PRB 07-43E
Jack Stilborn
Political and Social Affairs Division
5 October 2007
PDF (109 kB, 13 pages)
A number of changes to procedure and practice have been made in the House of Commons in recent years as part of an ongoing reform of this institution. This document considers the underlying reasons and key themes driving reform, the broad reform initiatives undertaken from 1980 to 2005, and recent and prospective initiatives. Concluding remarks are followed by a more detailed chronology of reform and a bibliography.
The current cycle of parliamentary reform responds to long-standing pressures for change, some of which have been heightened by recent events.
First, backbench and opposition frustration at the centralization of power in the hands of the prime minister and the Prime Minister’s Office has been a constant of parliamentary life for decades.
Second, concerns about the effectiveness of parliamentary institutions under modern conditions are also long-standing. The apparent ineffectiveness of Parliament’s established scrutiny and accountability functions in detecting the sponsorship scandal in advance of the Auditor General’s report in 2003 on the sponsorship program deepened these concerns, as did Parliament’s failure to detect earlier problems at Human Resources Development Canada or the firearms registry.(1)
Third, there is a broader concern about an apparent long-term decline in public confidence in politicians and political institutions. This trend was most recently documented in a report from the Minister for Democratic Reform, released on 10 September 2007. Based on extensive public consultations, the report identifies mistrust of members of Parliament (MPs) and frustration with the operation of the House of Commons as widespread attitudes. Perhaps reflecting this trend, voter participation in federal elections has declined from the levels of 75% to 80% typical of the 1950s and 1960s, to 61.5% in the 2004 election, for example, and 64.7% in 2006. Moreover, political engagement by young Canadians has fallen to extremely low levels from a traditional 50% voter participation rate to around 25% in recent elections. These figures have led to concern about an impending legitimacy crisis relating to Parliament and politics.
Until the 1970s, the dominant assumption of reformers was that the House of Commons was a legislative bottleneck and needed to become more efficient. This assumption reflected the pressures on the House created by the emergence of the modern interventionist state, with its volume of complex legislation.
By the mid-1970s, a new set of concerns had begun to arise. Parliament was seen as increasingly marginalized, reduced to rubber-stamping government legislation and spending proposals. This state of affairs was seen as a threat to the democratic character of the political process and as opening the door to unresponsive government, public disengagement and cynicism.
The post-1970s theme of House of Commons reform has been the belief that MPs need to be more independent and influential, and that this change would help to make Parliament more effective in counterbalancing the executive and more credible to the public. In the mid-1980s, the Special Committee on the Reform of the House of Commons (the McGrath Committee) declared, in language that could easily be used by reformers today:
The purpose of reform of the House of Commons in 1985 is to restore to private members an effective legislative function, to give them a meaningful role in the formation of public policy and, in so doing, to restore the House of Commons to its rightful place in the Canadian political process.
The present House of Commons committee system dates from 1968, when the committee structure was reorganized to reflect that of departments, and thus to foster specialized knowledge among committee members. However, it was not until the early 1980s that the contemporary themes of parliamentary reform began to emerge more clearly. Milestones in this cycle of reform included the following:
In February 2004 another cycle of reform was launched with the release by the Privy Council Office of the report Ethics, Responsibility, Accountability: An Action Plan for Democratic Reform. This document announced strengthened conflict-of-interest regimes for both houses of Parliament, as well as a series of measures intended to address the “democratic deficit” by expanding opportunities for independent legislative action on the part of MPs and by improving the effectiveness of committees. Some of these measures resulted in tangible changes. For example, the global committee budget was increased to $5 million, and a $1 million annual contingency fund was created to enable the hiring of forensic, e-consultation and other specialists and to support detailed estimates review. Other measures had minimal impact in practice. For example, a “three-line voting system” was announced, enabling votes in which backbenchers were freed from the party discipline of “two-line votes,” as well as entirely free votes, but the frequency of free votes (of either kind) remained limited.
In the wake of the June 2004 election, which created a minority government, the strengthened position of the opposition became apparent in further changes, most of which were initially proposed by opposition parties. In October 2004, the Chair of the Standing Committee on Government Operations and Estimates was assumed by an opposition member; new committees on the status of women and access to information, privacy and ethics were established; the Speaker acquired the authority to nominate the Deputy Speaker and assistant deputy speakers; and a separate committee on Aboriginal affairs was established.
Later in the 38th Parliament, additional procedural changes favoured committees and opposition parties. The likelihood of votes on committee recommendations was increased, and the referral of nominations for Order in Council appointments to committees for review was expanded. All opposition days were made “votable,” and more opportunities for questions and comments during debate were also created.
The January 2006 election result, which created a second consecutive minority government, could have reinforced the direction of recent reform, reducing executive dominance by enhancing the role of backbench MPs and opposition parties within Parliament. However, recent and current reform initiatives suggest that new approaches to reform have begun to displace the immediate post-2004 focus on procedural changes that empower backbench and opposition MPs. Although minor procedural changes were made during the 39th Parliament (e.g., concurrence, on 30 March 2007, in a proposal by the Committee on Procedure and House Affairs to make permanent the new arrangements for the broadcasting of committee proceedings), the cycle of procedural reform that began in 2004 appears to have stalled, at least while current minority government conditions persist.
Approaches to reform that focus on strengthening the capacities of Parliament and its committees, rather than increasing formal powers or authorities, have long been a component of reform initiatives. However, this approach appears to receive special emphasis in the Federal Accountability Act (FAA)(2) – a major initiative of the present government. The FAA, which received Royal Assent on 12 December 2006, creates within the Library of Parliament the position of Parliamentary Budget Officer, who is responsible for providing independent financial forecasting and related budget analysis to parliamentarians and committees, as well as estimates of the cost implications of proposals in private members bills or government legislation and analytical support for the review of government spending estimates.
Combined with other provisions of the FAA that strengthen the independence of officers of Parliament and clarify the accountabilities of deputy ministers, the creation of the parliamentary budget officer function has the potential to strengthen the credibility of work done by parliamentary committees and parliamentarians. It could thus serve long-standing reform objectives, ultimately enhancing the impact and effectiveness of the House of Commons as well as the Senate, especially in the area of financial accountability.
During the 39th Parliament, the government has initiated a number of reforms to the electoral system (including changes to campaign financing in the FAA). Although these initiatives do not directly empower individual MPs or committees, it can be argued that they may enhance the effectiveness of Parliament indirectly, by strengthening its credibility as a representative institution and its potential influence upon governments. On 3 May 2007, legislation that sets fixed dates for federal general elections received Royal Assent. This legislation could have the effect of reducing the capacity of the prime minister to trigger elections for strategic reasons. The incidence of parliaments that are not accurately representative of underlying public opinion may thus also be reduced, again enhancing the credibility and effectiveness of the institution.
The time of parliamentarians is a finite, and overtaxed, resource. If attempts to improve Parliament’s effectiveness in accountability roles demand the allocation of more parliamentary time to the scrutiny of programs and of government spending, the time available for other roles will be reduced. Current proposals envision improved staff support as an important basis for improved effectiveness, but Parliament’s success in meeting the challenge of prioritizing its functions (and its use of time) is still likely to be a key determinant of the success of current reforms.
More broadly, it is significant that symptoms of public disengagement have been increasing since the 1960s, despite the accelerating pace of parliamentary reform by means of procedural change. The approach of the current government, which emphasizes changes to the electoral system and campaign financing along with strengthened analytical support for Parliament, continues the shift away from the central reliance on procedural reform that has emerged in recent years.
The House of Commons agreed to major changes in procedural rules, to enable it to deal more smoothly with the increased volume of legislation and with the larger budgets being spent by a larger federal bureaucracy. As a result, standing committees took over many of the duties of the Committee of the Whole. These duties included the in-depth review of bills after second reading and the study of budget Estimates. A strict timetable was established for the adoption of the Estimates. The issue of limiting the length of debate was referred back to committee after a long, heated debate in the House, during which the opposition argued that freedom of speech was being limited by the proposed new rules.
The President of the Privy Council, the Honourable Walter Baker, tabled in the House of Commons a position paper on the reform of Parliament that made a number of recommendations on the size and role of committees, the rules of debate and the use of private members’ time. Among the recommendations was that committees should have the right to ask the House to undertake special investigations.
The bells in the House of Commons rang for more than 14 days in March 1982, calling members to the Chamber for a vote on energy. The incident attracted the attention of the Canadian public and the media, and led to a major debate on the issue of parliamentary reform.
In its third report, the Special Committee on Standing Orders and Procedure (the Lefebvre Committee, created on 31 May 1982) recommended several changes in the Standing Orders on a trial basis. The report was adopted by the House on 29 November and came into effect on 22 December 1982 for a one-year trial period that was extended (with minor amendments) on 19 December 1983 and 7 December 1984. Some of the changes implemented from this report included the automatic referral of departmental and Crown corporations’ annual reports to committees and the requirement for a government response to these reports within 120 days. A fixed parliamentary calendar was established, and a time limit was placed on speeches (reduced from 40 to 20 minutes).
The first report of the Special Committee on Reform of the House of Commons (the McGrath Committee, created on 5 December 1984) was tabled in Parliament. One of the principal goals of the report was to find ways to give private members a meaningful role in the development of public policy and in so doing to restore the House of Commons to its rightful place in the Canadian political process.
The second report of the McGrath Committee was tabled.
The third report of the McGrath Committee was tabled. Some of the recommendations included a revised committee structure to parallel government departments and the creation of legislative committees to study bills. The report said that committees should have the power to review non-judicial Order in Council appointments and should have the independence to undertake inquiries and hire staff. The report also recommended television coverage of committee proceedings. Other proposals included more free votes in the House.
Amendments to the Standing Orders pertaining to the speakership, the Board of Internal Economy and legislative committees were adopted on a provisional basis. A new procedure was established such that the Speaker would be elected by the members rather than the prime minister.
The House of Commons adopted a series of new provisional amendments to the Standing Orders, which came into force on 24 February 1986. Under these new rules, committees were given the power to review Order in Council appointments. A time limit was placed on emergency debates.
The first election of the Speaker by secret ballot resulted in the election of the Honourable John A. Fraser.
The provisional Standing Orders (with minor revisions) were adopted for incorporation into the permanent Standing Orders. The government was given 150 (from 120) days to respond to a standing committee report.
Provisional amendments transformed the draw for selecting private members’ bills for debate into a draw of members’ names, rather than items, thus removing the incentive for one member to propose multiple items. The Standing Committee on Privileges and Elections recommended these changes be made permanent in a report tabled on 6 December 1990.
Major revisions to the Standing Orders were adopted, after heated debate.
The government’s package of constitution-related proposals included changes to House of Commons procedure and practice to allow more free votes.
The Special Joint Committee on a Renewed Canada (the Beaudoin–Dobbie Committee) called for a comprehensive review of House procedures and practices.
The Standing Committee on House Management tabled a report containing 31 recommendations relating to parliamentary reform.
Changes were adopted regarding the sitting schedule of the House between January and Easter.
Provisional guidelines were adopted for the broadcasting of committee proceedings by the electronic media.
Standing Order 87(6) – regarding the 100-signature procedure for private members’ business – was repealed.
The report of the Special Committee on the Modernization and Improvement of the Procedures of the House of Commons was adopted; the recommendations contained in the report came into force on 15 October 2001.
Provisional Standing Orders regarding private members’ business came into effect, following the adoption of a report by the Special Committee on the Modernization and Improvement of the Procedures of the House of Commons: all items on the order of precedence will be “votable,” unless they contravene certain limited criteria, although provision is made for an appeal; all private members will have an opportunity to have an item voted on by the House of Commons.
The report of the second Special Committee on the Modernization and Improvement of the Procedures of the House of Commons was presented to the House of Commons; it was adopted on 18 September 2003.
The government tabled Ethics, Responsibility, Accountability: An Action Plan for Democratic Reform in the House of Commons.
The Prime Minister announced the creation of the Democratic Reform Secretariat at the Privy Council. The duties are now shared by the Government House Leader and the Deputy House Leader.( )
The Government House Leader tabled the first Annual Report on Democratic Reform.
Bill C-2, the Federal Accountability Act, providing for (among other things) changes to election campaign financing and creating the position of Parliamentary Budget Officer within the Library of Parliament to increase analytical support for Parliament, is introduced.
The Federal Accountability Act received Royal Assent.
National public consultations, to consist of 12 citizens’ forums on democratic reform issues, were launched. Issues included political parties, the electoral system, the House of Commons, the Senate, and the role of the citizen.
Public Consultations on Canada’s Democratic Institutions and Practices, containing the findings emerging from the consultations launched in January, was released.