 1938.53
NORAD and the Defence of North America
… even if the Government decided to reduce significantly the level of defence cooperation with the United States, Canada would still be obliged to rely on the U.S. for help in protecting its territory and approaches and this assistance would then come on strictly American terms, unmitigated by the influence Canada enjoys as a result of its defence partnership with the United States and with our other NATO allies.
Government of Canada,1994 Defence White Paper.
Given the facts of geography and history, Canadian governments have long decided that this country could best be defended in cooperation with allies, the first and most important of which is the United States. As Professor Jim Fergusson of the University of Manitoba argued, “it is important that we understand and recognize fully that any threat through terrorists acts or what have you to the continental United States, to American cities, to American commerce, or to the American economy is a fundamental threat to Canadian national interests and Canadian national security.”54
The defence relationship between the two countries has been based for over six decades on the reciprocal defence obligations cited above. These were freely entered into by governments that, especially during the Cold War, almost always shared common perceptions of military threats against North America. However, the Canadian pledge also constituted recognition that if Canada did not address fundamental U.S. security concerns, they would be addressed by the United States itself a notion that has been called “defence against help.” As Professor Rob Huebert noted in Calgary:
We cannot lose sight of the fact we are bordered to a superpower. Fortunately, this is a superpower that shares many of the same political culture, orientation, interests, and objectives of Canada. That makes it a lot easier than, say, the position Poland or Finland have faced, but it is a relationship that has to be monitored.
We will have to be careful how we understand it. We will have to be careful not to overreact, but by the same token, we have to be careful not to under-appreciate where the American concerns are. In other words, we have a balancing act that has to be monitored and examined. We have to remain constantly vigilant.55
Over the past half century, Canada and the United States have developed a degree of military cooperation unparalleled in the world. There are currently over 80 treaty-level defence agreements and more than 250 memoranda of understanding between them, and about 145 bilateral fora in which defence matters are discussed. The most important of these fora is the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD), established through the 1940 Ogdensburg Agreement to “consider in the broad sense the defense of the northern half of the western hemisphere.”56
The two countries’ armed forces also cooperate closely in all military environments. This has allowed the Canadian military to maintain a high level of technical “interoperability” with American forces, an important goal of military planners in a country that expects to fight alongside allies and has also seen significant cuts to its military budget. Canadian naval vessels routinely integrate with U.S. carrier battle groups, and did so in the fall of 2001. Canadian infantry forces fought closely with, and under the control but not the command of U.S. forces in Afghanistan.
The keystone and symbol of bilateral military cooperation remains the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD), a unique binational institution through which the two countries have cooperated in the aerospace surveillance and defence of the continent since the late 1950s. In effect, at the time of its creation NORAD was the ultimate “homeland defence” mechanism for the two countries. Indeed, according to a recent American report: “With its integrated early-warning and command-and-control capabilities and its joint command, with the tradition of a U.S. commander and a Canadian deputy commander NORAD is arguably the most integrated binational defense organization in the world. Inarguably, it is the foundation stone of the U.S.-Canadian mutual security relationship.”57 As noted above, John Manley, testifying before the Committee as foreign minister, had rejected the idea of an undefined North American security “perimeter”. He later added, however, that “If perimeter means things like NORAD, I’m a lot more comfortable with it, because we understand what we’re talking about.”58
Both countries prefer to continue cooperating in the aerospace defence of North America. However, a combination of technological changes, the end of the Cold War, and declining Canadian military capabilities has meant that the American need for Canadian cooperation is probably less now than it was in the late 1950s. In light of continuing differences over the issue of missile defences, U.S. unhappiness with the level of Canadian defence spending, and an American decision after September 11 to reorganize its military forces in North America to better support homeland security, some Canadians have argued that we are at a critical juncture in our bilateral defence relationship. As Professor Fergusson put it: “In terms of defence and security, the only real issue that stood out there, ironically, was about the future of cooperation between Canada and the United States centred on NORAD, and the future of NORAD…. In a sense, where the economic element was driving toward integration, on the defence and security side the issue was in fact that of a degree of disintegration, or the fear of disintegration.”59
The United States “Northern Command” (NORTHCOM)
It will take a great deal of time before the United States gets its security house fully in order, just as it will take Canada time to sort out some of the aspects within the cooperation between defence and the other, non-defence departments and agencies in the federal and provincial governments. These processes have to work both within and between both countries as we try to find out how far cooperation will go and how far we need to move towards alternative models to the existing one, which has simply been centred on NORAD.
Jim Fergusson, University of Manitoba,
Evidence, Meeting No. 75, May 6, 2002.
… in this specific area you must ensure that you just do what is required. You do not give more than you need to give. If there are real threats to Canada that we feel we cannot cope with on our own and we need to deal with them on a bilateral basis, then we must negotiate arrangement[s] that will protect Canadian sovereignty and enhance it by ensuring that we have a cooperative relationship with the United States, or whoever the other partner would be, that affords us that enhanced security but does not diminish our sovereignty. That is in the negotiations. However, it can be very difficult … to ensure that we hold the line.
Jill Sinclair, Acting ADM, Global and Security Policy, DFAIT.60
While not carried out by military forces, the September 11 attacks had important military consequences, including NATO’s invocation for the first time in its history of its Article 5 collective defence provision. The attacks also led the United States to rethink its defence structures and relationships, including those with Canada. In November 2001, following talks in Washington, the Minister of National Defence told reporters that Canada and the United States were reviewing all aspects of their defence cooperation. In his words: “We’ll be looking at areas of cooperation … in view of the changed security environment as of September 11.” He added: “I’m not going to speculate on the outcome of this other than to say that we’re out to improve the relationship and the safety and security of the people of our two countries and our continent.”61 The following months saw the beginning of an important debate over the future of bilateral defence cooperation, centred on NORAD.
Within months of the terrorist attacks, the U.S. military let it be known that it proposed for the first time to restructure existing U.S. commands to create one known as Northern Command (NORTHCOM), with responsibility for all U.S. forces in North America, as well as geographic responsibility for Canada and Mexico. When the plans for Northern Command were finally announced in April 2002, it became clear that this reorganization was designed primarily to allow U.S. military forces to better assist civilian first responders in the event of a natural disaster or terrorist incident involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD). When asked in September 2002 how NORTHCOM differed from other U.S. unified commands around the world, its new commander General Ralph “Ed” Eberhart (who is also the Commander of NORAD) responded that the main difference was that, since its responsibility is the U.S. homeland, it would have to provide unified support for civil authorities including the President and the Secretary of Defense. He added that this would require improving relations with local law enforcement agencies to detect and deter terrorist acts and to train and work with emergency responders.62
Given the lack of detail concerning the implications of Northern Command for Canada-U.S. defence relations, observers reacted differently. Former foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy warned the Committee in Vancouver of “increasing pressure for military integration.” Given the simultaneous pressures for economic integration, Mr. Axworthy told the Committee that
… the interaction between those two … creates, I think, a series of very major questions Canadians have to answer about the degree to which we will maintain our ability to manoeuvre, our freedom of choice, and our ability to make judgements based upon what we calculate to be our own interests and our own values. It is important not to treat these things in isolation but to see this as a cascading effect, one that really has to be examined in all its implications.63
A provocative high-profile study entitled Canadian Armed Forces Under U.S. Command, commissioned by Mr. Axworthy’s Liu Centre for the Study of Global Issues at the University of British Colombia and written by Canadian law professor Michael Byers of Duke University, highlighted a wide variety of legal and other issues that could arise if Canada agreed to closer “integration” with U.S. military forces without thinking through the implications. As Professor Byers told the Committee in presenting the study’s main conclusions and recommendations: “There are very many questions and not all that many answers, but that in itself is reflective of the uncertainty of the situation we’re working with.” He added: “The U.S. isn’t malicious, but things could happen because we both haven’t anticipated them.”64
Jim Fergusson dismissed as “hysteria” arguments that the United States was “dictating to” Canada in this area, and fears about the implications of Northern Command.65 As well, Dr. Granatstein dismissed the Axworthy/Byers arguments as a misunderstanding of Northern Command, noting that it is an internal U.S. structure. However, he also disagreed with their broader arguments about Canadian sovereignty. As he put it:
Very simply, Mr. Axworthy’s concerns are largely wrong in fact. They are certainly not in the interests of Canada and continental defence. By all means, Canadians need to raise their concerns about further integration with the United States military. But in their desire to stay a sovereign nation, they must not forget what is at stake. With almost 90% of our trade going to or passing through the United States, our well-being depends on good relations with our superpower neighbour.66
As noted earlier, Dr. Granatstein also argued that Canada effectively had “no choice” but to agree to long-standing U.S. demands in areas such as missile defences and defence spending. On the basis of that controversial assessment, he proposed that
… it would be good sense for Ottawa to press for the creation of an expanded NORAD arrangement that covers both nations’ land and naval forces and preserves Canada’s status in the binational NORAD.
Such suggestions run up against the DFAIT concerns about sovereignty and autonomy, and likely the Finance Department’s fear that if Canada expands NORAD to cover homeland defence, American pressures for much greater defence spending might be too strong to be ignored. The question, however, must be approached exactly as the national missile defence question. The U.S. is determined to improve its homeland defence and is certain to approach this subject, as it must, from a continental perspective….
Canada thus has the choice to stand back and allow the Americans to plan for the use of Canadian territory or to participate in the decisions.67
Although Northern Command is a strictly American initiative, it will have implications for Canada. Moreover, as a group of American experts noted in September 2002:
Because of its classified nature, the … review process inevitably created valid concerns on the part of Canadian officials. By necessity the Canadians were not formally briefed on the proposed blueprint for the new command until January, when it was first approved by President Bush, giving Canadian media months to speculate on the potential impact of the new command on mutual security arrangements. Clearly the creation of such a major command would affect the form and function of NORAD. But how exactly?68
In fact, since American forces would now be combined under one command, U.S. officials did favour the extension of NORAD functions to include naval and land forces. As these experts outlined the implications:
U.S. officials would … like to see NORAD’s operational scope which is now limited to warning against missile attack and detection and defense against air threats such as bombers expanded to include the maritime, land and civil support domains. That would make NORAD’s organizational structure roughly parallel with the new Northern Command, which will likewise include air, land and sea elements, as well as civil support functions.69
The Committee notes that during its meetings with senior officials in Washington, Frank Miller of the National Security Council pointed out that, since joint defence is always more effective, the United States would like Canada to cooperate as far as it is prepared to; the United States also wishes to begin discussions with Mexico.
In any event, a Canadian negotiating team, led by officials from the Department of National Defence which includes the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness (OCIPEP) and including representatives from DFAIT reportedly rejected the case for NORAD taking on land and sea functions. In support of its position, the team pointed out that the need for immediate reaction necessary in the case of aerospace threats did not exist in the other environments. According to testimony before a parliamentary committee in August 2002 and later reports, it instead agreed to the establishment of a small binational planning and monitoring group, to be co-located at NORAD headquarters, which would work on both contingency planning such as response to natural disasters or WMD terrorism incidents and ongoing monitoring. Reflecting recent criticism of security along coastlines and at ports, Vice-Chief of Defence Staff Lieutenant-General George Macdonald told a conference in September 2002 that “the maritime aspects of this will be more robustly developed in the shorter term than the land aspects would be.”70The Minister of National Defence also indicated that negotiations were under way to allow Canadian and American military forces to cross the border quickly when requested by the other country to assist in emergency response. On December 9, 2002, the Canadian government announced that a binational Planning Group, to be headed by a Canadian, would be established for an initial two-year period.
Such a planning and monitoring group raises fewer questions than an expanded NORAD arrangement would. Nonetheless, like the broader quest for ever-greater “interoperability”, it does raise some. Professor Byers had told the Committee in Vancouver:
… you will go back to Ottawa and will probably be told the plan the defence ministry in the United States want [sic] to implement is something called a policy cell, which simply involves sending in 50 or 100 Canadian officers to … provide close cooperation with the United States.
In my view, without a detailed explanation as to how it would operate, that policy cell raises exactly the same kinds of potential problems as any other form of closer military cooperation. The same questions need to be asked and answered. Regardless of what you call it, the question is, would Canada’s policies and would its freedom to act be compromised in a crisis situation? If a policy cell meant that [a] Canadian frigate 400 miles off Sable Island would do something the Government of Canada wasn’t consulted on, then it is the same as operational control or command.71
Joel Sokolsky, Dean of Arts at the Royal Military College in Kingston, pointed out that contingency agreements raise expectations of immediate response. In his words: “The time to question those arrangements is not when the crisis comes.… Something like this raises expectations in the United States that in the event of an emergency that threatens the United States, Canada would agree that if it couldn’t handle it, American troops would be requested to assist.”72
For this and other reasons, Dalhousie University political scientists Danford Middlemiss and Denis Stairs have recently argued that “continued participation in the kind of interoperability arrangement that NORAD represents entails certain costs, some of which are political and some financial.” Canadians have chosen to pay these costs in relation to NORAD. They add, however, that “the political dimensions of military interoperability with the United States may now warrant more attention than they have tended in the past to receive.”73
The Committee believes that in the current context of increased terrorist threats, Canadians can accept the need for increased contingency planning and monitoring. Yet the need for an expanded NORAD has yet to be proven, and would, at a minimum, require a full debate before the next renewal of the NORAD agreement.
The Government should make public all relevant agreements under which Canadian military planners will participate in the newly proposed planning and monitoring group to be co-located at NORAD headquarters. In order to allow for a full public debate over the group’s usefulness and broader implications, the Government should also prepare and table a report on the work of this new group before the next renewal of the NORAD agreement.
The Question of Missile Defences
… [it is] very difficult indeed for the Canadian government to reject any major defence proposals which the United States government presents with conviction as essential for the security of North America.74
Hon. Brooke Claxton,
Minister of National Defence, 1953.
External’s view of the U.S. relationship precluded anything that resembled direct defiance of American wishes that were based on the matter of security. The usual approach was to concede what could not be denied but leave a way open for either reconsidering or diluting those parts of the arrangement that were not thought to be in Canada’s own interests.75
Department of External Affairs, 1947-78.
The construction of defences against ballistic missiles has been a complicated and controversial issue for decades, both in the United States and among allies such as Canada. As Dr. George Lindsey, a former senior official at the Department of National Defence, pointed out to the Committee, however, in the current context, missile defence
… has several very important implications for Canada in different fields. Defence of North America against intercontinental attack is the main one, but not the only one. … We also have to be worried about operations overseas, where ballistic missiles are very likely to be used, but they’ll be shorter-range, theatre-range types, probably not with nuclear weapons. But Canadian troops are very likely to be involved in these operations. A third element, which is perhaps closer to the deliberations of your committee, is the relations between Canada and the United States. That isn’t just over defence or security, but includes the exchange of intelligence and cooperation in pursuing high technology, and it will some day be very important, more than now even, for exploiting space. Finally, there are the effects of national missile defence on the proliferation of weapons and on arms control.76
The controversy surrounding missile defences peaked in the 1980s, when President Ronald Reagan announced a “Strategic Defense Initiative” (SDI) to build a space-based missile defence system. Despite being so technologically difficult that many believed it was unlikely to work in any event, critics pointed out that this “Star Wars” proposal was illegal under the 1972 U.S.-Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which had prohibited extensive missile defences. Moreover, they claimed, the proposal broke a tacit agreement to protect space for peaceful uses and was provocative, therefore likely to ignite another nuclear arms race. The Mulroney government refused the invitation to participate officially in SDI, but allowed Canadian companies to do so.
The Clinton administration rejected the idea of a space-based missile defence system. Nonetheless, given Saddam Hussein’s use of Scud missiles in the Gulf War of 1990-91, the United States did continue research on short-range “theatre” systems. The year 1998 saw both the report of a commission chaired by Donald Rumsfeld warning of the “possibility” (rather than the probability) that rogue states could acquire ballistic missiles with outside help, and North Korea’s surprise testing of a multi-stage missile. As a result, the U.S. Congress passed a law that required the deployment of an effective National Missile Defense system “as soon as technologically possible.” The Clinton administration hoped to preserve the ABM Treaty by negotiating amendments with Russia to allow it to deploy a limited land-based system, designed to protect against both the “rogue” threat and any accidental launch from Russia or China.
The Clinton administration acknowledged that diplomatic considerations specifically, the impact on arms control negotiations would be an important factor in the decisions surrounding missile defences. Beyond the opposition of Russia and China, many U.S. allies disagreed with the “rogue” threat and simply did not believe the benefits of such a system outweighed its diplomatic, financial and other costs.
Canadian support would have helped the U.S. administration on two grounds: politically, since it would be difficult to convince other allies that there was a credible missile threat to North America if the other North American ally did not agree; and perhaps technically, since Canadian agreement would mean the system could be controlled through existing NORAD facilities. The Canadian government remained unenthusiastic, however, and since the U.S. government never officially asked it to participate, Canada was not forced to take a decision.
Russia refused to amend the ABM Treaty, and the Clinton administration eventually deferred the decision on missile defence, citing insufficient progress both technically and diplomatically. The new Bush administration came to power arguing that the major threat to the security of the United States was rogue states armed with weapons of mass destruction and missiles to deliver them.
Paradoxically, both sides in the missile defence debate claimed they had been proven right by September 11. Those opposed to such systems pointed out that if they had been built (at great financial and other costs), they would not have prevented the attacks, which were carried out not by using high-tech missiles launched from rogue states but by hijacking commercial airliners. As Carolyn Bassett of the Canadian Peace Alliance told the Committee in Toronto:
… we were quite surprised to see in the post-September 11 context a renewed commitment to developing the missile defence program when in fact we know it could not only have done nothing to prevent the attacks that took place on that date, but actually would be virtually useless if a terrorist organization were to even obtain a nuclear device.…
The delivery mechanism itself would be outside the capacity of any terrorist organization. You could not develop something like that secretly. It would be known, and it would presumably be dealt with long before it ever got to that stage.…
The expense of developing something like that really makes no sense when there are so many more practical purposes to which the money could be used that could have a much more immediate, positive effective on everyone’s security, our own security here in North America and everyone’s security around the world.77
Those in favour of missile defences saw the attacks as evidence that America was vulnerable. While the immediate U.S. priority following the attacks was the fight against terrorism, Stephen Flynn of the Council on Foreign Relations told the Committee in November 2001, in relation to missile defences “This is almost a religious issue in the United States, so it will continue, but I would definitely say a lot of the air has been sucked out of its sails.”78 On the other hand, despite a focus on terrorism, the Bush administration did not abandon the idea of missile defences. President Bush linked them to terrorism in the January 2002 State of the Union address by describing Iraq, Iran and North Korea as “axis of evil” states pursuing the development of weapons of mass destruction and missiles, which they might then give to terrorists. In practical terms, the administration has announced that it will pursue a “layered” system that may involve land, sea or air elements. It has removed the word “national” from the former term National Missile Defense (NMD), in recognition that such defences may be shared with allies, and has eliminated the distinction between research on “strategic” and “theatre” systems. Overall, it has boosted spending on missile defence by about 50%.79
As the respected International Institute for Strategic Studies put it in May 2002, under the title “Bin Laden Kills the ABM Treaty”:
The events of 11 September settled the issue. The attacks dramatically increased the American public’s sense of vulnerability and completely undercut efforts by Senate Democrats to challenge the administration’s desire to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. For the average American, it didn’t matter that the attacks came in the form of civilian airliners rather than ballistic missiles. All defences had to be strengthened against these irrational enemies, who appeared willing to do anything to attack America. As a result, domestic opposition … was virtually mute. Internationally, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s strategic decision to side with Washington in the campaign against global terrorism gave the U.S. more confidence that it could walk away from the ABM Treaty without damaging other aspects of the U.S.-Russian relationship.… This calculation proved correct.80
President Putin announced that, while he continued to believe that the U.S. move was a “mistake”, it did not threaten the security of the Russian Federation. The combination of the removal of the ABM treaty as a legal obstacle and Russia’s acceptance of U.S. plans severely undercut the arguments of missile defence opponents. They continue to start those arguments, however, by pointing to the lack of a real need for a system. They note, for example, that the American intelligence community reported in December 2001 its belief that the United States is more likely to be attacked with weapons of mass destruction by non-missile means, since these “… are less costly, easier to acquire and more reliable and accurate. They can also be used without attribution.”81
Opponents of the U.S. missile defence plans also point out that, while Russia does not see these programs as a threat to its security, China still does. Although China is not in the same league as the United States and Russia in terms of nuclear arsenals, a Chinese decision to significantly increase its much smaller ballistic missile force of about 20 long-range missiles in order to try to preserve an effective deterrent would probably lead rival India to build more missiles, and therefore Pakistan as well. As Kerry Duncan McCartney of Project Ploughshares Calgary said to the Committee, “in the open literature the analysis of the situation in Asia regarding the Chinese versus the Pakistanis and the Indians is quite generally accepted. We do risk destabilizing the world by moving into a missile defence scheme.”82 In practice, the Chinese government is probably at least as worried about two other points. First, it is concerned about the impact of increased research on theatre missile defences, since these might eventually be provided to Taiwan. Second, it fears that missile defence programs may lead to the U.S. weaponization of space a situation to which China, a developing space power, objects.
At the broader level, long-standing concerns about the impact of missile defences on the multilateral arms control regime have been partly addressed by the removal of the ABM restriction. More generally, many still fear that the pursuit of a layered missile defence system will eventually involve the weaponization of space, in contravention of international agreements. Ambassador for Disarmament Chris Westdal told the Committee in April 2002 that: “We accord a high priority to the prevention of the weaponization of outer space, as distinct from the militarization, which has already taken place.” He went on to offer the following assessment:
… I don’t think arguments about the sanctuary of the heavens and the sentiment that it would be nice to keep them free from weapons will win the day. Arguments would have to be hard nosed about the security interests that would be served or compromised by such a ban on the weaponization of space and by the implications for enormous and growing economic assets and our enormous and growing dependence on satellites for our civilization and for our global economy.… Our own analysis is that the costs of that kind of weaponization would exceed, by a great margin, the military benefits that might be gained. Those are subjects that need to be explored further, and that’s an exploration we’re encouraging.83
Among witnesses who argued that Canada should support missile defences, few focused on a rogue state threat to either the United States or Canada. In effect, their argument was that, while missile defence may still not be a good idea, the benefits of supporting it now outweigh the costs, particularly if these might threaten NORAD and even the broader defence relationship. As Dr. Granatstein put it: “Most Canadian officials downplay the rogue state threat and worry about American unilateralism. If the research failed to produce a useful defensive system, almost no one would weep.” However, he continued: “If Canada takes a high moral stand against the NMD defensive system … the Canadians in NORAD could no longer fully participate in the warning and assessment process. The implications of this are clear: the Americans might prefer to close down NORAD as an integrated command or to give NMD to their Space Command, perhaps even amalgamating it with the U.S. Strategic Command. For all practical purposes, NORAD’s gutting would take with it all Canadian influence on continental air defence, and it will almost certainly affect the vast flow of intelligence Canada receives from American sources.”
In Granatstein’s view: “If Canada accepts NMD, on the other hand, and missile defence goes to NORAD, Canadian influence might actually increase. No one suggests that Canada will acquire go or no-go authority over NMD if NORAD runs the show, but Canada will have the right to consultation, the right to participation, the right to a place at the table when decisions are made.” Accordingly, he drew the following conclusion: “As the United States under the Bush administration is all but certain to proceed, Canada must choose between high morality and great practicality. In such circumstances, when morality will only anger the Bush administration and hurt Canadian interests, there is no choice. The time for maximum benefit may have already slipped by; nonetheless, the earlier Canada agrees to support the NMD decision, the better.84
From another perspective, Dr. George Lindsey had this advice for the Committee:
I would try very hard to keep us in NORAD, and that might involve our having a bigger part to play in national missile defence than we would really like. Then, if the Americans urged us to do more, my advice would be, let us work on the short-range missiles and the overhead observation, which we can use to know what’s going on in our own country and get some good out of it. Usually, to get good out of something, you have to pay something and give in a little bit, but that isn’t quite the same as huffing and puffing and trying to start World War III, which we don’t want to do.85
Most observers probably agree that the cost/benefit calculations related to missile defences have changed significantly over the past year: while most allies still probably would not give priority to such a system themselves, the downside costs are much less now that the ABM Treaty is no longer a legal barrier and Russia has accepted the U.S. missile defence plans.
In the next chapter, the Committee cautions against the practice of linking unrelated issues. At the same time, Stéphane Roussel advised us, satisfying one aspect of U.S. security concerns in North America may give the Government of Canada more latitude over the long term on others. As he put it:
… homeland defence is a concept that will guide American foreign policy in the years to come, and anti-missile defence is an essential component of that policy.
[It is] not going to have as big an impact on Canadians’ daily life as, for example, the security perimeter, which is another component of homeland defence.… It would be better, for the Canadian government, to accept some compromises in the area of anti-missile defence to demonstrate goodwill in Washington and to say that the country was prepared to contribute to the defence of North America, even if that called into question certain aspects of arms control policy and even if that generated some discomfort on the international scene. Saying yes to anti-missile defence may give us some flexibility enabling us to negotiate other aspects that may have a much more direct impact on the lives of Canadians. By this I mean the security perimeter, border control, law enforcement. The harmonization of policies is something that will have much more of an effect on the lives of Canadian citizens than anti-missile defence.…
If we can negotiate … I would tend to make a lot more concessions in the area of anti-missile defence in the hope that this would give me more elbow room when discussing other aspects of the security perimeter, thereby ensuring that we would be able to preserve those matters which Canadian citizens care deeply about, such as the health system, immigration, the Firearms Act, and potable water. All of these sectors must be preserved, and we may be able to gain some flexibility by doing this.86
Unfortunately, as former senior American defence official and now Johns Hopkins University Professor Eliot Cohen recently summarized the lessons of decades of controversy over missile defences:
First, the impulse to defend one’s country against attack from long-range missiles is durable and, in the final analysis, compelling. Second, the technological capability to do so remains unproven.… People tend to be obsessed with either the logic of missile defense or its technology, but they never take both into account.… That dilemma is why … a dialogue of the deaf on this subject will continue.87
The question of how best to address the threat of missiles is a challenging one, and Committee members have struggled to achieve a degree of consensus on it. Missiles do present a real danger, and in the first instance, multilateral diplomatic means to address them must be redoubled. As Ernie Regehr of Project Ploughshares has argued: “The missile threat is global. The threat to use them to deliver weapons of mass destruction is wrong make that evil no matter who does the threatening. Protection against it requires global standards and action.…”88
At the same time, while any benefits of missile defences will become clear only in several years, recent developments have significantly reduced the diplomatic and other costs associated with the pursuit of such systems. The Government of Canada would certainly not give priority to the pursuit of such a system on its own, but its close alliance with the United States requires it to take U.S. perceptions of vulnerability seriously.
The Government should not make a decision about missile defence systems being developed by the United States, as the technology has not been proven and details of deployment are not known. However, the Government should continue to monitor development of this program with the Government of the United States and continue to oppose the weaponization of outer space.
The Question of Defence Spending
There is a tripping point beyond which any effort to right yourself requires a really Herculean effort, and I think the Canadian military is already below it.…You get into a vicious cycle where the amounts of money needed grow ever bigger until politicians throw up their hands and say we could never justify that level of spending, so let’s give up and leave defense of North America to the Americans. That’s dangerous thinking, however, because Canada has long recognized that in order to stay in the game and maintain its special relationship with the United States, they had to ante up a certain minimum amount of military capability. Canada has now fallen below that minimum.89
Dwight Mason, U.S. Co-Chair,
Permanent Joint Board on Defence, 1994-2001.
While missile defence represents a specific issue, a more general concern that came up in a number of the Committee’s hearings related to the issue of defence spending. On one level, U.S. arguments that its allies need to spend more on their shared defence are decades old, although the earlier term “burden sharing” has been replaced by “responsibility sharing”.
In recent years, and particularly since the huge increase in U.S. defence spending following the September 11 attacks, the United States has continued to argue that all its allies need to increase their defence spending. Within this general context, critics point out that Canada’s defence spending is among the lowest in NATO. In addition, they point to the fact that even the Chief of the Defence Staff has argued that the status quo “is not sustainable”.
Within the context of Canada-U.S relations, U.S. Ambassador Paul Cellucci has repeatedly (“respectfully”) called on the Canadian government to increase its defence spending. As he has pointed out more than once: “The one specific instruction Secretary [of State Colin] Powell gave me before I came to Canada was that ‘You have to get the Canadians to spend more money on defence.’”90 A number of witnesses argued that Canada must finally increase its defence spending if it wishes to be taken seriously by the United States in terms of defence and security. For example, Jack Granatstein argued: “We’ve saved the money we should have spent on defence and put it into other things, and the Americans have defended us. What kind of sovereignty do we have if that’s the situation in which we live.” He continued:
I would like to see us move as rapidly as we can toward the NATO average spending on defence which is exactly double ours in percent of GNP terms from 1.1% to 2.2% of GNP. If we do that, raise the number in our forces to 80,000 to 85,000, put an extra 10,000 people in the army, an extra 5,000 to 8,000 in the navy, and the remaining 10,000 or so in the air force, and get the new equipment we need, then we will have the capacity to play a role in the world. It will be a better role than peacekeeping; it will be a role in the defence of North America, and a better role in NATO operations in Bosnia and possibly elsewhere. We can’t do those things now without subjecting our men and women in the armed forces to extraordinary strain.
The quality of life of the Canadian Forces has deteriorated dramatically. The numbers cannot be sustained at their present 54,000, which is the real strength of the Canadian Forces. In the next two or three years, we’re facing a major departure from the forces of our senior NCOs and our officers because of age requirements.
The reality is we’re on the verge of becoming virtually defenceless. And if we do that, then there’ll be no question of defending North America; there’ll be no question of protecting our sovereignty. We will, very simply, have to rely on the Americans for everything. We cannot stay a sovereign state if that is the case. 91
Several arguments have been made in response. These include the facts that: the United States argues that all NATO allies need to increase their defence spending; in terms of dollars spent, Canada’s 2001 defence budget was the sixth largest in NATO; and while the number of Canadian troops participating in UN missions is very low, the numbers participating in important regions such as Bosnia remain high. Moreover, in terms of the key U.S. focus on “homeland security” measures including intelligence, law enforcement and border security as we have already noted, the $7.7 billion the Government of Canada committed in the December 2001 budget was proportionally larger than the amount the United States spent on the same items.
Nevertheless, a key theme of both the Committee’s interim report last fall and this report is the need for the Government of Canada to provide adequate resources for Canadian foreign policy. The amount of money spent on the Canadian military does not have to be increased in order to address American security concerns in North America. The Committee agrees, however, with the many experts, as well as parliamentary committees, that have reported unanimously on this topic, that spending does have to be increased in order to allow the Canadian Forces to carry out the surveillance of Canadian territory and effectively play their traditional role as a key instrument of Canadian foreign policy. The fact that such an increase would be seen positively by the United States is an added benefit.
Following the elimination of the federal deficit, the Government of Canada rightly focused its first defence spending increases on addressing serious “quality of life” issues facing the men and women of the Canadian Forces. The time has come, however, for the Government to recommit itself in this area. Whether as peacekeepers or peacemakers, effective military forces remain an important element of Canadian foreign policy. The question is not simply how much money is spent, of course, but on what it is spent and for what purpose. As Michael Byers summarized the report commissioned by Mr. Axworthy’s Liu Centre for the Study of Global Issues:
… we probably need to spend more on the Canadian military, but we need to spend it on Canadian priorities as the Canadian government deems these priorities to be. I have my own views as to what those priorities should be. They would include logistics and intelligence gathering.
The report is not saying we shouldn’t spend money on defence, and it’s not saying we should stop cooperating with the Americans. It’s saying we should cooperate with the Americans; we need to invest in our defence, but we need to do so on our terms, in favour of our interests, after having thought very carefully about what we’re doing.92
While the Government has committed itself to reviewing Canada’s long-term foreign policy and defence requirements, the Committee believes that the Canadian Forces will need additional resources in order to fulfill their key role in Canadian foreign policy.
Taking into consideration the forthcoming reviews of Canada’s foreign and defence policy, and recognizing the important contribution of the Canadian Forces in achieving Canada’s foreign policy goals, the Government should commit itself to substantially increased and stable multi-year funding for the Department of National Defence.
The Question of Political Oversight
While many of the defence and security issues discussed in this chapter have important technical elements, the responsibility for judging and ultimately approving them rests with the political leadership of the country. As Lloyd Axworthy pointed out to the Committee, “technical” issues, such as an agreement to allow cruise missile testing in Canada, can also become political.93
Although it is neither possible nor probably advisable to attempt to make all Members of Parliament expert in the areas of defence and security issues within North America, it is important that they have more than a passing awareness of them. One method of doing this is through the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD). As the 1994 Defence White Paper pointed out: “The Permanent Joint Board on Defence is the senior advisory body on continental security and is composed of two national sections made up of diplomatic and military representatives. Its meetings have served as a window on Canada-US defence relations for more than five decades.” It added: “The government believes that the Board will remain a valuable forum where national interests are articulated and where frank exchanges on current issues allow discussion of the full spectrum of security and defence issues facing our two countries.”94
The Board is currently co-chaired by a Canadian Member of Parliament and a senior U.S. government official. While a low profile has probably helped the day-to-day work of the PJBD, James Wright, the Assistant Deputy Minister for Global and Security Policy at DFAIT, told the Committee last fall that “I think we will see a heightened political interest in the work of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence.… Ministers will be monitoring this process more closely. They may decide they wish to associate themselves more directly with this process from time to time. It’s an option that is certainly out there.”95 To date, ministers have not in fact participated more fully in the work of the Board, although the Committee believes this would be useful. In addition, the Committee will explore means of interacting directly with members of the Board, and encouraging U.S. and even, potentially, Mexican colleagues to do the same.
In view of the changed security environment in North America since September 11, 2001, the governments of Canada and the United States should expand the mandate of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence to include relevant security issues and officials. The Government of Canada should also facilitate interactions between the Board and Canadian Members of Parliament, and encourage the Government of the United States to do likewise.
More generally, the Canadian Ministers of Foreign Affairs and National Defence along with the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense and other relevant Cabinet members as may be necessary should meet at least once a year, alternating between Canada and the United States, to discuss mutual defence and security issues. These meetings should be coordinated with the Permanent Joint Board on Defence.
|1||S. Neil MacFarlane and Monica Serrano, “NAFTA: The Security Dimension,” in Louise Fawcett and Monica Serrano, eds., Regionalism’s “Third Wave”: The Americas (forthcoming; cited by permission of the authors).|
|2||Evidence, Meeting No. 79, May 8, 2002.|
|3||Christopher Sands, “Fading Power or Rising Power: 11 September and Lessons From the Section 110 Experience,” in Norman Hillmer and Maureen Appel Molot, eds., Canada Among Nations 2002: A Fading Power, Oxford University Press, Don Mills, 2002, p. 65-68. |
|4||“President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point, Remarks by the President at 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States Military Academy West Point, New York,” White House News Releases, June 2002. See also the International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Dealing With the ‘Axis of Evil’: The U.S. and the ‘Perilous Crossroads,’” Strategic Comments, Volume 8, Issue 5, June 2002.|
|5||Evidence, Meeting No. 76, May 6, 2002.|
|6||Monica Serrano, “U.S.-Mexico Security Relations in the 21st Century,” in Peter Andreas and Tom Bierstecker, eds., Re-Bordering North America? Integration and Exclusion after 9-11, New York, Routledge (forthcoming).|
|7||Canada did not join the Rio Treaty when it joined the OAS in 1990, yet does not discount its usefulness to its member states.|
|8||See Hal Klepak, “Hemispheric Security After the Towers Went Down,” Canadian Foundation for the Americas (FOCAL), FOCAL Policy Paper FPP-02-4, Ottawa, February 2002.|
|9||“Speaking Notes for the Honourable Art Eggleton, Minister of National Defence, at the Mexico Defence College,” Mexico, Mexico City, January 22, 2002, p. 6.|
|10||Evidence, Meeting No. 79, May 8, 2002.|
|11||Evidence, Meeting No. 75, May 6, 2002.|
|12||Evidence, Meeting No. 77, May 7, 2002.|
|13||Evidence, Meeting No. 76, May 6, 2002.|
|14||Ibid. See also Canadian Armed Forces Under U.S. Command, Liu Centre for the Study of Global Issues, University of British Columbia, May 2002.|
|15||Evidence, Meeting No. 90, June 13, 2002.|
|16||Evidence, Meeting No. 57, February 19, 2002.|
|17||The work of CUSP will be discussed further in the following chapter.|
|18||Tim Naumetz, “Expert Slams ‘Mindlessly’ Beefed-Up Border,” The Ottawa Citizen, September 24, 2002.|
|19||Christopher Sands (2002), p. 52.|
|20||See Lisa M. Seghetti, “Border Security: U.S.-Canada Border Issues,” CRS Report for Congress, Washington, Congressional Research Service, 8 July, 2002, p. 2.|
|21||Stephen Gallagher, “The Open Door Beyond the Moat: Canadian Refugee Policy From a Comparative Perspective,” in Hillmer and Molot (2002), p. 117.|
|22||George Haynal, “Interdependence, Globalization and North American Borders,” prepared for presentation at the Symposium on Governance and Public Security, Alan K. Campbell Public Affairs Institute, Maxwell School, Syracuse University, 18 January 2002, p. 14.|
|23||Stephen Clarkson, Uncle Sam and Us: Globalization, Neoconservatism and the Canadian State, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2002, p. 403.|
|24||Evidence, Meeting No. 82, May 9, 2002.|
|25||Evidence, Meeting No. 76, May 6, 2002.|
|26||Stephen Clarkson, “Uncle Sam and Us One Year Later: The Geopolitical Consequences for Canada of September 11th,” in “9/11: Canada and the World, One Year Later,” Canadian Issues, Association for Canadian Studies, September 2002.|
|27||Reid Morden, “Canada and the U.S. Must Protect Each Other,” The Ottawa Citizen, September 16, 2002.|
|28||U.S. Department of State, “Homeland Security,” Foreign Press Center Briefing, Washington, September 5, 2002. |
|29||According to Clarkson, this was proportionately more than the United States spent on these issues. (“Uncle Sam and Us One Year Later: The Geopolitical Consequences for Canada of September 11,”) loc. cit.|
|30||For a recent set of ideas on the development of a national security policy for Canada, see W.D. Macnamara and Ann Fitz-Gerald, A National Security Policy Framework for Canada, Institute for Research on Public Policy, Montreal, October 2002. Available at: www.irpp.org.|
|31||Evidence, Meeting No. 74, May 2, 2002.|
|32||Although outside the Committee’s mandate, in one of the many areas that could be addressed, Richard Chenoweth of Securitas Canada pointed out in Toronto that the thousands of private security providers in Canada are regulated under different provincial regimes, and that little interest has been shown in coordinating these standards since September 11 (Evidence, Meeting No. 79, May 8, 2002).|
|33|| George Haynal, 2002, p. 9.|
|34||Evidence, Meeting No. 76, May 6, 2002.|
|35||Evidence, Meeting No. 77, May 7, 2002.|
|36||Evidence, Meeting No. 88, June 6, 2002. For a useful discussion of some of the lessons that might be learned from the contrasting European and Mexican experiences with border management, see several recent reports from the executive study tours undertaken by the Ottawa-based Public Policy Forum: Disappearing Borders and Economic Integration: Learning from the European Union, Report of the November 2-9, 2001 tour; and The New Dynamics of North America: U.S.-Mexico Relations and the Border Economy, Report of the May 10-17, 2002 tour, both available at: www.ppforum.ca.|
|37||Evidence, Meeting No. 76, May 6, 2002.|
|38||Evidence, Meeting No. 45, November 27, 2001.|
|39||Evidence, Meeting No. 30, October 4, 2001.|
|40||Evidence, Meeting No. 76, May 6, 2002.|
|41||Government of Canada, “Progress Report Security and Opportunity at the U.S.-Canada Border,”|
June 28, 2002, p. 1.
|42||“Notes for a Statement by the Honourable John Manley, Deputy Prime Minister of Canada and Minister of Infrastructure and Crown Corporations, to the House of Commons Subcommittee on National Security,” Ottawa, April 10, 2002, p. 5.|
|43||See “Governor Ridge and Deputy Prime Minister Manley Issue One-Year Status Report on the Smart Border Action Plan,” Government of Canada News Release, December 6, 2002, as well as the related Smart Border Action Plan Status Report.|
|44||Evidence, Meeting No. 88, June 6, 2002.|
|45||“Minister Coderre Seeks Government Approval of Safe Third Country Agreement,” Citizenship and Immigration Canada, News Release (2002-26), Ottawa, September 10, 2002.|
|46||Evidence, Meeting No. 76, May 6, 2002.|
|47||Kurt M. Campbell and Michele A. Flournoy, To Prevail: An American Strategy for the Campaign Against Terrorism, Washington, Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 2001, p. 78. For a good overview of Canadian developments in this area since last September, see Reg Whitaker’s “9/11 and The Canadian Security and Intelligence Community,” a paper presented to a September 2002 conference of the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies (CASIS). Available at www.sfu.ca/igs/CASIS/Whitaker.pdf.|
|48||The Canadian government has also created four Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams in major urban centres to better integrate intelligence and enforcement perspectives on national security issues at an early stage. |
|49||Denis Stairs, “9/11 ‘Terrorism,’ ‘Root Causes’ and All That: Policy Implications of the Socio-Cultural Argument,” Policy Options, September 2002, p. 10.|
|50||Evidence, Subcommittee on National Security of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, Meeting No. 3, April 10, 2002.|
|51||Evidence, Meeting No. 76, May 6, 2002.|
|52||Government of Canada, “Canadian Security and Military Preparedness,” The Government’s Response to the Report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, October 2002, p. 10. This response contains a review of all security and defence-related actions taken by the government over the past year.|
|54||Evidence, Meeting No. 75, May 6, 2002.|
|55||Evidence, Meeting No. 80, May 8, 2002.|
|57||Stephen Cundari et. al., The U.S.-Canada Strategic Partnership in the War on Terrorism, Center for the Study of the Presidency, August 2002, p. 5-6.|
|58||Evidence, Meeting No. 40, November 6, 2001.|
|59||Evidence, Meeting No. 75, May 6, 2002.|
|60||Evidence, Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence, Issue No. 19, August 14, 2002, morning session.|
|61||Tim Naumetz, “Canada, U.S. May Expand Joint Defence,”The Ottawa Citizen, November 22, 2001.|
|62||Master Sergeant Bob Haskell, “NORTHCOM Chief: Guard Key to Homeland Defense,” AirLINK News, September 10, 2002.|
|63||Evidence, Meeting No. 76, May 6, 2002.|
|65||Evidence, Meeting No. 75, May 6, 2002.|
|66||Evidence, Meeting No. 79, May 8, 2002.|
|68||Cundari et al., The U.S.-Canada Strategic Partnership in the War on Terrorism, Center for the Study of the Presidency, 2002, p. 8-9.|
|70||Robert Fife and Sheldon Alberts, “Canada, U.S. Devise Joint Military Unit,” National Post, September 17, 2002, p. A1. |
|71||Evidence, Meeting No. 76, May 6, 2002.|
|72||Daniel LeBlanc, “Plan Joint Troop Action in Detail, Experts Warn,”The Globe and Mail, August 29, 2002.|
|73||Danford W. Middlemiss and Denis Stairs, “The Canadian Forces and the Doctrine of Interoperability: The Issues,” Policy Matters, Volume 3, No. 7, Institute for Research on Public Policy, June 2002, p. 19 and p. 13.|
|74||Quoted in Joel Sokolsky, “The Future of North American Defence Cooperation,” International Journal 46 (Winter 1990-91).|
|75||Arthur Andrew, The Rise and Fall of a Middle Power: Canadian Diplomacy from King to Mulroney, Toronto, James Lorimer and Company, 1993, p. 52.|
|76||Evidence, Meeting No. 88, June 6, 2002.|
|77||Evidence, Meeting No. 79, May 8, 2002.|
|78||Evidence, Meeting No. 46, November 27, 2001.|
|79||Bradley Graham, “Missile Defense Choices Sought,” Washington Post, September 3, 2002, p. A01.|
|80||Strategic Survey 2001/2002, London, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002, p. 21.|
|81||Statement of Robert Walpole, hearing on the “CIA National Intelligence Estimate of Foreign Missile Development and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015,” before the Senate Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services, March 11, 2002, p. 2.|
|82||Evidence, Meeting No. 80, May 8, 2002.|
|83||Evidence, Meeting No. 72, April 25, 2002.|
|84||Evidence, Meeting No. 79, May 8, 2002.|
|85||Evidence, Meeting No. 88, June 6, 2002.|
|86||Evidence, Meeting No. 77, May 7, 2002.|
|87||Eliot A. Cohen, “Recent Books on International Relations,” Foreign Affairs, Volume 81, No. 3, May/June 2002, p. 158.|
|88||Ernie Regehr, “Getting Serious About the Ballistic Missile Threat,” Ploughshares Monitor, Spring 2002.|
|89||“The U.S.-Canada Strategic Partnership in the War on Terrorism,” Washington, Center for the Study of the Presidency, September 2002, p. 17.|
|90||Geoffrey Scotton, “Military Spending Gains Ground: U.S. Envoy’s Criticism Wins Supporters,” Calgary Herald, September 26, 2002. |
|91||Evidence, Meeting No. 79, May 8, 2002.|
|92||Evidence, Meeting No. 76, May 6, 2002.|
|94||Government of Canada, 1994 Defence White Paper, p. 21-22.|
|95||Evidence, Meeting No.43, November 20, 2001.|