To be published in a special issue of the periodical Clés on local public policies (April 2001) 

 The uncertainty of penal policy.

The example of drug charges [1].

 Michel Kokoreff
Université Lille 1. Clersé

 How appropriate is the term "local penal policies"? This may seem a contradictory expression, given that the connection between penal justice and the State has been determined historically since the end of the XVIII century (Vernier, 1998).

As the Welfare State withdraws and public policies are redeployed to the various more local levels, the meaning of this expression becomes clearer, however.  According to Faugeron (Faugeron, 1992), the trend toward judiciary responses that are not only diversified (ranging from alternative solutions to total imprisonment, victim assistance, penal mediation and so forth) but also decentralized and closer to the structure of local life, is "an attempt to reverse history after centuries of centralization".  Today, the magistrates de parquet (local magistrates) occupy a central position in local policies.  One example of this: is their role in the implementation of local security contracts.  Moreover, as a number of studies have shown, there is a strong disparity between practices from one jurisdiction to another, which raises the question of the consistency of response -- this is viewed as more significant by some legal experts than others. 

Are we to conclude that the only penal policy remaining is local policy?   This is a question worth addressing. The disparity between practices does not necessarily imply that there are local policies.  If by "policy" we mean an action oriented by choices and priorities, it must be admitted that their clarity and implementation mechanisms are not self-evident[2]. According to Justice D. Salas (1998), "the values of the political order are forgotten in the every day administration of public security ".  From the methodological point of view, it is important to differentiate the discourse of effective practices.  Such elements as the methods of prosecution and sentencing, the nature of sentences, and their range, even within a given jurisdiction, do not involved involve the same stakeholders: the magistrats de parquet (prosecuting magistrates) the magistrats-instructeurs (examining magistrates), the presidents de chambre, the juges d'application des peine(sitting magistrates) and so forth.  In addition to the relative opacity of these practices--when data is available, it is not always reliable--there is the difficulty of differentiating between the bureaucratic application of the law, adaptation to local contingencies, and the strategies of those involved. 

Consequently, our initial question could be subdivided as follows : 1. can we read between the lines of these practices, penal policies or does the action observable in these jurisdictions translate by default into institutional logics, (police, customs, penal)? 2. what about the truly local dimension of the activity of the tribunaux de grande instance (TGI) (the courts for major offences) ? 3. what effects does this activity have on the national level, in the design and implementation of a public policy of which the state is the major stakeholder?

The penal processing of drug legislation offences (DLOs) serves as an example by which to analyze these various processes. On the one hand, the forbidden nature of anything to do with drugs has been reduced (Ehrenberg, 1988); the difference between legal and illegal drugs has also become blurred, [3], along with the difference between what is normal and what is pathological.  A number of studies have focussed on the absence of an overall anti-drug policy (Ehrenberg, 1998), the failure of the penal anti-drug policy, and the arbitrary nature of application of the law.  On the other hand, there are many arguments in favour of the penal reaction to the use of and trafficking in illegal drugs; it is legitimized as the preferred solution for combating delinquency and reassuring the public.  In this context, a local approach to the institutional phase of the penal process makes it possible to detect networks (Aubusson de Cavarlay, 1995 and 1997) and the effective practices of magistrates, the new implementation mechanisms and the extent to which they are like or unlike the old ones.

This article, which is based on the outcome of several qualitative surveys in the courts of Lille and [4], Nanterre, addresses the uncertainties of penal policies and those relating to illegal drugs.  It will provide an overview of "penal logic", that is the way in which a system of actions is organized in the various professions (magistrates, police forces etc.) - although not making these its main focus.  After touching briefly on the legal bases of public action in this area, we will focus attention on the disparity of practices on various levels, the obstacles faced by the desire for consistency in the local approach, and then on the tensions between the various "local" and "global" levels, which attest to the contradictions between the various policies on drugs (de facto decriminalization coupled with legal criminalization, territorialization and globalization).

 1. From the legislative framework to the disparity in practices

The public policies governing the French campaign against illegal drug use and trafficking are based on legislation that was enacted on December 31, 1970.  This was passed unanimously, within a context characterized by, on the one hand, a movement of social and cultural contestation and on the other by a typical phenomenon of moral panic.  There is, in fact, a considerable deviation between the "objective" scope of the phenomenon and the extent t of political and media reaction.[5]. Is it necessary to have a policy that disqualifies an already militant marginal youth by criminalizing one of its supposed practices (Zafiropoulos, Pinell, 1982)? The events of May 1968 predisposed the powers that be to implement a "vast operation of re-moralization" which involved enacting a whole series of repressive laws, such as the anti-vandalism legislation of 1970 (Bergeron, 1999, 25). The epidemic-model is what underlies positions that refer to escalation and the contagious nature of the phenomenon.

The law as compromise 

As we know, this law is the outcome of a compromise, one that was both normative (De Munck, 1996) and political (Bernat de Célis, 1992), between two conceptions of addiction.  The drug addict was either a criminal or a sick person.  On the one hand, there is a repressive aspect, characterized by penalizing drug use -- including use in private, unlike the previous legislation, which dated back to 1916 (Retaillaud-Bajac, 1997) -, prosecution differing from the usual approach--particularly in connection with the extension of the duration of allowed policy custody to 92 hours-- severe sanctions for traffickers, reinforced by the new penal code, introduced in 1994, which made drug trafficking by organized crime punishable by a life sentence[6]. On the other hand there is the health aspect, which is aimed at taking charge of "addicts".  At the urging of certain psychiatrists, under the law they have the possibility of voluntary anonymous and free treatment[7]. This possibility was only concretized by the gradual creation of treatment centres, starting with the Marmottan centre, opened in July 1971 by C. Olievenstein.

One good illustration of this compromise and the ambiguities it implies is this hitherto unheard of measure to encourage users to seek treatment: therapeutic injection programs.  This approach is ordered by the procureur de la République, (the state prosecutor) and when effective leads to "classement sans suite" (closure of the case) when effective; when not, it leads to legal proceedings, particularly if there is a repeat offence.  This type of measure stirred up strong negative reactions among the drug addiction treatment community; how could a person be forced to seek treatment?  It was, in fact, only really effective from the mid-80's onward.  Its application resulted in an imbalance--a constantly criticized one--between the penal approach and the health-centred approach[8].  The only evidence needed of this is a comparison of the number of charges for illegal drug use (over 70,000 in 1998 of a total of 90,000) with the number of treatment orders issued (a little over 8,000) and the number that were effective (close to 4,000) (Simmat-Durand, 1999).

The 1970 legislation brought with it a number of directives to regulate its application[9], the 1970 statute remains the legal basis for public action, whereas narcotics have become a major problem and the ideological context (the end of the counterculture), the social context (massive unemployment and precarious employment) and the health context (AIDS epidemic) of the 1980's and 1990's have led to considerable changes to the way this phenomenon is looked at and the approaches taken by law enforcement agencies and the courts. 

Differences in approach

The legislation, founded as it is on the principle of universality, is supposed to be applied to everyone everywhere in the same way, whether in Marseille, Paris, Brest, Strasbourg or Lille.  When interviewed, the magistrates referred readily to this same principle in defining the framework of their activity: applying the law, respecting procedures, working to seek the truth.  After that, they placed a lesser emphasis on the local specificities of their actions and the jurisdiction in which they worked.  Yet it has been a known fact for more than ten years now that there are differences in application, depending on which court is involved[10]. A study of the records from the early 1980's proposed classifying courts according to how they processed such cases: those who used "classification sans suite" for users, those who made heavy use of the charge of the "trafficking" and those using direct procedures, regardless of the nature of the charge.  It is also possible to examine court sentencing practices according to a number of different classifications, depending on whether incarceration or other sentences are used (Pérez-Diaz, 1989).

More recently, there has been a report on penal policy prepared by the Ministry of Justice which pointed out the disparities in the amounts that determine whether or not a person will be charged.  In Bastia, for example, the level is 50 grams, whereas it is 20 grams in Ajaccio. In  Lyon, prosecutions for use and resale of the so-called hard drugs start at 20 grams.  In courts in border areas, such as Montbelliard or Vesoul, the limit is 5 grams, including cannabis [11]. On the other hand, in Lille, the level of tolerance has--under pressure from the community--been raised considerably.  For example, one magistrate gave the explanation that, while in the late 1980s he could institute proceedings against two young prostitutes apprehended on the train from Holland with four grams of heroin, at the present time no one could imagine such a case in Lille being handled the same way, with referral to a prosecuting magistrate.  (Duprez, Kokoreff, 2000)         

There is no doubt that the diversity of penal policies is not limited to narcotics cases.  It is the same for others, such as hold-ups, traffic offences, alcohol-related offences, youth crime or assistance to victims.  It appears, however, that the penal management of drug offences is one of the areas in which there are obvious limitations to harmonization, and where the related ideology plays an important role.

How can this diversity be explained? The common explanation is the specificity of location situations.  Thus the repression of cannabis use is more pronounced in middle-sized cities, where there are fewer such charges than in the major metropolitan centres, the northern border cities and the areas heavily frequented by tourists, such as the Côté d’Azur or Aquitaine. In the Paris region (as in the north) a lesser emphasis on a penal approach is observable, but merely going from Hauts-de-Seine to a bordering département such as Val d’Oise finds a different approach, and users may be treated as dealers.  As a result, there are strong disparities depending on locality, between the respective weight assigned to offences, how they are prosecuted, and how the charges are handled. 

That said, this explanation is not always convincing, in that geography does not have a "mechanical effect".  This is readily seen in a comparison of border zones with departments that have a heavy urban density.  Other elements come into play: on the one hand, the trafficking pattern, the existence of a "community", the heavy presence of a parallel economy, and so on, and on the other the organization of repressive services, human resources (their numbers and their degree of specialization).  In addition to the context-related effects, there are the strategies used by the various magistrates.  Instead of limiting themselves to being the "spokesmen of the law" they have a degree of leeway in interpreting texts and circulars, one that is directly proportionate to the degree to which their conditions of application are clearly specified(Setbon, 1998).  "The lack of any consensus on how dangerous the products are and the choice of ways to handle cases leaves the door open to practices that could not be more opposite to one another"[12]. The differentiation -- one not included in the law--between the so-called "soft" and "hard" drugs shows in the jurisprudence in one place and is not applied in another.

Institutdépartementional logic behind the application of procedures

Based on a comparison between various jurisdictions (Nanterre, Lille, Bobigny), three dimensions can be focussed on to show the disparity between practices.

First of all, we can observe the variety in the various logics involved (police force, customs, medico-social.  I will give two illustrations of this.  One concerns the different police forces dealing with drug trafficking.  In Hauts-de-Seine as in other s in the Paris region there are three different services: the sécurité publique, the sûreté départementale and the service départemental de police judiciaire[13]. In theory, each is differentiated from the others by its mandate.  For example, the public safety forces, in addition to cases involving simple possession, which are the main thrust of its activity, have a mission which has been sometimes compare to the role of the SAMU, but for handling delinquency emergencies rather than medical ones; it handles the emergency without much of an investigative role, except for information that is accessible and usable in the short term.  As for the service départemental, its mission is to handle cases of medium significance as far as the number of people involved and the ramifications of the trafficking.  The police judiciaire, on the other hand, deals with heroine and cocaine cases, and major cannabis cases that exceed the département framework (trafficking outside the boundaries of one département, imports and so on).  Ideally, these services would co-operate, and would pass information on to the ‘right office’, but this is not always the case.  The effects of competition between these elements is observable, conflicts in the approach to be taken.  For example, between an approach that prefers to step up charges and seizures – sometimes prematurely—and an initiative aimed at going higher than the users and street dealers.  This has negative effects, because the presence of local patrols helps drive activities underground and can have negative effect on the work being done by the police judiciaire.

The other example concerns the significance of customs officials in this matter – particularly in the north.  Close to two-thirds of trafficking offences are in fact detected by Customs.  This requires a very complicated procedure because the offence that can be charged is not possession of drugs but importation of banned substances.  The terminology used is solely a customs offence ‘importation of contraband’ when the border has been crossed; otherwise, the charge is ‘irregular circulation of goods’.  The Customs officials at Lille play a particularly significant role, and one with considerable impact on the statistics of the correctional tribunals.  In fact, on top of the 20% of court cases in Lille that involve illegal drugs, there is another 90% plus of customs offence cases. This local particularity is not reflected in the statistics, which are compiled centrally. On the other hand, in the départements of Hauts-de-Seine and Seine-Saint-Denis, Customs plays a negligible role, one concentrated generally at the airports of the Paris region, Roissy and Orly.

Second, from the point of view of organization per se, certain jurisdictions have been moved by the high number of drug cases, to create specialized sections.  For instance, in Bobigny, the ‘narcotics squad’ which dealt solely with everything to do with drug trafficking and addiction (including the court ordered treatment component) has undergone a change.  The new organization, created in 1996, is called the Organized Crime Unit and its field of operations has been expanded to address those areas.  In Nanterre, the various sections of the court have been reorganized to include narcotics and youth offences.  This is, to our knowledge, the only one of its kind in France and was created in order to balance the workload of the magistrates; as a result, the authorities became aware of the disquieting number of youth involved in petty trafficking.  At the same time, the role of the financial crimes sector has been enhanced in order to improve the knowledge of the money laundering activities in which the drug trade is involved, within what the authorities term "a culture of money laundering". involved in the drug trade, what the authorities call a ‘culture of money laundering, about which little is generally known at present.  In Lille, for instance, there are no specialized sections, which may be explained by the fact that the demand is uneven and the unit is under-staffed compared to other jurisdictions.

Third, the way various procedures are used points to the diversity of practices in the courts.  Procedures have been created out of the imagination of the magistrates or shaped by the necessity for jurisdictions to adapt to the local context.  The changes involve the amount of drug for which charges are laid, the extent to which immediate court appearances are required (which used to be an exception and now has become commonplace), as well as the provision of the charges being laid by an officer of the customs police (the COPJ).  This procedure is applied to large numbers of drug offences but other offences as well – up to 70% of all charges in Lille, and over 50% at Nanterre. This indicates the non-specific nature of drug charges.  Another example involves the court-ordered treatment procedure.  Comparison of statistics for the jurisdictional areas of Bobigny, Nanterre and Lille indicates not only that this measure is being used more often, [14], but the proportion of users by substance [15] also varies.

The criminalization of drug cases also constitutes a particularly significant indicator. The use of this procedure , an extremely unwieldy one since it requires long and costly investigations and the meeting of a special court of assizes for several days, involving seven magistrates – varies considerably from one jurisdiction to another. In Nanterre for instance there have been three trials concerning organized  rime and cannabis importations that have been handled in this way,  The first was judged in 20000, the instruction on the second, which began 1996, is not yet done, and the third may end up being dismissed.  In Bobigny, about ten cases are under way on the criminal level, but some are converted to the correctional stream.  On the other hand, in Lille, no criminal cases have been initiated.

2. Penal policy or penal logic?

We can see that the disparity between practices is the result of a number of factors and occurs at various levels.  To what extent does this indicate the effect of local penal policies ? And what are its limitations ?

Generally speaking, ‘penal policy’ can be taken to mean the actions taken by the services at the parquet level submitted to the hierarchy of their authority, i.e. within the structure of the Ministry of Justice.  What actions are taken with respect to drugs ? What are their proportions of cases closed, court-ordered treatment, immediate court appearances, proceedings leading to investigation? What are the defined objectives (types of offence, types of clients, areas)? Where trafficking is involved, are major police actions launched where the major deal took place, or do the magistrats de parquet give precedence instead to the investigation services of the police judiciaire ?  At what level of sentencing does the parquet level get involved?

In the case of the TGI de Nanterre, which covers the entire département of Hauts-de-Seine, the parquet level is highly aware of the drug offence situation.  If the increase in such crimes is comparable there to that in other jurisdictions, with an increase in offences involving property (with or without violence) and with the large numbers of minors involved, the main increase is in drug trafficking, which constitutes the major problem with the increase in crime, on which the magistrates admit they are not having much impact.  Their region appears to be an area that is a source of both cannabis and heroin.  Over and above the cases heard at Nanterre, those in Versailles or some provincial cities reveal that the people arrested have come to acquire drugs for dealing in the 92 area.  Taking this as the criterion for cases heard in this jurisdiction, the share drugs occupy is an average of 7% of all its activities.

Another characteristic of penal action is the focus on social housing areas within a département where the social conditions are greatly different.  According to one magistrate, ‘inner city drug dealings are our daily bread’.  Although statistics are not available on the geographical distribution of drug cases, some estimate that close to 80 % are focussed in these neighbourhoods.  It is as if the repression of drug use and dealing constituted a strategy of protection of the public order in the inner cities.  On the other hand, the repression of organized trafficking has less public support and is also difficult.  Some magistrates feel that the new penal code has shortcomings, particularly the lack of an overall policy for this type of offence, and they criticize the inflationist logic that requires each service to record more seizures to the detriment of a focus on dismantling international networks, the spreading out of investigations over a number of different geographical areas, which limits repressive actions to the "wholesalers" or "semi-wholesalers" and hampers the operations of the bodies responsible for operational co-ordination[16].

The systems are not necessarily compatible.  Ensuring public order is not necessarily compatible with an approach of doing away with trafficking.  Focussing on the micro-local level (neighbourhoods, inner city areas) just moves the dealers elsewhere, and the département-wide dimension is neglected.  Thus, as one magistrate said, ‘we are supposed to be protecting public order with a policy dictated by the Ministry of the Interior, to show that we are cleaning up the inner cities. The police services find themselves required to put into practice the demands by mayors for the immediate clean up of the inner cities, for immediate results. If we clean up things in the 92 area that is of no interest to the mayors.  The préfet is more attuned to that, so we are faced with different degrees of awareness, so the procureurs do the best they can.’

Generally speaking, the predominance of cannabis is mentioned by all stakeholders; "That is where the real problem lies.  It’s everywhere.’ The police role is therefore a central one, and some magistrates willingly admit this.  The role of their level is, therefore, according to the magistrats de parquet, to "motivate the police", insure that cases are properly followed up on, constructing credibility, inaugurating dialogue, showing competency.  This means then that the decisions of the magistrates are also linked to the activities of the police services, which are essentially proactive as apposed to reactive—and therefore supply the courts with a continuing supply of cases.  This point may explain why cannabis charges remain at a high level, while the magistrate level generally does not continue cases of simple possession most of the time.

Interviews with the stakeholders supported this – a high awareness of drug offences, focussing on public housing, the central role of the police – while at the same time they are the ones setting the limits.  For example, one legal official explained: "A penal policy involves making choices.  But where drug trafficking is concerned, there are no choices.  We try to focus on certain operations, for instance in Layolle.  We told the SDPJ two or three month ago to focus on that community and try to accomplish something.  So we can direct police efforts on a given area, but it is not up to us to decide on the appropriateness of laying charges.  You see what I mean.  Trafficking takes place, we try to catch them at it, we make choices but they are more technical than otherwise.  Will it end with immediate court appearance, or will we stop the investigation right here.  Generally, the investigation stops by itself."

From these comments we can see the propensity of magistrates to neutralize the choices of the penal policy by focussing on operations or technical aspects.  The penal system is foremost its follow-up of procedures which seem not well suited to for the many cases that occur in the public housing areas, despite their having been selected as a priority.  This is what the legal expert F. Tulkens means when she writes; "Lacking any precise policy relating to drugs, we seen practices being put in place that are inspired by implicit policies or even policies by default."

We end up with the following situation as a result:: on the one hand, the arguments of the stakeholders and the institutional practices observed bring out a variety of logics and fit into concrete systems of action (Friedberg, 1997) which reinforce their complexity; yet, on the other hand, it cannot be ignored that they shape trends that go beyond the local level.

3. Tensions between the various local and wider levels 

This leads us to a last point: how does the "local" determine particular approaches relating to penal action?  A response to this presupposes that there are various local levels.

First and foremost, there is the parquet level and its public action.  This is where the decision is made to proceed or not to proceed with a case, and to set the sentence deemed appropriate.  Both it and the person sentenced can appeal tribunal decisions.  Then it becomes the responsibility of the court of appeal to rehear the case and harmonize decisions, because this is the level at which appeals from all jurisdictions are heard.  In other words, there is a sort of balance between the three parties involved: the action of the tribunal, oriented by an individualization of sentences (the individual is judged as an individual), the parquet" which can intervene in the decision that has been brought down, and the appeal court, which has a more contextual view of the decisions involving several départements. Various scenarios are possible. For instance, as soon as rulings by a chamber specializing in drugs are deemed "too lax", the parquet can systematically appeal.  In certain cases, this is not without effect, in that the proceedings that have led to the refusal to proceed may lead to a sentence in excess of one year.  This overview available to the appeal court gives magistrates an idea of the effectiveness of the outcome of decisions.

The local dimension of public action is then translated into interactions between institutional logic and the various local stakeholders.  In particular, we are thinking of the role of the local elected officials, one that has become very significant since the 1980s.  Although the campaign against drugs and drug addiction does not fall under the jurisdiction of the municipalities, the elected officials have acquired some capacity for involvement in public powers.  This is particularly the case with local trafficking and the spread of HIV among heroin addicts (Joubert et al. 1998 ; Kokoreff, 1997). These officials have the legitimacy not only of their mandate but also of their knowledge of their local areas.  In other words, as one prosecutor put it, "We are now obliged to respond to the cries of alarm coming from the mayors".  The fact that there are now local security contracts is a clear indication of this redefinition of the relationship between State and local officials.  Another illustration of this is the call for closer connections between those in the various préfets' offices responsible for the campaign against drugs and drug addiction.

It remains to be seen to what extent the local level is becoming the new centre of gravity for state interventions[17]. It can be seen that there is a combining of two logics: administrative action and contractual action.  One of these is vertical and the other decentralized (Salas, 1998).  This makes it possible to understand the redefinitions given in two circulars from Justice[18]. The first defines drug use as not just a criminal offence but also as an at-risk behaviour.  While accommodating to the existing legal framework, public health concerns are also introduced.  The recommendation is made to procureurs to not prosecute users apprehended near drop in centres or needle exchange sites.  The second circular addresses a reinforcement of actions against trafficking.  This involves on the one hand improvements to the co-ordination between public action and repressive services.  This involves a reaffirmation of the prerogative of the parquet in the initial orientation of preliminary investigations and that of the parquets généraux in the circulation of information, with an encouragement to try out "ad hoc conventions of repression" or inter-service co-operation, according to the local particularities.   As well, depriving traffickers of the proceeds of their criminal activity becomes an area of priority with the offence of "living on the avails of drugs"[19] which introduced for the first time a reversal of the burden of proof.

Is this part of a more general process? This thesis is staunchly defended by L. Wacquant(1999), who feels that we are seeing a bolstering of the penal State in parallel with a weakening of the economic state and a withdrawal of the social State.  He focuses on the creation in the United States of what he terms a "criminal policy for the poor", which affects in particular "the pauperized elements of the new post-Ford proletariat" as well as strategies of the criminalization of ethnic minorities.  The question is whether such a model is exportable to Europe (from zero tolerance to the tendency to incarcerate).

In Europe, there is less penalization of use than in the United States although detention may be seen as a roundabout way of penalizing it.  In France in particular there is a relative balance between the penal and the social approaches to poverty..  The number of charges for possession or trafficking rose from 4,000 in 1984 to close to 24,000 in 1994, and the length of sentences more than doubled over that same period (from 9 months to 20 months).  What is more, the percentage of foreigners in the prison population rose from 18 % in 1975 to 29 % in 1995, although of course this does not take into account the heavy representation among that number of nationals perceived and classified as foreigners, such as the children of immigrants.  These figures suggest that the penal approach is not just an instrument of control over the disadvantaged segments of society, but also one over foreigners whose status is irregular (or even regular) and their French-born children

Conclusion 

It would seem that penal action is not exempt from the process of territorialization of public policies.  The diversity of penal policies that is evident when a number of different jurisdictions are compared in the way they handle heavy loads of drug use and drug trafficking cases is remarkable.  Rather then simply adapting to local necessities, this diversity is also evidence of the degree of latitude the stakeholders in the penal system have in relation to the police services.  This is evidence of the convictions of the procureurs and their degree of knowledge about the realities of addiction.  It also relates to the way they perceive not only the facts but also the social and geographical characteristics of the populations characterized as criminal.

Yet it is hard to prove that penal policies are merely local.  The fact that they are hard to trace, and that it is hard to construct any cohesive action, except case by case, and ignoring institutional logic, attests to the limits encountered.  What is more, trends are showing up, from an examination of the various levels involved, perhaps general trends.  These include: a crackdown on use and users of cannabis, which has increased in recent years and is noteworthy, coupled with a significant drop in actions relating to heroin users.  Another trend is the development of "fast-track procedures" characterized by the increase in the "real-time processing" of cases.[20].  Justice is being expected to act like a rapid and efficient administration, in short an up-to-date one, and it has long been known that this is not without its negative effects (Davidovitch, Boudon, 1964). A third trend concerns the attempts at harmonization and co-operation at the European community level, in order to be able to break the trafficking rings and those involved in drug money laundering.

Nevertheless, the disparity in practices over the territory poses a dual problem of equity and efficiency.  At a time when certain countries, such as Belgium, are following Holland's lead in decriminalizing cannabis use[21] and those charged with enforcing the law are themselves going around it, it would seem more desirable than ever to open up a political, rational public debate-- not a pious theological one.  It is not just a question of changing (or not changing) the law, but of remedying the social inequalities which result from these disparities. 

Bibliography

AUBUSSON de CAVARLAY B., 1997.  L’usage de stupéfiants dans les filières pénales, Psychotropes, décembre 1997, vol 3, n°4

BERGERON H., 1999. L’Etat et la toxicomanie, Paris, PUF.

BERNAT de CELIS J., 1992. Fallait-il créer un délit d’usage illicite de stupéfiants ? Une étude de sociologie législative, Déviance et contrôle social, Cesdip, 54.

CHEVALIER G., 1996. Volontarisme et rationalité d’Etat. Revue Française de sociologie, XXXVII, 209-235.

CESONI M.-L. 2000. L’incrimination de l’usage de stupéfiants dans sept législations européennes, Documents du GDR Psychotropes, politiques et société, n° 4.

COPPEL A. 1998. Postcriptum, in CASTEL R., Les sorties de la toxicomanie, Editions Universitaires de Fribourg.

DAVIDOVITCH  A., BOUDON R., 1964. Les mécanismes sociaux des abandons de pôursuites : analyse expérimentale par simulation, L’année sociologique, 111-144.

De MUNCK J. 1996. La consommation de drogues dans le conflit de normes, Communications, n°62.

DUPREZ D., KOKOREFF M., 2000. Les mondes de la drogue. Paris, Odile Jacob Editions.

DUPREZ D., KOKOREFF M., WEINBERGER M., 2000. Carrières, territoires et filières pénales. Pour une sociologie comparée des trafics de drogues (Hauts-de-Seine, Nord, Seine-Saint-Denis), Paris, OFDT..

EHRENBERG A., 1995, L’individu incertain, Paris, Calmann Lévy.

EHRENBERG A., 1996.  Comment vivre avec les drogues ? Communications,  n° 62.

FAUGERON C., 1992. Les politiques pénales, Paris, La Documentation française.

FRIEDBERG E., Le pouvoir et la règle, Paris, Le Seuil 1997.

GARAPON A., Justice et drogue. De la répression d’un acte à la protection d’une personne, Communications n° 62, 1996.

HENRION R., (président) 1995. Rapport de la commission de réflexion sur la drogue et la toxicomanie, La Documentation Française.

JOUBERT M., (ss la direction de). 1998. Villes et toxicomanies. Paris, Grass.

KOKOREFF M., 1997. De la défonce à l’économie informelle, Lille, Clersé-Ifresi.

PEREZ-DIAZ C., 1989. Les disparités des politiques pénales de répression de l’usage et du trafic de stupéfiants, Paris, Cesdip.

RETAILLAUD-BAJAC E., 1997. L’usager de drogues devant la loi pénale durant l’entre-deux guerres, Psychotropes, décembre, Vol 3, n°4.

SALAS D., 1998. Le tiers-pouvoir, Paris, Hachette, coll. Pluriel.

SETBON M., 1998. L’injonction thérapeutique, Paris, GAPP-CNRS.

SIMMAT-DURAND L., (ss. la direction de) 1998. L’usager de stupéfiants entre répression et soins : la mise en oeuvre de la loi de 1970, Paris, Cesdip.

SIMMAT-DURAND L., 1999. Les obligations de soins en France, in FAUGERON C., (ss la direction de). Les drogues en France, Genève, Georg Editeur.

TULKENS F., 1999. Logiques pénales et logiques médico-sociales, in FAUGERON C., (ss la direction de). Les drogues en France, Genève, Georg Editeur.

VERNIER D., 1998, La justice en France, Paris, La Découverte.

ZAFIROPOULOS M., PINELL P., 1982. Drogues, déclassement et stratégie de déclassement social, Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, n° 42.