PDF (324 kB, 7 pages)PRB 07-35E
Natalie Mychajlyszyn
Political and Social Affairs Division
20 November 2007
PDF (324 kB, 7 pages)
The objective of current development and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan is to help build a stable, democratic and prosperous country that contributes to regional and global security. Guided by the Afghanistan Millennium Development Goals, the Afghanistan Interim National Development Strategy and the Afghanistan Compact, the Afghan government is working with international partners to address the country’s immediate and long-term needs in areas as diverse as health, education, governance, policing, agriculture and infrastructure rehabilitation.This paper provides an overview of these activities and situates Canada’s commitments – amounting to $1.2 billion from 2001 to 2011 – within the larger context of international assistance. It also reviews the primary obstacles to reconstruction and development, the most significant of which is the fragile security environment in the country.
After 30 years of conflict, Afghanistan is now among the poorest and least developed countries in the world. In 2007 the country ranked 174th out of 178 on the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) human development index and had showed some deterioration in real terms in comparison with results for 2004.(1) Such conditions entrench a cycle of underdevelopment, vulnerability and conflict, perpetuating Afghanistan’s position as a source of concern for regional and international security. In an effort to break this cycle, the post-Taliban Afghan government has set a course for development and reconstruction. The frameworks that set out priorities and strategies for this effort are as follows.
Afghanistan came late, in 2004, to these UN-sanctioned targets to enable more of the world’s population to enjoy the minimum requirements of human dignity by the year 2015.(2) Special MDGs were developed to reflect local realities in Afghanistan; the baseline was set with data from 2002-2005, and the deadline was extended from 2015 to 2020. The key issues reflected in Afghanistan’s MDG targets are: poverty and hunger; universal primary education; gender equality; child mortality; maternal health; HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; environmental sustainability; a global partnership for development; and security.
Informed by the Afghanistan MDGs, the 2006 I-ANDS lays out a five-year program of action in four areas: security; governance; rule of law and human rights; and economic and social development.(3) Released by the Afghan government at the 2006 London Conference, it also addresses cross-cutting issues such as the narcotics trade, gender inequity and corruption. The I-ANDS will be replaced in mid-2008 by a more developed strategy that is expected to lead to a fully costed, prioritized and sequenced development strategy.
Intrinsically linked to both the Afghanistan MDGs and the I-ANDS and signed at the 2006 London Conference, the Afghanistan Compact is a political agreement by which Afghanistan is committed to make progress in the I-ANDS and the international community has agreed to provide resources to support this endeavour and to improve the effectiveness and accountability of such assistance.(4)
Adherence to the Afghanistan MDGs, the I-ANDs and the Afghanistan Compact is coordinated and overseen by three primary mechanisms:
A prominent feature of Afghanistan’s post-Taliban reconstruction and develop-ment is the international donor conference. The 2002 Tokyo International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan resulted in pledges estimated at US$4-5 billion.(7) The 2004 Berlin Conference on Afghanistan resulted in pledges of over US$8 billion,(8) which were later surpassed by pledges from the 2006 London Conference of over US$10.5 billion.(9)
Development and reconstruction funds are channelled primarily through two instruments: the Afghan budget, and the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF).(10) Established at the 2002 Tokyo conference, the ARTF is currently funded by pledged contributions from 27 countries amounting to US$2.27 billion, of which US$1.83 billion have been received and disbursed. It is administered by the World Bank, while decisions about the allocation of funds are carried out by the World Bank, the UNDP, the Asian Development Bank and the Islamic Development Bank, in cooperation with the government of Afghanistan and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. Its primary function is to cover recurring costs from the Afghan budget, such as salaries for teachers, health care workers, and civilian staff in ministries and provinces.
Operating in 25 provinces, PRTs are hosted and assembled by individual countries, including Germany, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. They comprise military units, civilian political advisors and development advisors working in an integrated fashion to provide humanitarian assistance and to support development activities. The priorities and configuration of each PRT are set out by the host country to reflect the conditions and needs in the particular province, but the overriding objective is to contribute to the stability, security and outreach of the central government’s authority and to support local and provincial administrations.(11) The primary mechanisms for achieving these objectives are regular interaction with the local authorities and the population, visibility, information-gathering with regard to security and stability, and support for the Afghan National Police. It is also important to note that, despite the internal integration of PRTs, their military components are part of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) efforts.
Although Afghanistan takes the lead in its own development and reconstruction, the international community assists it in reaching its development goals, including the Afghanistan MDGs and the objectives of the I-ANDS. International partnersare active in health, education, infrastructure, food aid, landmine clearance, governance and institutional capacity-building, and rural and agricultural development. The key players include the following:
Other UN bodies that are making an impact on Afghanistan’s development and reconstruction include the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) and UNICEF. The World Food Programme (WFP) is active in providing emergency assistance as well as rehabilitation and recovery with respect to food aid and food distribution.(15) The World Bank has committed over US$1.4 billion for 33 projects and two budget support operations since 2002.(16) The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has provided approximately US$892.28 million in loans, making Afghanistan the bank’s 17th largest borrower.(17)
Non-governmental organizations also have a significant place in development and reconstruction efforts. They are numerous, have tremendous scope in their reach and activities, and are also the means of channelling donor funding toward development and reconstruction goals. Moreover, they have been present in Afghanistan for a long period, going back to 1961 in some cases. These NGOs include CARE,(18) the Aga Khan Foundation(19) and the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC).(20) Indeed, Afghanistan is currently the ICRC’s largest operation.
Among bilateral development and reconstruction contributions, the United States ranks the highest, having spent US$4,394 million in 2002-2006, and is projected to spend US$2,484 million in 2007-2008.(21) Ranked second, the United Kingdom has spent over £490 million on reconstruction and development in Afghanistan since 2001 and is planning to spend £107 million in 2007-2008.(22)
Canada ranks among Afghanistan’s top five donors, and Afghanistan is Canada’s largest single aid recipient. Canada’s aid contribution will total C$1.2 billion in the period 2001-2011 (when the I-ANDS five-year period expires). Its commitments have been pledged at the various donor conferences and are channelled mainly through multilateral organizations and agencies, such as the UNDP, UNICEF, the WFP, CARE Canada, the Red Cross, and the Aga Kahn Foundation of Canada. Accordingly, its support has been felt at the national and provincial level and in a range of sectors, including democracy-building and governance, economic and rural development, infra-structure, education, health, landmine clearance, counter-narcotics activities, military and police training, security and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. In this respect, its priorities and activities correspond with the I-ANDS. (23)
Canada’s contribution reflects the integration of human and financial resources from various government departments and agencies. These include Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (DFAIT), the Department of National Defence (DND), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), Corrections Canada and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). For instance, to support the Afghan government’s strategic development capacity, members of Canada’s Canadian Forces have been deployed to the Strategic Advisory Team in President Karzai’s office. In addition, DFAIT’s Global Peace and Security Fund will have provided more than C$8.5 million in capacity-building, supporting, for example, security sector reform (specifically, training and the rehabilitation of Afghan National Police substations), justice sector reform, political and tribal engagement, and landmine clearance. These activities involve personnel from other departments such as CIDA, the Canadian Forces and the RCMP.(24)
Since 2001, CIDA’s investment of close to C$600 million in Afghanistan(25) has promoted national and provincial projects and programs such as the National Solidarity Program, the Counter-Narcotics Trust Fund, landmine clearance, agricultural development, the rule of law, road reconstruction, and health. Canada also claims to be the lead donor in education and in the national micro-financing program, which provides services and small loans to Afghans who would normally be denied such access.(26) In addition, CIDA supports the Canada Fund for Local Initiatives. Amounting to C$750,000, this fund is administered by the Canadian embassy in Kabul to support small projects and community-based development initiatives.
Canada’s provincial efforts have been concentrated in Kandahar. Its strategy in this southern Afghan province focuses on basic human needs and on strengthening livelihoods (especially in rural areas), building infrastructure, promoting democracy and effective governance, improving the status of women and girls, and increasing the capacity of local governments.(27)
Since 2005, Canada’s activities in Kandahar have been enhanced by the establishment of a PRT in the province, which currently comprises 330 people, (28) including a civilian advisor or political director from DFAIT, four RCMP officers, an officer from the Charlottetown City police, development aid specialists from CIDA, and military personnel. Their objective is to enhance security in Kandahar, enhance links between the provincial, district and central authorities, improve the lives of the residents and build confidence among them about the international presence. In this way, the PRT intends to diminish the population’s vulnerability to insurgent activities, thereby improving stability in the region as well as the implementation of development and reconstruction efforts. Kandahar is a former stronghold of the Taliban and a primary target of insurgent activity; thus, the challenge before Canada is not small.(29)
Canada’s PRT activities in Kandahar are many. They include security sector reform by way of building the capacity of the Afghan National Police in Kandahar with training and mentoring programs,(30) engaging with local authorities and the population of Kandahar, supporting health and education programs, including immunization and adult literacy programs, supporting Afghan-led work to strengthen governance structures, administering the Kandahar Local Initiatives Program and the Rapid Response Health Fund, leading landmine awareness programs, and carrying out patrols in remote regions to enhance the presence of a security force and build confidence and trust among the population. The PRT also includes a Quick Reaction Force by which it can respond to sensitive situations and incidents, or to requests for assistance from ISAF.(31)
In carrying out these activities, Canada in general and the PRT in particular uphold the principle of local ownership. Thus, development and recon-struction are supported by Canada but are ultimately the responsibility of the Afghan people and government. Moreover, Canada and its PRT work in close cooperation with other donors and implementing partners to ensure effective coordination and to maximize efforts. Canada’s presence is also intended to achieve long-, medium- and short-term effects, with an emphasis on sustainable progress for the Afghan population.(32)
The development and reconstruction of post-Taliban Afghanistan are not abstract concepts but, rather, deliberately designed strategies of the Afghan government that are documented in international frameworks and are significantly supported by donor countries and other participants. However, the security landscape of post-Taliban Afghanistan, the changing nature of international development work, the lack of sufficient capacity among government partners, and issues relating to the donor community present significant challenges to the rehabilitation of Afghanistan.
The uneven security situation in Afghanistan is reflected in the two extremes of the deteriorating situation in the south, where insurgent activities are on the rise, and the relative calm in the north. Dangerous conditions on the ground impede development and reconstruction work and make access to its beneficiaries more difficult.(33) For example, the fragile security situation in southern Afghanistan affected the vaccination of children against polio in 2005 and was later reflected in disease incidence: 7 out of the 9 polio cases reported in Afghanistan in 2006 were in the south.(34)
When development and reconstruction activities are compromised by insecure conditions, the local population is vulnerable to choices that perpetuate instability. Thus, it is not uncommon for fighters to be recruited and armed against international forces in return for food and protection. These perceptions are reinforced when civilian casualties result from international forces engaging with insurgents, thereby undermining the dividends of confidence and trust otherwise gained from development and reconstruction activities.
Thus a vicious circle persists whereby insecurity undermines development, thus making it difficult to establish the conditions that would foster stability. One option that has been suggested is to hold back on development and reconstruction in areas where insurgent activities are on the rise and to concentrate on the northern or at least more stable areas where efforts are likely to be more productive. An alternative is to focus resources on the more insecure regions, where they are most needed to build up defences against destabilizing elements. A consequence of either approach could be to create regional distinctions based on the degree of stability and the level of development attention and financing; this in itself would not be conducive to building national solidarity in a country already beset by divisions and conflict.(35)
A second and related complication is the changing nature of development work in war-torn countries. In the case of Afghanistan, development and reconstruction activities and gains, not to mention the workers themselves, have become targets of the insurgency. This presents development agencies and NGOs with a difficult choice. To withdraw from unstable areas would offer the best protection to the workers, and might be financially responsible given that development and reconstruction cannot viably take place under insecure conditions. However, the greater the instability, the greater the need for development aid and reconstruction as populations are displaced and infrastructure is destroyed. Therefore, some development groups have resorted to hiring armed guards to protect staff and resources.(36) Others work intimately with military support already in the field. In other situations, military personnel carry out development and reconstruction work, as they are better able to defend their positions against attack. However, as some development groups argue, this close relationship with private armed guards or military personnel blurs the lines between humanitarian and military activities, militarizes development and reconstruction work, and seriously injures the reputation of neutrality so jealously guarded by NGOs.(37)
The Afghan government’s capacity to develop strategic plans and implement decisions appears to be uneven across the various departments.(38) The results of this weakness include unreliable performance data for development programs, difficulty in meeting deadlines (e.g., release of the full ANDS has been delayed to mid-2008 from mid-2007) and in consolidating military gains achieved by international and national forces, as well as suboptimal working relationships with international donors and development agencies.(39) Ultimately, the role of the Afghan government in directing development and reconstruction is undermined, along with the strength of its leadership and public confidence. The longer this situation persists, the longer and more extensive becomes the involvement of the international community.(40)
The international donor community, including national funding agencies, international organizations and NGOs, has also been portrayed by come commentators as contributing to the difficulties of reconstruction and development. For instance, funding has been inconsistent, whereas the proper planning and prioritization of projects and programs requires confirmed, long-term, multi-year funding. Moreover, a growing gap has been noted between amounts pledged and amounts dispersed, as well as delays between disbursement and implementation.(41) Disbursements also remain inadequate: foreign aid disbursements since 2002 are estimated at US$83 per capita per year, whereas the need has been estimated at US$168.(42)
Questions about the effectiveness of aid as structured and delivered by the international community have also arisen.(43) At the local level, perceptions of development workers as receiving excessive wages, living in large homes, and generally living apart from the rest of society are not uncommon and result in local resentment and questions about the value derived from donor funding. Some of these views are reinforced by the inflationary effect of such a large, well-paid group on the local economy, making it that much more difficult for local residents to survive.
The development and reconstruction of any war-torn society is immensely challenging. This is clearly true for Afghanistan. The prevalence of violence and the relationship between security and development continue to foster debate about basic approaches to development efforts. One view argues that such challenges present the very reason why the international community, including Canada, should stay committed to the endeavour and even increase its contributions to ensure positive results as soon as possible. Another view, focusing on unfavourable conditions in Afghanistan that threaten to undo the small gains achieved thus far, argues for a reconsideration of development and reconstruction until these conditions change. Whatever the path taken, Afghanistan’s future and that of the region hangs in the balance.