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41st Parliament, 1st Session

Legislative Summary of Bill C-10: 9 Amendments to the Youth Criminal Justice Act [Bill C-10, Part 4, Clauses 167–204 (Formerly Bill C-4)] *



 

Publication Number 41-1-C10E PDF  PDF 1.2 MB, 158 pages



9 Amendments to the Youth Criminal Justice Act [Bill C-10, Part 4, Clauses 167–204 (Formerly Bill C‑4)]

9.1 Background1

9.1.1 Purpose and Principal Amendments

Clauses 167–204 of Part 4 of Bill C-10 are very similar to the provisions in Bill C-4, An Act to amend the Youth Criminal Justice Act and to make consequential and related amendments to other Acts (short title: Sébastien’s Law [Protecting the Public from Violent Young Offenders]), which was tabled in the House of Commons by the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, the Honourable Robert Nicholson, on 16 March 2010. Bill C-4 died on the Order Paper when Parliament was dissolved on 26 March 2011. The primary difference between Part 4 of Bill C-10 and Bill C-4 is that Bill C-10 would facilitate pre-sentencing detention in certain cases (clause 169).

The purpose of Part 4 of Bill C-10 is to amend certain provisions of the Youth Criminal Justice Act 2 (YCJA) to emphasize the importance of protecting society and to facilitate the detention of young persons3 who reoffend or who pose a threat to public safety. More particularly, the bill:

  • establishes specific deterrence and denunciation as sentencing principles similar to the principles provided in the adult criminal justice system (clause 172);
  • expands the case law definition of a violent offence to include reckless behaviour endangering public safety (clause 167);
  • amends the rules for pre-sentencing detention (also called “pre-trial detention”) to facilitate the detention of young persons accused of crimes against property punishable by a maximum term of five years or more and those with a history of outstanding charges or findings of guilt (clause 169);
  • authorizes the court to impose a prison sentence on a young person who has previously been subject to a number of extrajudicial sanctions (clause 173);
  • requires the Crown to consider the possibility of seeking an adult sentence for young offenders 14 to 17 years of age convicted of murder, attempted murder, manslaughter or aggravated sexual assault (clauses 176 and 183);
  • facilitates publication of the names of young offenders convicted of violent offences (clauses 185 and 189);
  • requires police to keep a record of any extrajudicial measures imposed on young persons so that their criminal tendencies can be documented (clause 190); and
  • prohibits the imprisonment of young persons in adult correctional facilities (clause 186).

Part 4 of Bill C-10 includes the essential aspects of the two features contained in the former bills C-4 and C-25:4 the addition of deterrence and denunciation as sentencing principles and, second, rules facilitating the pre-sentencing detention of young persons.

9.1.2 General Background to Proposed Reform

Youth crime in general, and violent youth crime in particular, are a source of concern to many Canadians. According to some, these types of crime are on the rise, although the most recent statistics reported by police indicate that crime committed by individuals 12 to 17 years of age has declined. According to Statistics Canada figures, the overall youth crime rate fell by 7% in 2010 relative to 2009. As for violent crime, the statistics indicate a 3% drop from the previous year. Breaking those statistics down further, Statistics Canada explains,

There were 56 youth accused of homicide in 2010, 23 fewer than in 2009, resulting in a 29% drop in the rate. Declines were also seen in the rates of youth accused of motor vehicle thefts (-14%), serious assault (-12%) and break–ins (-10%). Robbery, up 2%, was one of the few crimes committed by youth to increase in 2010.5

The data generated by Statistics Canada’s new Crime Severity Index (CSI)6 in 2010 show that the severity of all youth crimes combined has generally been declining since 2000. Much of this decrease is explained by a significant decline in the severity of non-violent crime. During the same period, violent youth crime severity increased by 5%, but between 2009 and 2010 the severity of violent youth crime decreased in all provinces and territories.

Table 9-1 shows the rate of violent and non-violent crimes committed by young persons from 2000 to 2010. Table 9-2 shows the youth crime severity index values for the same period.

Table 9-1 – Youth Accused of Police-Reported Crime, Canada, 2000–2010
Year Total Crime
(youth crime rate)
Violent Crime Property Crime Other Criminal Code Offences
Number Ratea Percentage Change
from
Previous Year
Number Rate Percentage Change from Previous Year Number Rate Percentage Change from Previous Year Number Rate Percentage Change from Previous Year
2000 171,148 6,914   7 48,130 1,944   13 96,760 3,909   4 26,258 1,061   11
2001 178,529 7,159   4 49,475 1,984   2 99,097 3,974   2 29,957 1,201   13
2002 175,537 6,945 − 3 47,960 1,898 − 4 98,021 3,878 − 2 29,556 1,169 − 3
2003 186,041 7,280   5 50,106 1,961   3 105,625 4,133   7 30,310 1,186   1
2004 179,670 6,959 − 4 49,695 1,925 − 2 99,601 3,858 − 7 30,374 1,176 − 1
2005 172,024 6,596 − 5 49,430 1,895 − 2 92,631 3,552 − 8 29,963 1,149 − 2
2006 178,839 6,812   3 51,452 1,960   3 94,835 3,612   2 32,552 1,240   8
2007 177,400 6,782   0 51,144 1,955   0 93,701 3,582 − 1 32,555 1,245   0
2008 169,747 6,577 − 3 49,130 1,903 − 3 88,878 3,443 − 4 31,739 1,230 − 1
2009 167,103 6,593   0 48,030 1,895   0 88,309 3,484   1 30,764 1,214 − 1
2010 152,700 6,147 − 7 45,653 1,838 − 3 78,366 3,155 − 9 28,681 1,155 − 5
Percentage change,
2000–2010
N/Ab − 11 N/A N/A − 5 N/A N/A − 19 N/A N/A 9 N/A
Notes:
a. Crime rates are based upon Criminal Code incidents (excluding traffic offences). The youth crime rate refers to the number of youth 12 to 17 years of age who were either charged (or recommended for charging) by police or diverted from the formal criminal justice system through the use of warnings, cautions, referrals to community programs, etc. Counts are based upon the most serious violation in the incident. One incident may involve multiple violations. Data for the youth crime rates of total, violent, property and other crime categories are available beginning in 1977. Rates are calculated on the basis of 100,000 youth population. Traffic offences set out in the Criminal Code, drug offences, other federal statute offences and provincial statute offences are not included. See Shannon Brennan and Mia Dauvergne, “Police-reported crime statistics in Canada, 2010 pdf (817 kB, 43 pages),” Juristat, Statistics Canada catalogue no. 85-002-X, 21 July 2011. [ Return to text ]
b. Not applicable. [ Return to text ]
Source: Statistics Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Uniform Crime Reporting Survey.

 

Table 9-2 – Police-Reported Youth Crime Severity Indexes, Canada, 2000–2010a
Year Youth Crime
Severity Index
Youth Violent Crime
Severity Index
Youth Non-Violent
Crime Severity Index
Indexb Percentage Change
from Previous Year
Index Percentage
Change from Previous Year
Index Percentage Change
from Previous Year
2000 103.5   4  89.3   7 114.4    3
2001 106.0   2  91.4   2 117.1    2
2002 101.1 − 5  87.3 − 5 111.7  − 5
2003 106.0   5  92.6   6 116.2    4
2004 100.8 − 5  87.8 − 5 110.7  − 5
2005  97.3 − 4  94.1   7  99.8 − 10
2006 100.0   3 100.0   6 100.0    0
2007 101.6   2 102.2   2 101.1    1
2008  96.2 − 5  96.3 − 6  96.1  − 5
2009  96.6   0  97.8   2  95.8    0
2010  90.5 − 6  93.7 − 4  88.0  − 8
Percent change
 2000 to 2010
− 13 N/Ac   5 N/A − 23 N/A
Notes:
a. Refers to the number of youth 12 to 17 years of age who were either charged (or recommended for charging) by police or diverted from the formal criminal justice system through the use of warnings, cautions, referrals to community programs, etc. Data on the youth crime severity indexes are available beginning in 1998. [ Return to text ]
b. The Crime Severity Index (CSI) is a tool used to measure crime trends. It allows Statistics Canada to assign a weight to each crime according to its seriousness, based on the sentences handed down by the criminal courts across Canada. To calculate this figure, Statistics Canada assigns to each crime a different weight derived from the average of the sentences handed down by the courts for that offence. The more serious offences are assigned heavier weights than less serious offences. Consequently, the more serious offences have a more significant impact on the CSI. [ Return to text ]
c. Not applicable. [ Return to text ]
Source: Statistics Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Uniform Crime Reporting Survey.

In attempts to address the concerns of Canadians and to react to youth crime, Parliament has, from time to time, proposed amendments to youth justice legislation (we will briefly describe the development of youth justice in the next section). A number of those amendments were motivated in part by violent incidents involving young persons that had made the headlines and contributed to increased feelings of insecurity among the public. Bill C-4 was similar in that regard. The first part of its short title – Sébastien’s Law – was chosen in memory of Sébastien Lacasse, who, in 2004, was chased down by a group of youths and killed on a Laval, Quebec, street by a 17-year-old.

In his speech in the House of Commons when Bill C-4 was introduced, the Minister of Justice emphasized that the bill would “make the protection of society a primary goal of our youth criminal justice system, and it will give Canadians greater confidence that violent and repeat young offenders will be held accountable.” 7 The Minister noted a number of times that the proposed reform was based on the recommendations of the commission of inquiry chaired in Nova Scotia by the Honourable D. Merlin Nunn8 The commission’s mandate was to examine the charges laid against AB, a 16-year-old teenage male responsible for the death of Theresa McEvoy in Halifax on 14 October 2004, and the reasons leading to his release two days before that tragic incident. AB, who was driving around in a stolen car at the time of the incident, had been released on 12 October 2004, even though 38 criminal charges had been laid against him.

Commissioner Nunn’s report, presented on 5 December 2006,9 contains 34 recommendations, of which 19 concern the need to simplify the administration of justice and improve accountability, six concern reinforcement of the YCJA, and nine relate to the prevention of youth crime. In general, Mr. Nunn found that the YCJA “provides an intelligent, modern, and advanced approach to dealing with youths involved in criminal activities.” 10 In his view, Canada is now “far ahead of other countries in its treatment of youth in conflict with the law.” 11 He nevertheless felt that certain amendments to the YCJA were necessary “to give flexibility to the courts in dealing with repeat offenders, primarily by opening a door to pre-trial custody and enlarging the gateways to custody.” 12 Mr. Nunn’s recommendations specifically addressing the YCJA were as follows:

Recommendation 20: The Province should advocate that the federal government amend the “Declaration of Principle” in section 3 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act to add a clause indicating that protection of the public is one of the primary goals of the act.

Recommendation 21: The Province should advocate that the federal government amend the definition of “violent offence” in section 39(1)(a) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act to include conduct that endangers or is likely to endanger the life or safety of another person.

Recommendation 22: The Province should advocate that the federal government amend section 39(1)(c) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act so that the requirement for a demonstrated “pattern of findings of guilt” is changed to “a pattern of offences,” or similar wording, with the goal that both a young person’s prior findings of guilt and pending charges are to be considered when determining the appropriateness of pre-trial detention.

Recommendation 23: The Province should advocate that the federal government amend and simplify the statutory provisions relating to the pre-trial detention of young persons so that section 29 will stand on its own without interaction with other statutes or other provisions of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

Recommendation 24: The Province should advocate that the federal government amend section 31(5)(a) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act so that if the designated “responsible person” is relieved of his or her obligations under a “responsible person undertaking” the young person’s undertaking made under section 31(3)(b) nevertheless remains in full force and effect, particularly any requirement to keep the peace and be of good behaviour and other conditions imposed by a youth court judge.

Recommendation 25: The Province should advocate that the federal government amend section 31(6) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act to remove the requirement of a new bail hearing for the young person before being placed in pre-trial custody if the designated “responsible person” is relieved of his or her obligations under a “responsible person undertaking.” 13

It will be seen in section 9.2, “Description and Analysis,” in this legislative summary how Part 4 of Bill  C-10 provides for action on Recommendations 20 to 23 of the Nunn Report. However, the bill does not include provisions implementing Recommendations 24 and 25.

Starting in 2007, the federal Department of Justice undertook an exhaustive review and consultation process relating to the YCJA involving the provinces, territories, civil society and the public. The results of that consultation do not appear to have been published by the Department of Justice.

9.1.3 History of Youth Justice in Canada From 1908 to the Present

9.1.3.1 From 1908 to 1984

The approach to young offenders has evolved considerably since the Juvenile Delinquents Act (JDA), the first statute in Canada exclusively concerning young persons in conflict with the law, was passed in 1908.14 Under that Act, young people in conflict with the law were seen as not-yet-mature beings in need of “aid, encouragement, help and assistance.” According to the JDA, “every juvenile delinquent shall be treated not as a criminal, but as a misdirected and misguided child.” 15 The response was therefore to protect the young offender by focusing on the factors that gave rise to the criminal behaviour rather than punishing the young person for the offence that brought him or her into contact with the justice system.

In the opinion of some, the involvement of the criminal justice system under the JDA resembled “more of a social welfare exercise than a judicial process.” 16 This approach, on which there was general agreement until the 1960s, was strongly criticized by some who felt that the JDA gave too much arbitrary power to legal authorities in the name of the welfare of the child and too little attention to a fairer and more equitable system. Young offenders were given indeterminate sentences that bore no relation to the seriousness of the offences. Some also decried the inconsistencies in the treatment of young offenders from province to province and the fact that young offenders had no basic rights or recourse in criminal law procedure, such as the right to consult a lawyer or to appeal a decision.

The process of reforming the JDA took a long time. It began in 1961, when a committee in the Department of Justice was given the task of examining youth crime,17 and it ended in 1982 with the passage of the Young Offenders Act.

9.1.3.2 From 1984 to 2003

When the Young Offenders Act (YOA) came into force in 1984,18 it marked the beginning of a new era in dealing with young people in conflict with the law.19 Compared to the JDA, it contained a much narrower definition of the term “young offender.” Under the 1908 Act, the range of offences for which a young person could be prosecuted was very broad. Anyone from 7 to 15 years of age was a “juvenile delinquent” if he or she had committed an offence contained in the Criminal Code 20 or in any federal or provincial Act or regulation or municipal by-law, or who was guilty of “sexual immorality or any similar form of vice.” Under the new YOA, a “young offender” was anyone from 12 to 17 years of age alleged to have committed an offence created by federal statutes or by regulations made thereunder (except Territorial ordinances). The new Act also set the threshold of criminal responsibility at 12, and standardized the age of criminal majority at 18 all across Canada.21 But, as in the 1908 Act, under the YOA a youth court could send cases to adult court if they involved young people aged 14 or older alleged to have committed a serious crime.

The YOA also moved away from the exclusively “protective” approach of the 1908 Act in favour of an approach that attempted to balance the protection of a young offender with accountability. The young person was still seen as not yet mature, but his or her responsibility in a given matter was recognized. A young offender was therefore no longer seen simply as the product of his or her environment, but also as an involved and accountable participant. This change in approach also gave rise to the establishment of fundamental procedural guarantees for young people in conflict with the law, such as the right to a lawyer and the right to appeal a decision.

From the time it took effect, the YOA was criticized for not setting out clear principles to guide those with the task of upholding the law. Some claimed that this gave rise to disparity and injustice across the country. Another criticism of the YOA was that it placed more value on reintegration into society and rehabilitation than on public protection, particularly in cases in which young offenders were charged with serious crimes.

In response to these criticisms, the YOA was amended in 1986, 1992 and 1995. The amendments toughened the Act for young people charged with serious crimes. Among the amendments were longer sentences for murder, and reversal of the onus of proof so that, in relevant cases, young offenders would have to prove that they should not be tried in adult court.22

9.1.3.3 From 2003 to the Present

The YCJA took effect in April 2003. Longer, more detailed and more complex than the Act that preceded it, the YCJA is an attempt to address the problems identified in the Act it replaced, such as over-reliance on court involvement and incarceration and too little consistency in the way the Act was enforced across the country. In addition to adding new sentences23 and replacing trials in adult court with a system of adult sentences that can be imposed on young people over 14 years of age, it has a preamble and principles that are intended to provide clear direction to those with the responsibility of imposing penalties on young people convicted of criminal offences.

The preamble to the Act states that the youth criminal justice system should take the interests of victims into account, foster responsibility and ensure accountability through meaningful consequences and effective rehabilitation and reintegration through the elimination of the underlying causes of crime among young persons, and reduce over-reliance on incarceration for non-violent young persons. The YCJA also has a number of other underlying principles:

  • The intent of the youth criminal justice system is to promote the long-term protection of the public.
  • Young offenders should be held accountable for their behaviour by making them acknowledge the consequences of their offences and by encouraging them to repair the harm done to victims and the community.
  • The parents of young offenders as well as the community as a whole should be, as appropriate, involved in the measures taken for the social integration of young offenders.
  • The expectations of victims should be taken into consideration, and victims should suffer the minimum degree of inconvenience as a result of their involvement with the youth criminal justice system.
  • Ethnic background, language and gender differences must be respected when deciding how to hold a young person accountable, while the overriding principle remains that a sentence must be proportionate to the seriousness of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the young person for that offence.24

The YCJA also aims to provide justice more fairly and equitably through, for example, sentences that appreciably vary with the gravity of the offence. This means lighter penalties for those convicted of minor offences and more serious penalties for those convicted of serious offences.

The YCJA clearly establishes that a sentence must be “proportionate to the seriousness of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the young person for that offence.” 25 In this sense, the YCJA reaffirms the responsibility of young people in conflict with the law; it also sets accountability as an objective that must guide all sentences imposed by youth courts as well as measures taken outside the court process (extrajudicial measures).

9.1.3.4 The Youth Criminal Justice Act of 200326

Most young people brought before the courts are charged with non-violent offences.27 While the YOA provided for alternative measures to incarceration in such cases, these measures were rarely made available. In 1997, for example, they were used in only 25% of cases.28 This is partially explained by the fact that the YOA was not clear enough in setting out the goals of extrajudicial measures, in describing the measures that were available and in establishing the cases in which their use was valid.

One of the objectives of the YCJA is to remedy the lack of sentencing guidelines in the YOA in order to have less court involvement for those who committed minor offences. Official crime statistics seem to show that the YCJA has met these expectations. “[I]n 2008, 42% of youth accused were formally charged by police while the remaining 58% were diverted by other means.” 29 That year, the rate of charges laid against youth fell 4% from the previous year. According to the most recent statistics, 26% fewer cases were heard in youth court in 2006–2007 than in 2002–2003, the year before the YCJA came into effect. All provinces and territories saw their numbers drop: the largest reductions were in the Northwest Territories (52%), Newfoundland and Labrador (47%) and Yukon (45%).30

Lastly, the YCJA also appears to have achieved expected results in reducing the use of incarceration for young offenders. Under the YOA, about 80% of all custodial sentences were for non-violent offences31 and Canada was known for having the highest rate of incarceration for young offenders between 12 and 17 of any Western country. In 2007–2008, non-violent offences were the cause of 43% of admissions to custody following conviction.32 Since the YCJA came into force, the youth incarceration rate has also decreased substantially. In 2008–2009, the average number of youth in detention following conviction had fallen 42% relative to 2003–2004, the year in which the YCJA came into force.33 The decrease in incarceration rates was not followed by an increase in the youth crime rate; as shown in Table 9-1, the youth crime rate has generally dropped since the Act came into force.

Since the YCJA came into effect in April 2003, debate has centred on the treatment that young people in conflict with the law should receive. Some say the Act is too lenient in its provisions regarding repeat offenders and those who commit serious crimes. Others say the Act places greater emphasis on protection of the public than on the rehabilitation and social reintegration of young people. The challenge for lawmakers is to design an approach that allows serious matters involving young people to be dealt with in a way that protects the public and meets victims’ needs while still recognizing that young people do not have the same degree of responsibility as adults, given their age and level of maturity.

9.2 Description and Analysis

9.2.1 Basic Principles of the Youth Criminal Justice Act (Clause 168)

In 2006, in his report for the public inquiry conducted in Nova Scotia, Commissioner Nunn recommended that protection of the public (in the short and long term) be included among the principles stated in section 3 of the YCJA to assist in solving the problem presented by the small number of dangerous offenders and reoffenders.34 The YCJA expressly includes “long-term protection of the public” as a principle.35 Clause 168 of the bill amends section 3(1)(a) of the YCJA, which will now refer to “protecting the public” (in the short and long terms), by holding young persons accountable, promoting their rehabilitation and reintegration and referring them to programs or agencies in the community to address the circumstances underlying their offending behaviour.

In the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, the French version of clause 168 was amended by changing the word “encourager” to “favoriser” in section 3(1)(a)(ii). The Quebec Minister of Justice had asked for such a change to better reflect the equivalent to the English term that is used in the provision, “to promote,” and to be consistent with the translation of that word in other areas of the Criminal Code.

By amending section 3(1)(b) of the YCJA, clause 168 of the bill also provides that the youth criminal justice system is based on the principle of diminished moral blameworthiness or culpability of young persons. The Supreme Court of Canada has previously held that there is a rebuttable presumption of diminished blameworthiness or culpability in young persons by reason of the fact that they are more vulnerable, less mature and less able to exercise moral judgment.36

9.2.2 Detention Prior to Sentencing (Clause 169)

In general, the Criminal Code provisions concerning bail hearings apply to release and detention prior to sentencing.37 The YCJA may, however, override those provisions by providing specific rules applying to young persons.38

Under the current rules, youth court must direct the release of a young person, except where the prosecution can justify detaining that young person under section 515 of the Criminal Code.39 In addition, section 29(2) of the YCJA (in reference to sections 39(1)(a) to (c), which concern imprisonment upon conviction) provides for a specific presumption in favour of releasing a young person until sentencing. However, in three specific cases that presumption does not apply, and the young person may be detained until sentencing:

  • The young person has been charged with a violent offence.40
  • The young person has failed to comply with non-custodial sentences.
  • The young person has committed an indictable offence for which an adult would be liable to imprisonment for a term of more than two years and has a history of findings of guilt.

The bill amends section 29(2) of the YCJA to provide, in that section alone, all reasons justifying the detention of young persons prior to sentencing and expands the possible justifications for doing so. By simplifying the pre-sentencing detention regime, the bill implements Recommendation 23 of the Nunn Commission.

Clause 169 of Bill C-10 provides that the pre-sentencing detention of young persons is prohibited, except where the young person is charged with a “serious offence” or where “they have a history that indicates a pattern of either outstanding charges or findings of guilt.” The former was included as a possible justification for pre-sentencing detention in Bill C-4, while the latter was not.

The new provision is also broader than the current one, which considers findings of guilt, but not outstanding charges. This amendment implements recommendation 22 of the Nunn Report (see section 9.1.2, “General Background to Proposed Reform,” in this legislative summary). In addition, Bill C-10 does not include the current requirement that, to be ordered into pre-sentencing detention, the young person must have such a history or pattern and be charged with committing an indictable offence for which an adult would be liable for more than two years in prison.

To detain a young person prior to sentencing, clause 169 also requires that the judge or justice hearing the case be satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that:

  • there is a substantial likelihood that the young person will not appear in court41 (Bill  C-4 included the same provision);
  • detention is necessary for public safety, including the safety of any victim or witness, considering all of the circumstances, including whether there is a substantial likelihood that the young person will commit a serious offence if released (Bill C-4 included a narrower provision: whether there is a substantial likelihood the young person will commit a serious offence); or
  • the young person has been charged with a serious offence and there are exceptional circumstances warranting detention and detention is necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice (no equivalent provision was included in Bill C-4, but a somewhat similar provision currently exists in relation to sentencing [not pre-sentencing detention] in section 39(1)(d)).

Finally, clause 169 requires the judge or justice to be satisfied that no set of conditions of release would, depending on the justification relied upon above:

  • reduce the likelihood that the young person will not appear in court to a level below substantial (Bill C-4 included the same provision);
  • offer adequate public protection (Bill C-4 included a narrower provision: whether there is a less-than-substantial likelihood that the young person would commit a serious offence if released); or
  • maintain confidence in the administration of justice (no equivalent provision was included in Bill C-4).42

Clause 167(3) of the bill defines “serious offence” as “an indictable offence under an Act of Parliament for which the maximum punishment is imprisonment for five years or more.” A large number of Criminal Code convictions are punishable by a maximum prison term of five years or more, such as child pornography, murder, impaired driving, assault, sexual assault,43 theft over $5,000, breaking and entering and fraud.

In addition, unlike the definition of “violent offence” established by the Supreme Court, which excluded offences solely against property,44 the definition of “serious offence” in clause 167(3) includes offences against both property and the person. Consequently, the bill extends the potential application of pre-sentencing detention to young persons charged with offences against property that may result in maximum terms of imprisonment of at least five years.

To determine whether there is a substantial likelihood that the young person will not appear in court or will commit a serious offence, the court may, for example, consider prior convictions as well as outstanding charges against the young person. The bill therefore appears to implement Recommendation 22 of the Nunn Commission, which suggested that courts be allowed to consider outstanding charges so that they can more easily detain, before sentencing, young persons charged with a series of offences committed in rapid succession.

Note, lastly, that the YCJA expressly provides that the court sentencing the young person must consider time served in detention prior to sentencing.45 The court then has the discretion to decide on the credit that should be granted in computing the term of imprisonment.46

9.2.3 Sentencing Principles: Denunciation and Deterrence (Clause 172)

The purpose of sentencing under the YCJA is to hold a young person accountable for an offence through the imposition of just sanctions that have meaningful consequences promoting his or her rehabilitation and reintegration into society, thereby contributing to the long-term protection of the public.47

In addition to the general principles stated in section 3 of the Act, section 38(2) states the principles that must guide a youth justice court in appropriate sentencing. For example, section 38(2) provides that the sentence imposed must be proportionate to the seriousness of the offence and to the degree of responsibility of the young person for that offence and afford the best chances for rehabilitation and reintegration into society. It must also be the least restrictive sentence that is capable of achieving the sentencing purpose and must in no case be greater than punishment appropriate for an adult.

In amending section 38(2) of the YCJA, clause 172 of the bill adds the following two objectives to these sentencing principles: “to denounce unlawful conduct” and “to deter the young person from committing offences.” These two principles are already included in the framework for sentencing adults.48 Nonetheless, the deterrence principle is more general in the latter case, since the punishment may be used to deter the adult from committing a new offence and the public from committing this type of offence (specific deterrence vs. general deterrence). In its decision in R. v. B.W.P.; R. v. B.V.N., 49 the Supreme Court of Canada held that deterrence does not constitute a sentencing principle for young offenders under the current regime of the YCJA. While deterrence had to be considered under the YOA,50 the Court noted that the YCJA had introduced an entirely different and new sentencing regime.51

Like the former Bills C-4 and C-25 on the youth criminal justice system, which also provided for the principles of denunciation and deterrence, Part 4 of Bill C-10 makes those principles subject to the application of the fundamental principle of the proportional nature of the sentence to the seriousness of the offence and to the degree of responsibility of the young offender for the offence.52

9.2.4 Keeping a Police Record of Extrajudicial Measures (Clause 190)

Sections 4 to 12 of the YCJA provide for measures that police officers and Crown prosecutors may take instead of instituting legal proceedings. For all offences, they must first determine whether an extrajudicial measure will be sufficient to make the young person accountable and to ensure the long-term protection of the public. Whenever a young person has committed a non-violent offence and has not previously been convicted of an offence or had previously committed an offence for which an extrajudicial measure was used, the YCJA provides that police or the Crown should use extrajudicial measures, except in exceptional cases.53

Police or Crown prosecutors wishing to use the available extrajudicial measures must, in all cases, have reasonable grounds to believe that the young person has committed an offence. They have full discretion in deciding which extrajudicial measure they deem to be appropriate in each case.54 They may thus:

  • take no measures (police);
  • issue the young person a caution (police);
  • issue the young person a formal warning (police and Crown);
  • refer the young person to a program or agency in the community that may help him or her to stop offending (police); or
  • refer the young person to a program of extrajudicial sanctions (police and Crown).

Currently, a police department conducting an investigation of a young person may establish a file that includes, among other things, measures taken with the young person, as well as police notes, victim statements, fingerprints and photographs.55 Clause 190 of the bill requires the police force to keep a record of any extrajudicial measures taken to deal with the young person. If that person is convicted of the offence, the police force will then be required to forward the file to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police for the purpose of keeping criminal history files or records of the offenders.56

9.2.5 Custodial Sentences Specific to Young Persons (Committal to Custody) (Clause 173)

For all offences except murder, a court sentencing a young offender under the YCJA57 must first consider the many options that do not involve custody.58 Section 42 of the Act sets out a wide range of sentences such as a formal reprimand from the judge, community service, restitution, compensation, or placement in an intensive program of support and supervision.

The YCJA seeks to limit custody to cases of young offenders who are violent or who otherwise present a danger to the public. In sentencing a young person under section 39(1) of the YCJA, a court can currently choose incarceration only in the following four cases:

  • the young person has committed a violent offence;59
  • the young person has failed to comply with two or more non-custodial sentences;
  • the case is an exceptional one, where the aggravating circumstances warrant a custodial sentence;
  • the young person has committed an indictable offence for which an adult would be liable to imprisonment for a term of more than two years and has several findings of guilt under the YCJA or YOA.

Clause 173 of the bill amends section 39(1) of the YCJA to add a fifth case in which a custodial sentence may be imposed:

  • the young person has committed an indictable offence for which an adult would be liable to imprisonment for a term of more than two years and has had a number of extrajudicial sanctions under the YCJA or the YOA.60

Extrajudicial sanctions differ from other types of extrajudicial measures – such as cautions, warnings and referrals by police officers – in that the young person must formally acknowledge responsibility for the offence.61 Under the current provisions of the YCJA, unlike failure to comply with the other types of judicial measures, failure to comply with an extrajudicial sanction may result in judicial proceedings, and the information that a young person has been subject to an extrajudicial sanction may be adduced in evidence in court to establish that person’s criminal conduct.62 However, an admission of guilt by a young person in order to receive an extrajudicial sanction is never admissible in evidence.63

The YCJA does not currently define what constitutes a “violent offence.” However, as we have already mentioned, the Supreme Court of Canada defined it in 2005 as “an offence in the commission of which a young person causes, attempts to cause or threatens to cause bodily harm.” 64 However, this definition excluded offences during which bodily harm is only reasonably foreseeable.65 Bill C-10 expands this definition by adding reckless behaviour that endangers the safety of the public. More specifically, clause 167(3) of the bill defines “violent offence” variously as:

  • an offence causing bodily harm;
  • an attempt or a threat to cause bodily harm; and
  • an offence that endangers the life or safety of another person by creating a substantial likelihood of causing bodily harm.66

Consequently, the bill also increases the opportunity for the court to impose a custodial sentence on a young person convicted of this kind of reckless offence.67 This is consistent with Recommendation 21 of the Nunn Commission, which suggested including in the definition of “violent offence” behaviour that is likely to endanger the life or safety of another person.

9.2.6 Application of Adult Sentences to Young Persons (Clauses 176 and 183)

The YCJA precluded the possibility of referring young persons to adult courts. Since 2003, all proceedings involving young persons have been conducted in youth court, which may currently impose a sentence applicable to adults solely in the following cases:

  • where a young person (aged 14 or older at the time of the offence) is found guilty of an offence for which an adult would be liable to imprisonment for a term of more than two years;68
  • where a young person (at least 14 years of age at the time of the offence, but the provinces may increase the age limit to 15 or 16)69 is found guilty of murder, attempted murder, manslaughter, aggravated sexual assault or the third in a series of serious offences involving violence, there is a presumption that a conviction will bring with it an adult sentence, but the presumption may be rebutted if the court is persuaded that the length of a youth sentence would be sufficient to hold the young person accountable.70

The courts have addressed this presumption, and in 2008, the Supreme Court of Canada71 rendered a decision in R. v. D.B. similar to those of the appellate courts of Quebec72 and Ontario,73 finding that requiring young people to challenge the presumption that an adult sentence applies, rather than having the Crown attempt to prove that an adult sentence is justified, violates section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Bill C-10 repeals this presumption.74 As a result, a youth court may impose an adult sentence solely in the following case: where a young person (aged 14 or older at the time of the offence) is found guilty of an offence for which an adult would be liable to imprisonment for a term of more than two years.

In this case, then, under clause 176 of the bill,75 the Crown prosecutor may ask a youth court to impose an adult sentence, and where the young person was at least 14 years of age at the time of the offence (although the provinces may increase the limit to 15 or 16) and the offence is a “serious violent offence,” the Crown prosecutor will be required to determine whether an application to impose an adult sentence should be filed; should the prosecutor decide not to file such an application, he or she will be required to inform the court of that fact.

According to clause 167(2) of the bill, a “serious violent offence” means murder, attempted murder, manslaughter or aggravated sexual assault. These are essentially designated offences which currently give rise to the presumption that the offender should be subject to an adult sentence.

According to the amendments proposed in Bill C-10, the onus of proof would lie with the Crown prosecutor who files an application to impose an adult sentence on a young person. To have an adult sentence imposed, the prosecutor will have to convince the youth court that:

  • the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness or culpability of the young person is rebutted; and
  • a youth sentence would not be of sufficient length to hold the young person accountable for his or her offending behaviour (clause 183 of the bill).

The amendment in Bill C-4 explicitly stated that the court must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that both of these criteria were met to impose an adult sentence. However, Bill C-10 does not state which standard of proof is to be used, leaving some uncertainty as to what standard the court is to apply in such circumstances.

Under the current rules of the YCJA, in its decision to impose an adult sentence, a youth court must consider the seriousness and circumstances of the offence, the age, maturity, character, background and previous record of the young person and any other factors it deems relevant.76

9.2.7 Place of Detention (Clause 186)

Currently the youth court decides, after a hearing, on the appropriate place of detention. Section 76(2) of the YCJA provides for a presumption based on the age of the young person:

  • If the young person is under the age of 18 years at the time that he or she is sentenced, the court shall order that he or she be placed in a youth custody facility.
  • If the young person is 18 years or older at the time that he or she is sentenced, the court shall order that he or she serve the sentence in a provincial correctional facility for adults or, if the sentence is two years or more, in a federal penitentiary for adults.77

However, the court may order that a young person under the age of 18 will serve his or her sentence in a correctional facility for adults if the Crown prosecutor proves, for example, that the young person is preventing or impeding the progress of other young persons confined at a place of detention and presents a threat to their safety.78

Clause 186 of the bill replaces section 76(2) of the YCJA in order to remove the possibility that a young person under the age of 18 might serve his or her sentence at an adult correctional facility. The bill thus provides that young persons under the age of 18 will, in all cases, serve their sentences at a youth custody facility.

9.2.8 Publication of the Names of Young Persons (Clauses 185 and 189)

Since the JDA of 1908, the Canadian youth justice system has operated on the principle that publishing the identity of a young person would adversely affect his or her reintegration into society, would be prejudicial to him or her and, therefore, would compromise long-term public safety. The privacy principle is clearly stated in section 3(1)(b)(iii) of the YCJA.79 The general rule therefore prohibits the publication of information revealing the identity of a young person.80 However, the YCJA provides for certain exceptions to the ban on publication, in particular:

  • where the young person has received an adult sentence, the information on the identity of that young person is automatically published;81 and
  • where an application has been filed for a young person to be subject to an adult sentence for certain offences (murder, attempted murder, manslaughter, aggravated sexual assault or a third serious violent offence) and the court has dismissed that application and instead imposed a young offender sentence, there is a presumption that information on the young offender’s identity will be published.82

In the latter case, the young person may rebut the presumption by satisfying the youth court that there are grounds to ban publication. The court must then consider the public interest and the importance of the young person’s rehabilitation.83

The Supreme Court of Canada84 and the Quebec Court of Appeal85 have held that this presumption violates section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.Clauses 185 and 189 of the bill therefore replace it with the possibility of publishing information on the identity of a young person where the court has dismissed an application that was filed to impose an adult sentence on a young person and has instead imposed a young offender sentence for a “violent offence” within the meaning of clause 167(3) of the bill.

For publication to be permitted in that case, the Crown prosecutor must satisfy the youth court that there is a substantial likelihood the young person may commit another “violent offence” and that it is necessary to lift the ban in order to protect the public from that risk. The youth court must then consider the basic principles stated in sections 3 and 38 of the YCJA.

Contrary to the current presumption, with regard to which the young person carries the onus of proof justifying non-publication, the bill provides that the burden is on the Crown prosecutor to convince the court to authorize publication. However, the new definition of “violent offence” includes many more types of criminal behaviour than the offences giving rise to the current publication presumption (i.e., murder, attempted murder, manslaughter, aggravated sexual assault or a third serious violent offence).


Notes

*  Notice: For clarity of exposition, the legislative proposals set out in the bill described in this Legislative Summary are stated as if they had already been adopted or were in force. It is important to note, however, that bills may be amended during their consideration by the House of Commons and Senate, and have no force or effect unless and until they are passed by both houses of Parliament, receive Royal Assent, and come into force. [ Return to text ]

  1. Sections of this part of this legislative summary are drawn from the publication by Lyne Casavant, Robin Mackay and Dominique Valiquet, Youth Justice Legislation in Canada pdf (180 kB, 22 pages), Publication no. 08-23E, Parliamentary Information and Research Service, Library of Parliament, Ottawa, November 2008. [ Return to text ]
  2. Youth Criminal Justice Act, S.C. 2002, c. 1. [ Return to text ]
  3. Under the YCJA, “young person” means a person 12 to 17 years old who is suspected of having committed an offence created by federal Act or regulation. [ Return to text ]
  4. Bill C-25: An Act to amend the Youth Criminal Justice Act, 2nd Session, 39th Parliament. [ Return to text ]
  5. Shannon Brennan and Mia Dauvergne, “Police-reported crime statistics in Canada, 2010,” pdf (817 kB, 43 pages) Juristat, Statistics Canada catalogue no. 85-002-X, 21 July 2011, p. 20. It is important to emphasize that the violent crime rate now includes a number of offences that were not previously considered, and that the related data collated by Statistics Canada have been comparable only since 1998. The “violent crime” offence category has been revised to include a number of offences which were previously considered to be “Other Criminal Code” offences. Those offences include criminal harassment, sexual offences involving children, forcible confinement or kidnapping, extortion, uttering threats and threatening or harassing phone calls. [ Return to text ]
  6. Brennan and Dauvergne (2011). The CSI allows Statistics Canada to track changes in the severity of police-reported crime from year to year. This tool, developed at the request of community police, makes it possible to determine whether crimes brought to the attention of police are more or less serious than before, and whether police-reported crime in a given city is more or less serious than in Canada overall. In addition, since the time spent on police investigations depends in part on the seriousness of the offences, the CSI also allows police forces to show that, even though the volume of crimes reported in one city might be lower than the volume in another, the police resources needed in the former may be higher in light of the severity of the crimes reported and the ensuing complexity of the investigations. Additional information on the CSI is available at Statistics Canada, Measuring Crime in Canada: Introducing the Crime Severity Index and Improvements to the Uniform Crime Reporting Survey, Statistics Canada catalogue no. 85-004-X, 21 April 2009. [ Return to text ]
  7. The Honourable Rob Nicholson, Speech in the House of Commons, Debates, 19 March 2010. [ Return to text ]
  8. On 29 June 2005, Nova Scotia commissioned this public inquiry and named the Honourable D. Merlin Nunn commissioner for that purpose. [ Return to text ]
  9. D. Merlin Nunn, Spiralling Out of Control: Lessons Learned from a Boy in Trouble – Report of the Nunn Commission of Inquiry pdf (2.6 Mb, 378 pages), December 2006 [Nunn Commission Report]. [ Return to text ]
  10. Ibid., p. 238. [ Return to text ]
  11. Ibid. [ Return to text ]
  12. Ibid., p. 230. [ Return to text ]
  13. Ibid., pp. 237–248. [ Return to text ]
  14. Juvenile Delinquents Act, S.C. 1908, c. 40, repealed. [ Return to text ]
  15. Department of Justice, The Evolution of Juvenile Justice in Canada pdf (293 kB, 38 pages), International Cooperation Group, 2004. [ Return to text ]
  16. Ibid. [ Return to text ]
  17. Department of Justice, Committee on Juvenile Delinquency, Juvenile Delinquency in Canada, Queen’s Printer, Ottawa, 1965. [ Return to text ]
  18. Young Offenders Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. Y-1, repealed. [ Return to text ]
  19. The YOA was adopted in 1982, but did not come into force until 1984, as a way of addressing the concern to provide a sufficient transition between the two regimes. [ Return to text ]
  20. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-45. [ Return to text ]
  21. The age of criminal majority under the JDA was set at 16. The provinces, however, could ask that it be raised to 17 or 18. As a result, Quebec and Manitoba set the age of criminal majority at 18, whereas Newfoundland and British Columbia set it at 17. [ Return to text ]
  22. The 1992 amendments increased maximum terms for murder to five years. Other amendments, made in 1995, raised terms to 10 years for first-degree murder and to seven years for second-degree murder. [ Return to text ]
  23. The YCJA incorporates the alternative measures provided for in the JDA and adds new ones under the heading of extrajudicial measures. [ Return to text ]
  24. YCJA, ss. 3, 5 and 38. [ Return to text ]
  25. YCJA, s. 38(2). [ Return to text ]
  26. For detailed information on the impact of the YCJA on the youth justice system, see Nicholas Bala, Peter L. Carrington and Julian V. Roberts, “Evaluating the Youth Criminal Justice Act after Five Years: A Qualified Success,” Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Vol. 51, No. 2, April 2009. [ Return to text ]
  27. See Department of Justice, “Principal Charge in Majority of Cases in Youth Court (Canada, 1998–99),” YCJA Explained.Return to text ]
  28. It also provides that these measures are enforced by police (responsible for cautions and referrals) and by the Crown (responsible for warnings); Department of Justice, A Youth Strategy for the Renewal of Youth Justice, 1999. [ Return to text ]
  29. Brennan and Dauvergne (2011), p. 18. [ Return to text ]
  30. Complete data are available in Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Youth Court Statistics, 2006–2007, Statistics Canada catalogue no. 85-002-XIE, Vol. 28, No. 4, May 2008. [ Return to text ]
  31. Department of Justice, “Youth Sentencing,” YCJA Explained, May 2002. [ Return to text ]
  32. Rebecca Kong, “Youth custody and community services in Canada, 2007–2008,” Juristat, Statistics Canada catalogue no. 85-002-SX, Vol. 29, No. 2, May 2009, p. 7. [ Return to text ]
  33. Statistics Canada, “Adult and youth correctional services: Key indicators,” The Daily, 8 December 2009. [ Return to text ]
  34. Nunn Commission Report, Recommendation 20. [ Return to text ]
  35. See YCJA, ss. 3(1)(a) and 38(1). [ Return to text ]
  36. See R. v. D.B., [2008] 2 S.C.R. 3, paras. 41 and 45. [ Return to text ]
  37. YCJA, s. 28. [ Return to text ]
  38. For a detailed analysis of the conditional release system, see Nicholas Bala and Sanjeev Anand, Youth Criminal Justice Law, 2nd ed., Irwin Law, Toronto, 2009, p. 293 and following. [ Return to text ]
  39. The reverse onus provisions in section 515(6) of the Criminal Code do not apply where the presumption referred to in section 29(2) of the YCJA applies (see Department of Justice, “Pre-trial Detention,” YCJA Explained.) [ Return to text ]
  40. Noting the absence of a legal definition, the Supreme Court of Canada defined “violent offence” as “an offence in the commission of which a young person causes, attempts to cause or threatens to cause bodily harm.” However, that definition excluded offences strictly against property (R. v. C.D.; R. v. C.D.K., [2005] 3 S.C.R. 668, paras. 17, 51 and 52). [ Return to text ]
  41. Compare para. 515(10)(a) of the Criminal Code. [ Return to text ]
  42. Note that, in these provisions, while the English version of the bill requires a reduction “to a level below substantial,” the French only requires a reduction in the probablility that the adolescent will not appear in court. [ Return to text ]
  43. Common assault (Criminal Code, s. 265) and sexual assault (Criminal Code, s. 271) involve a broad range of behaviours. [ Return to text ]
  44. See note 41. [ Return to text ]
  45. YCJA, s. 38(3)(d). [ Return to text ]
  46. See on this point R. v. B. (T.), (2006) 206 C.C.C. (3d) 405 (C.A. Ont.). [ Return to text ]
  47. YCJA, s. 38(1). [ Return to text ]
  48. Criminal Code, ss. 718(a) and (b).Return to text ]
  49. [2006] 1 S.C.R. 941, para. 4. [ Return to text ]
  50. With less importance, however, than in the case of adult offenders (R. v. M. (J.J.), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 421, 434). [ Return to text ]
  51. R. v. B.W.P.; R. v. B.V.N., paras. 4 and 21. [ Return to text ]
  52. As is currently the case for the sentencing of adults (Criminal Code, s. 718.1). [ Return to text ]
  53. YCJA, ss. 4(c) and (d). [ Return to text ]
  54. Citizens committees (called youth justice committees) or advisory groups may make recommendations on extrajudicial measures (YCJA, ss. 18 and 19). [ Return to text ]
  55. YCJA, s. 115(1). See Pierre Hamel, Loi sur le système de justice pénale pour les adolescents, Éditions Yvon Blais, Cowansville, 2009, p. 444. [ Return to text ]
  56. YCJA, ss. 115(2) and (3). [ Return to text ]
  57. Murder is the only offence for which the Act provides for mandatory custody (YCJA, s. 42). [ Return to text ]
  58. YCJA, s. 39(2). [ Return to text ]
  59. See note 41. [ Return to text ]
  60. The extrajudicial sanctions set out in the YCJA are the equivalent of alternative measures in the YOA. [ Return to text ]
  61. YCJA, s. 10(1)(e). [ Return to text ]
  62. YCJA, ss. 9, 10 and 40(2)(d)(iv). See also Hamel (2009), pp. 35–45. [ Return to text ]
  63. YCJA, s. 10(4). [ Return to text ]
  64. R. v. C.D.; R. v. C.D.K., [2005] 3 S.C.R. 668, para. 17. [ Return to text ]
  65. Ibid., paras. 76 and 77. In the Court’s view, the YCJA should be designed in part as follows:
    … to reduce over-reliance on custody for young offenders, a narrow interpretation of the term “violent offence,” which acts as a gateway to custody, is to be preferred. However, a definition of “violent offence” that includes offences where bodily harm is merely reasonably foreseeable is quite broad, since most Criminal Code offences may, at some point, lead to harm. [ Return to text ]
  66. Section 2 of the Criminal Code defines “bodily harm” as “any hurt or injury that interferes with the person’s health or comfort and is more than just brief or minor.” [ Return to text ]
  67. On recklessness, see R. v. Hamilton, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 432, paras. 27 and 28. [ Return to text ]
  68. YCJA, s. 62. [ Return to text ]
  69. YCJA, s. 61. Quebec set the age of presumption at 16 in March 2003 (Order 476-2003). [ Return to text ]
  70. YCJA, ss. 62, 63 and 72. [ Return to text ]
  71. [2008] 2 S.C.R. 3. [ Return to text ]
  72. Québec (Ministre de la Justice) c. Canada (Ministre de la Justice), [2003] R.J.Q. 1118 (Renvoi relatif au projet de loi C-7 sur le système de justice pénale pour les adolescents). [ Return to text ]
  73. R. v. B.(D.), (2006), 206 C.C.C. (3d) 289. [ Return to text ]
  74. See, among others, clause 175 of the bill. [ Return to text ]
  75. This clause also applies to an offence committed before the coming into force of the bill where no proceedings have been commenced at that time (see clause 195 of the bill). [ Return to text ]
  76. YCJA, s. 72(1). [ Return to text ]
  77. Section 76(9) of the YCJA establishes the principle that the young person may not remain in a youth custody facility after the age of 20. [ Return to text ]
  78. Hamel (2009), p. 297. [ Return to text ]
  79. See also the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. R.C., [2005] 3 S.C.R. 99. [ Return to text ]
  80. YCJA, s. 110(1). [ Return to text ]
  81. YCJA, s. 110(2)(a). See R. v. D.B., [2008] 2 S.C.R. 3, para. 29. [ Return to text ]
  82. YCJA, ss. 75 and 110(2)(b). [ Return to text ]
  83. YCJA, s. 75(3). [ Return to text ]
  84. R. v. D.B., [2008] 2 S.C.R. 3, para. 87:
    Losing the protection of a publication ban renders the sentence more severe. The onus should therefore be, as with the imposition of an adult sentence, on the Crown to justify the enhanced severity, rather than on the youth to justify retaining the protection to which he or she is otherwise presumed to be entitled. [ Return to text ]
  85. Québec (Ministre de la Justice) c. Canada (Ministre de la Justice) (2003). [ Return to text ]

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